The United States - Republic of Korea security relationship,

1953-1960: great power and small state by Hwang, I.S.
The United States - Republic of Korea Security Relationship, 
1953-1960: Great Power and Small State 
Submitted for the Degree of Ph. D. 
Department of History 
University College London 
by 
In Soo Hwang 
1 
Abstract 
This study investigates South Korea's security behaviour vis-a-vis the United 
States and that of the U. S. towards Korea. The significance of this study lies in its 
emphasis upon relations between South Korea and the United States during the 1953- 
1960 period from the perspective of the patron-client state relationship. 
This study analyses the issues and historical events in order to trace the 
development of each nation's strategy, leverages, and tactics towards the other. Each 
chapter is related to the U. S. security commitment policy to South Korea, and South 
Korea's response in the frame work of the big power and small state relationship. The 
Introduction explains the purpose and importance of the research and the analytical 
framework. Chapter 1 analyses U. S. -South Korean diplomatic seesawing and Korean 
President Rhee's bargaining position during the Korean armistice negotiations. Chapter 
2 traces the post-armistice period and the Korean Political Conference at Geneva during 
1953-1954. As the Korean Armistice Agreement was a temporary measure to secure a 
complete cessation of hostilities, the Geneva Conference of 1954, intended to establish 
a political settlement, was a significant issue in the post-armistice period. Chapter 3 
analyses U. S. security and military policy following the Korean War. The question of 
the proposed reduction of ROK forces and the redeployment of U. S. forces in Korea in 
connection with the `New Look' policy were troublesome issues between Seoul and 
Washington, over which the two governments exerted their bargaining power. Chapter 
4 deals with Rhee's conflicts with the U. S. concerning the normalisation of South 
Korea-Japan relations, U. S. economic policy towards Korea and its negative effects on 
Rhee's Government, and Rhee's undemocratic rule and dispute with the U. S. 
concerning Korean political affairs. Chapter 5, the conclusion of this study, summarises 
the research findings. 
As power and administration in South Korea were highly centralised under Rhee, 
it is important to ask to what extent did he, as the leader of the weaker state, manage 
and manipulate a bargaining position in Korea's relations with the United States. 
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In order to analyse U. S. -South Korean relations, three paradigms seem to be 
applicable: realism; interdependence; and the patron-client relationship in the form of a 
big power and a small state. 
Realism is one of the oldest theories in international relations and has been 
employed to analyse international politics and to establish foreign policy by most 
politicians and diplomats. It maintains that the struggle for power and security is the 
dominant logic in world politics. Nation-states, as rational and autonomous actors, seek 
to maximise their own interests as defined in terms of power and security. Raymond 
Aron and Hans J. Morgenthau seem to share the opinion that because of international 
anarchy, military capability is the decisive element for a power base. ' Kenneth Waltz 
argues that states can exercise some control over their propensity to use violence by 
endeavouring to maintain strategic equilibrium between the major powers; the balance 
of power is rational as long as there is no realistic alternative to the states system; and, 
moreover, to the extent that states comply with the principles of the balance of power 
they can enjoy a limited yet significant influence over the international-systemic forces 
around them. 2 They argue that asymmetrical dependence can be obvious in international 
politics. Unlike the idealist, the realist maintains that the alliance between states could 
be changed under the condition of national interests, and that the distribution of power 
in the international system is extremely unequal. In this context, a small group of states 
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 114. 
2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), pp. 
127-128. 
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stands out in international politics and, together with the Great Powers, are the main 
subjects in international politics for analysts of Realism. In this paradigm, realists 
criticise the domestic power struggles in a state attempting to adjust their conflicting 
interests. They believe that this adjustment process hinders and delays urgent measures 
to cope with the swift change of international situations, like wars. 
Interdependence theory is also applicable to the analysis of two countries' 
relations. Many of the important articles and books on interdependence have derived 
from dissatisfaction with the Realist assumptions. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye characterise international politics as complex interdependence. This emphasises 
multiple channels of contact between societies, an absence of hierarchy among issues 
and a minor role for the use of force. Interdependence means that states are mutually 
dependent on one another for things valued by their populations, such as peace, 
security, power, cultural goods, etc. Interdependence encompasses both conflictive and 
cooperative interactions amongst states. This relationship rests far more on mutually 
beneficial economic or security interchange with little apparent asymmetry in 
contributions. This theory includes the independent role that transnational and 
international organisations can play. But some scholars maintain different views. 
Kenneth Waltz argues that interdependence characterises much of the European state 
system before the First World War. By contrast, the current world displays more 
independence and dependence. He points out that large and economically well 
developed countries can more quickly move towards an autarkic condition. On the other 
hand, low economic capability leads to dependence upon another state of higher 
economic capability. 
In Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye argued that asymmetrical 
interdependence can be a source of power. They distinguish two kinds of 
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interdependence, sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. The 
former means "liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are 
altered to try to change the situation. " The latter can be defined "as an actor's liability to 
suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. " 3 In fact, 
interdependence could not be totally symmetrical and equally beneficial to each party. 
The relationship between developed countries is likely to be sensitive interdependence, 
while the relationship between developed countries and developing countries is one of 
vulnerable interdependence. The former is evident in U. S. relations with its NATO 
partners. The latter relationship is based on the positive gains for a developing country 
from participating in the capitalist world economic structure and from engaging itself in 
the reciprocity of the world economy. Some scholars reject this argument and stress that 
under this relationship, the autonomy of developing countries can be highly restricted. 4 
As the bargaining position of a developing country is weaker and more disadvantaged 
than a developed one, this relationship is likely to convert to dependency. 
Some scholars of international relations emphasise interactions between the great 
powers and the small states. 5 Their relationships are defined as patron-client state 
3 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1977), pp. 10-13. 
4 For instance, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974); 
Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970); 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1979); Samir Amin, Accumulation on a 
World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) 
5 For example, David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), and The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small 
Power/Great Power Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Robert O. Keohane, `The Big 
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relationships, which may be distinguished from other forms of bilateral interaction by 
the dominance of several key elements. Firstly, there is generally a dramatic difference 
between the military capabilities of the states involved. The client, by itself, cannot 
become a major military force in international politics; nor can it completely guarantee 
its own security by itself. This means that the principal security transfers between 
patron and client are directional in nature, flowing from the former to the latter. 
Secondly, the client is a prominent factor in the patron's competitiveness. The more 
advantage the patron gains over its competitors through its association with its client, 
the more the patron will value the relationship, often in apparent contradiction to the 
material benefits which the patron derives from the relationship. This aspect of patron- 
client state relationships is manifested by the patron providing specific funds and items 
of military equipment for concessions from the client which will readily translate into 
advantages over the patron's opponents. 
It is apparent that there is an incompatibility of goals between the patron-client 
states in the relationship. The patron, whatever its specific objectives in the relationship 
might be, seeks to exert some degree of control over the client. This control can take 
many forms, but in general it implies the surrendering of some measure of the client's 
autonomy to the patron. The patron is willing to pay a much higher price in the 
relationship if the client can provide some valuable advantage for the patron over the 
patron's adversaries. It is generally agreed that based on the scope of foreign policy 
Influence of Small Allies', Foreign Policy, 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 161-182; Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances 
and Small Powers (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1968); George Liska, Alliances and the Third 
World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968); Alan Ned Sabrosky, `Allies, Clients and 
Encumbrances', International Security Review, 5 (Summer 1980), pp. 117-149; Marshall Singer, Weak 
States in a World of Powers (N. Y.: The Free Press, 1972) 
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interest, small powers have limited interests in international politics. Their policies, 
consequently, are designed to achieve the limited objective of the security of their own 
territory. Big powers' interests are not restricted to their own territory and particular 
regions, but are concerned with the issues of the world at large. Smaller states, in the 
Cold War international system, assume a value to the superpowers based not only upon 
the smaller state's intrinsic worth but also upon its ability to put the other super power 
at a disadvantage. These smaller states then become scarce resources which are 
sometimes able to extract a considerable price for their particular contribution to the 
global balance of power. Their value, then, becomes rooted in their role in superpower 
competition. Even though there are many definitions of the small power, Robert 
Rothstein's contention of the small power's situation are applicable to South Korea 
during Rhee's regime as Rothstein focuses on a particular category of the small power 
and its security dilemma. He defines the small power's situation as follows: (a) outside 
help is required; (b) the state has a narrow margin of safety, with little time for 
correcting mistakes; and (c) the state's leaders see its weakness as essentially 
unalterable. They believe that they are potentially threatened by the policies of the great 
powers. 6 
Three paradigms, realist theory, interdependence theory, or patron-client theory, 
could explain the U. S. -South Korean relationship since the establishment of Korea in 
1948. As the two countries have come to relate closely to each other in political, 
economic, and social affairs, each paradigm could not fully characterise the complex 
nature of the relationship in the last fifty years. However, the post-Korean War period 
during the 1950s can be explained by the patron-client paradigm only. In the militarily 
6 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliance and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 29- 
34. 
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bipolar world after the Korean War, patron-client state relationships were primarily 
security-fulfilling in nature. Even though there were other aspects of such relationships, 
security transactions were the most evident and pervasive. 
During that period, economic interests between the two countries were not 
critical. Military and economic aid to South Korea was provided for security objectives 
only. As a result, Interdependence Theory was not relevant to that period since there 
was no possibility that the two countries would share cooperative interactions. In strict 
terms, as realists maintained, there was a great power gap between the U. S. and South 
Korea with the latter depending heavily on the former for its security, by which 
understanding interdependence theory was not applicable to President Rhee's era. 
Realist theory disregards the possibility that a small state could exert its influence 
over the big powers to extract considerable concessions from them. South Korea in this 
period was awarded a lot of concessions and assistance from the U. S. by virtue of its 
particular contribution to U. S. strategy. It also ignored the importance of domestic 
politics being closely linked to foreign policy. Leaders in essence may seek to counter 
internal rather than external threats to their rule by entering into international 
alignments. Political power groups or interest groups in a state could affect its foreign 
policy. In the United States, the dispersal of political power inherent in the structure of 
the federal government has created many opportunities for bureaucratic and societal 
interests to challenge presidential policies. 
With the end of World War II and the Japanese surrender to the Allies in 1945, 
Korea suddenly found itself divided by the Allied powers, leaving the area north of the 
38th parallel under the Soviet Union's control and the area to the south under the 
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control of the United States. Due to its unique geopolitical and strategic location, the 
Korean peninsula has historically occupied a central role in regional politics, and any 
changes or shifts of power in the region have greatly affected the status and politics of 
the country. 
From the period of its formation, South Korea acknowledged that the U. S. would 
be the principal source of all the kinds of assistance it needed. There are a variety of 
issues and dilemmas in the relationship between the United States and South Korea. Of 
these, in the international political setting, national security perspectives are the 
dominant basis for U. S. -South Korean policy making. 
After the U. S. had first defined its strategic interests in Northeast Asia in a 
manner that left South Korea outside its defence perimeter, the Korean War 
dramatically changed its security policy towards South Korea by creating an awareness 
of the strategic importance of Korea to U. S. containment objectives. Since the Korean 
War the U. S. has held the key position in the global balance of power system. The 
principal aims of U. S. security policy towards Korea have been to prevent further 
hostilities and to maintain a military balance on the peninsula as a means of sustaining 
regional stability amongst the major powers. In particular, the US military presence has 
established the U. S. as the dominant force in Korean security affairs as well as in 
international politics in Northeast Asia. 
The most apparent element of U. S. involvement in Korea was its pervasive 
military presence. The defence of South Korea as a front line in the global containment 
of communism has been in the U. S. national interest. The compulsion to counter its 
rivals, the Soviet Union and the PRC (People's Republic of China), everywhere in the 
world was the crucial point in maintaining U. S. interest in the world during the 1950s. 
In terms of regional interest, the security of Japan was another important issue because 
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it was regarded as an eventual economic partner. At the same time, with the collapse of 
the Nationalist Chinese on the Asian mainland in 1949, Japan replaced China as the 
country the United States hoped would shortly become its principal Asian political ally. 
South Korea was particularly crucial to the defence of Japan, the keystone of the U. S. 
security system in East Asia. Moreover, U. S. behaviour towards its commitment in 
Korea was viewed by the U. S. 's Asian allies as a litmus test of the reliability of U. S. 
commitments elsewhere, particularly in Japan. 
In connection with the reversal of its perception of the ROK (Republic of Korea) 
as a crucial part of its forward defence zone against Communist expansion, the U. S. 
altered its policies from providing only limited military assistance to making available 
large amounts of military aid. This was designed to strengthen South Korean forces to 
the point where, backed by the United States, they could effectively deter North Korean 
aggression. 7 Although the security interests of South Korea were local, not global like 
those of the United States, the two countries agreed on the importance of deterring 
North Korea, an ally of the superpower rival of the U. S., but did not always agree on the 
amount of U. S. or Korean resources that should be allocated to this objective. 
There are a variety of indicators that demonstrate the crucial role the United 
States has played in the survival and development of South Korea in the post-Korean 
War period. The war left South Korea devastated and its economy shattered. U. S. 
military and economic aid to South Korea, that was justified by the U. S. government 
largely on national security grounds, represented important resources to support the 
very existence of South Korea. With such U. S. assistance, South Korea developed a 
Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-Joo Han, The U. S. -South Korean Alliance (Washington D. C.: Heath and 
Company, 1983), pp. 38-39. 
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substantial military capability. In addition to this military assistance, the U. S. realised 
the need to supplement it with economic aid. Based on the belief that strengthening the 
ROK forces was not sufficient for countering Communist expansion, the U. S. provided 
a great deal of economic aid to South Korea. This aid was especially significant during 
the Eisenhower period. 
President Syngman Rhee exerted his influence to maximise American aid, 
minimise American intervention, and instigate American military and foreign policies 
that conformed with his attitudes, especially with respect to the Communists and Japan. 
His long residence in America with the Korean independence movement had 
transformed him into an arch-conservative in his views on communism, views which 
were later to make him suspicious of U. S. detente policy towards the Soviet Union. 
These views were reinforced by the division of Korea following the Korean armistice. 
He tried to exert influence directly upon Congress, the Administration, and the public, 
to the constant annoyance of the State Department and the American Embassy in South 
Korea. He was known to be more distrustful of the State Department than the 
Republicans were. He considered it pro-Communist as well as pro-Japanese. 8 
On the establishment of South Korea in the southern part of the Korean peninsula 
in 1948, Rhee embraced a strong anti-Communist and anti-Japanese stance, 
concentrating the nation's attention on these issues at the sacrifice of his country's 
political and economic development. Fearing the re-emergence of Japanese power in 
Asia, he opposed American policies which reinforced Japan, especially after the San 
Francisco Treaty of 1951 that gave back Japanese sovereignty. His anti-Japanese 
$ This negative attitude towards the State Department stemmed from the fact that, in his independence 
movement in America, he was entirely disregarded by the State Department while attempting to assert 
Korea's independence from Japan. 
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posture prevented the U. S. from establishing a NATO-type military organisation in East 
Asia, for which the inclusion of Japan was essential as the Eisenhower administration 
wished to impose the responsibility of leading the organisation on Japan. 
As South Korea was under the tight control of Rhee who dominated national 
government from 1948 to 1960, the Eisenhower administration believed that it should 
base its overall position largely upon its relationship with President Rhee, who was well 
versed in manipulating American power for the security of a small country. In many 
cases, Eisenhower and Dulles were dealing with Rhee on the issues of Korean domestic 
and foreign policy under a one-directional relationship of assistance and influence. The 
United States was the provider of assistance and South Korea the recipient. Heavy 
dependence on US aid characterised Rhee's regime. By heavily depending on the US 
aid programme, Rhee's government raised the question of sovereignty. 
Since South Korea was seen as only one segment of its global geopolitical 
strategy, the United States often made major policy decisions unilaterally, giving little 
thought to the serious consequences they would have for South Korea, and it exerted 
considerable influence over South Korea's domestic and foreign policies, as could be 
seen in the role it played in the resignation of President Rhee in 1960. Like other 
countries, South Korea through its foreign policy sought to advance its security, 
autonomy, and economic prosperity. These goals often conflicted with each other. In its 
policy towards the U. S., Rhee's Government sought to maximise U. S. support in 
providing for its security and economic progress while minimising the negative effects 
of the asymmetry inherent in the relationship. In this period of foreign aid from the 
U. S., it was difficult to distinguish military from economic aid. In most cases, they 
were so interrelated that the United Nations Command (UNC) could control and advise 
about the aid programmes. 
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Since the United States basically considered the role of South Korea in the light 
of its strategic position in East Asia, it often ignored the economic development of 
South Korea. In the last years of Rhee's rule, South Korea suffered a drastic cut in 
military and economic aid from the U. S., which was partly intended to damage Rhee's 
Government. According to the domino theory and cold war conceptions, the United 
States focused on its security position concerning friendly nations, regarding them as 
key players in protecting American interests from Communist expansion. Aware of 
this, the client states frequently manipulated an advantage in intra-alliance bargaining. 
These security concerns thus inhibited the United States from reacting as vigorously 
against the abuse of democracy in South Korea as it might otherwise have done. 
Rhee's achievements in getting concessions from the United States during the 
Korean War and the Korean Political Conference through stubbornness and unilateral 
action were noteworthy. His release of Communist prisoners of war immediately before 
the Korean armistice, and refusal to agree to an armistice or even to a political 
conference for settling the problem of the armistice, gained him a mutual defence treaty 
and a large amount of economic and military aid when the Eisenhower administration 
desperately wanted to end the war. His demonstrations against the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission's inspection induced the U. S. to suspend the armistice 
agreement in order to drive away Communist representatives. Had it not been for an 
American re-evaluation of South Korea's strategic and political importance, Rhee's 
tactics would not have worked. Nevertheless, South Korea might have benefited far less 
from American aid programmes without Rhee whose leadership was quite ingenious in 
exploiting the U. S. position in the period of the Cold War. Washington accepted Rhee's 
leadership as inevitable until 1960, despite the difficulties of dealing with him. 
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A great number of scholarly works on Korean-American relations have been 
published. However, most of these works have been concentrated on the subject of the 
Korean War, or have only examined broad periods in U. S. -South Korean relations, 
focusing on American military, economic, and diplomatic policies. 9 Recently some 
scholars and students have emphasised the two countries' relations in the context of the 
big power and small state alliance. Like others, they deal with the Korean War period or 
the Korean Political Conference. 1° This thesis, on the other hand, will concentrate on 
the period from the beginning of the Eisenhower administration's work for a Korean 
cease-fire to the resignation of President Rhee, and will analyse the two countries' 
security relationships within the scope of big power-small state interaction. This 
period provides an ideal case study of small state behaviour in client position in 
response to big power control in the bi-polar world situation. 
9 John Barry Kotch, United States Securi Policy Toward Korea, 1945-53: The Origins and Evolution of 
American Involvement and the Emergence of a National Security Commitment, PhD, Columbia 
(ed. ) 
University, 1976; Bruce CumingsyChild of Conflict (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); 
Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Callum A. Macdonald, 
Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Sydney D. Bailey, The Korean 
Armistice (London: Macmillan, 1992) 
10 Astri Suhrke, `Gratuity and Tyranny: The Korean Alliance', World Politics Vol. 25 (July 1973); Chang 
Jin Park, `the Influence of Small States upon the Superpowers: United States-South Korean Relations as a 
case study, 1950-53', World Politics, Vol. 28 (1975); Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U. S. Policy Toward 
Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); Gerald L. 
Curtis and Sung Joo Han, The U. S. -South Korean Alliance (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1983) 
19 
The primary purpose of this study is to describe and analyse the U. S. -South Korea 
security relationship systematically and comprehensively in a conceptual framework of 
the interrelationship between a great power and a small power in an alliance system. As 
power and administration in South Korea were highly centralised under President Rhee, 
it is important to ask to what extent did Rhee, as the leader of the weaker state, manage 
and manipulate a bargaining position in Korea's relations with the United States? 
Actually Rhee's accomplishment in winning benefits for his country from the 
Eisenhower administration was remarkable in view of his having no recourse except 
bargaining skill. It is necessary to trace how the Eisenhower administration responded 
to the emerging international and regional power configuration with its New Look 
strategy. 
This study examines closely the strategic connection between the U. S. and South 
Korea and their diplomatic interaction from 1953 to 1960, and analyses the issues in 
historical events in order to trace the development of each nation's strategy, leverages, 
and tactics towards the other. Each chapter is related to the U. S. security commitment 
policy to South Korea, and South Korea's responses in the framework of the big power 
and small power relationship. The organisation of this study is basically chronological. 
The Introduction of this study explains the purpose and importance of the 
research and the analytical framework. Some discussion is devoted to the context of 
American and Korean foreign policy to see the origin and development of U. S. policy 
and the emergence of the U. S. commitment towards Korea. 
Chapter 1 covers the Korean War, but analyses the resumption of the armistice 
negotiations, Eisenhower's efforts to end the Korean War, Rhee's opposition to an 
armistice and his demands to the U. S. for compensation for agreeing to an armistice, 
and U. S. -South Korean diplomatic seesawing and Rhee's bargaining position. Conflict 
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and tension prevailed between Washington and Seoul during the period prior to the 
armistice agreement. An armistice was Eisenhower's pledge to the Americans, but it 
meant engaging in a hard bargaining process with President Rhee, who must have been 
disappointed with the indefinite division of his country even after a bloody and 
miserable war. Thus, while the Eisenhower administration became determined to end 
the war through an armistice, Rhee deliberately sought to prevent the truce talks. Rhee 
used exquisite bargaining skills to obtain security guarantees from the United States by 
manoeuvreing to release the Communist POWs, a move which delivered a powerful 
blow to the truce talks. Whereas the Eisenhower administration were ready to offer a 
mutual defence treaty, military and economic aid, and a build-up of the ROK forces, 
they planned to place Rhee in custody if he obstructed an armistice. Rhee in the end 
accepted the Korean armistice because South Korea was to receive such compensations, 
which would be linked with the postwar reconstruction and security of the country. 
Chapter 2 traces the post-armistice period and the Korean Political Conference 
during 1953-1954. After the Korean armistice, it was significant that the U. S. asked for 
Rhee's cooperation in carrying out U. S. policy in the Far East, whereas Rhee's 
Government attempted to discourage U. S. efforts to reach an agreement with the 
Communists at the Korean Political Conference. If the U. S. failed to secure South 
Korea's participation, the conference would be meaningless. President Rhee had an 
opportunity to use his bargaining power with Eisenhower to build up Korean forces by 
taking a hard line towards the Geneva Conference in the hope of getting further 
concessions. In the end, Eisenhower agreed to Rhee's demand for increasing United 
States responsibility for South Korea's security. 
Chapter 3 analyses U. S. security and military policy in the framework of the New 
Look strategy. U. S. -ROK relations were rooted in the sphere of defence following the 
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Korean armistice. It was necessary for America to protect South Korea for the defence 
of the Northern Pacific area, while South Korea desired America's power for the 
security of its system. The relationship emerged with the signing of the Mutual Defence 
Treaty in October 1953. The activity of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 
and the process of its dissolution with regard to the denunciation of the armistice 
agreement, and in connection with the introduction of atomic weapons into Korea, 
became a main point of controversy both between Washington and Seoul, and in intra- 
departmental relations within the Eisenhower administration. While the US forces were 
stationed in Korea, a great number of problems occurred because there was no 
agreement on the legal status of US forces. The U. S. did not want to change a 
privileged position in Korea which was not recognised by other allies' authorising US 
military bases. The question of the proposed reduction of ROK forces and the 
redeployment of US forces in Korea in connection with the `New Look' policy were 
troublesome issues between Seoul and Washington, over which the two governments 
exerted their bargaining power. 
Chapter 4 traces the U. S. role in the normalisation of ROK-Japanese relations in 
the perspective of U. S. military and economic policy towards East Asia. The United 
States considered Japan to be the heart and soul of the situation in the Far East. After 
the Korean War, the U. S. wanted to strengthen the economy of South Korea in the light 
of American security objectives. In this situation, there were some strains between the 
U. S. and South Korea over Korean economic policies. While Japan became the 
objective of massive U. S. investments in productive industries, South Korea was 
mainly the recipient of defence support programmes. Rhee's Government emphasised 
obtaining more aid and expanding productive capacity but the U. S. desired to supply 
Japanese-made commodities. The Eisenhower administration had a plan to institute an 
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anti-Communist regional security organisation in a way which made South Korean- 
Japanese diplomatic normalisation a prerequisite. However, Rhee's suspicion of 
Japan's revival impeded early rapprochement. 
This chapter examines the conflict between Washington and Seoul with regard to 
the issue of democratisation of Korean internal affairs and the positive role played by 
America, along with the student uprising against Rhee's Government in 1960, in the 
resignation of President Rhee. President Rhee was much more successful in checking 
U. S. interference in domestic affairs. Since the Eisenhower administration also 
concentrated on South Korea's security position against the Communists, the political 
stability of South Korea had been regarded as crucial, and they ignored the deterioration 
of Korean democratic politics, only remonstrating indirectly. However, acknowledging 
that Rhee's anti-Japanese stance had jeopardised the normalisation of ROK-Japanese 
relations, and that Rhee's prestige in Korea had clearly fallen, the United States 
changed its attitude towards Rhee's Government and took a positive role in the collapse 
of the Rhee regime. 
Chapter 5, the conclusion of this study, summarises the research findings. 
Because of the nature of this study, the primary sources employed in the 
dissertation involved digging through archives and manuscripts. The National Archives 
and Records Service Center in Washington, D. C., the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in 
Abilene, Kansas, the Public Record Office in London, and manuscripts at the Foreign 
Ministry in Seoul, Korea, have numerous diplomatic, economic, and military 
documents for this period, 1953-1960. The Oral History Collection at the Eisenhower 
Library has interviews with former American officials in Korea and several State 
Department officers. 
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Many of the records relating to U. S. -South Korean relations during the period are 
contained in the Department of State, decimal file 795.00, in the Diplomatic Branch of 
the National Archives. Documents in the file include instructions to and reports from 
U. S. diplomatic officials in Korea, correspondence between the U. S. government and 
South Korea, and between the State Department and other U. S. government 
departments. The Modern Military Branch of the National Archives also has important 
documents on U. S. -South Korean negotiations regarding the armistice, a mutual 
defence treaty, economic and military aid, and the strengthening of South Korean 
forces. These are contained in the Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File 383.21, Korea. 
For my study, the Eisenhower Library provided a great deal of material. The Ann 
Whitman File revealed the Eisenhower administration's principO1 military and 
economic policies towards Rhee's government. John Foster Dulles' Papers were 
important documents regarding the armistice and the Geneva Conference. The Records 
of the White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, and the Papers of the White House Office, National Security Council Staff, 
were worthwhile for tracing the security relationship between the two countries. 
Extensive research in diplomatic documents and manuscripts has been supplemented by 
published sources. 
The Department of State has published valuable materials: Foreign Relations of 
the United States; Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 
18,1954; The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15,1954; 
American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents; Public Papers of the 
Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower; and issues of the Department of State Bulletin. 
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Korean archival documents have become available recently, and provide good 
resources for researchers to trace the Korean government's and President Rhee's 
intentions in dealing with the United States. Before the documents became available, 
researchers and students who were interested in the two countries' relations depended 
upon U. S. archival sources alone. Amongst Korean archival documents, the record of 
communications between President Rhee and the Korean Embassy in the United States 
is an invaluable resource for analysing Rhee's attitudes towards and methods of coping 
with the United States' Korean policy. 
The Public Record Office in England also provided me with the opportunity to 
trace the allies' attitudes regarding the U. S. security policy towards South Korea. 
Newspapers, both in English and Korean, provided good sources of contemporary 
views and details. 
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1. Eisenhower and the Korean Armistice 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 made the United States take a 
direct and continuing military involvement in South Korea despite a previous reluctance 
to undertake such a role. Following the policy of containment, the United States was 
determined to prevent any Communist expansionism. Defending South Korea was 
viewed as important to the United States, not because of the strategic significance of 
Korea, but because the North Korean attack was seen as a projection of Soviet 
Communist influence in the Cold War. The United States had to enter the Korean War 
in order to establish American credibility as an anti-Communist power. The American 
actions were approved by the Security Council, which called upon other members of the 
United Nations to participate in support of South Korea. As a result, fifteen other UN 
members joined the American military operations in Korea. The root of America's new 
involvement in Korea was caused primarily by the changing nature of the international 
environment. By late 1949 and early 1950, a number of developments had begun to 
induce a major re-evaluation of U. S. strategic thinking. Particularly important were the 
Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in August 1949 and the fall of Chiang Kai-Shek's 
regime to the communists in October 1949. These two events caused the U. S. to fear 
that the global balance of power was shifting to the Communist side. Moreover, the 
North Korean invasion was perceived as naked aggression inspired and controlled by 
the Soviet Union, perhaps as a prelude to general war. A radical transformation had 
occurred in American thinking. Enraged by the charges of McCarthy, the nation had 
become obsessed with making war on Communism. This new orthodoxy had become 
exceedingly dangerous to oppose and it explains why no influential voices were raised 
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against the Korean War. Subsequently, Truman took action that was in line with 
domestic demands to fight the Communist rising. 
From the beginning, however, U. S. involvement in the Korean War was limited 
to expulsion of the Communist aggressors and localisation of the conflict. These placed 
heavy restraints on the scope of military operations. The main motivation of the limited 
war policy of the United States was to avoid provoking a major war with Communist 
China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, there were limitations not only on the 
objectives of military operations but also on the use of weapons. The use of nuclear 
weapons was considered, but was decided against for fear of spreading the war. ' 
The Korean War affected changes to the U. S. strategic outlook on the value of 
South Korea. The U. S. began to realise the significant role that South Korea could play, 
not only for the sake of containing communist expansion, but also in protecting 
offshore island chains in the Far East. The war became a testing ground of the overall 
contaimnent policy with regard to the security of Europe. It also illustrated to 
Americans how this small peninsula was intricately linked with the overall system of 
containment. 2 
The Korean armistice negotiations were one of the hardest bargaining processes 
of the Cold War period. As the battle lines stabilised, pressures for a political settlement 
1 Martin Lichterman, 'Korea: Problems in Limited War', in Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challener 
(eds. ), National Securijy in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories (London: Stevens & Sons Limited 
, 1960), pp. 
39-40. 
Nathan White, U. S. Policy toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1979), pp. 224-226. 
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of the conflict mounted. In its determination to avert an expanded war in Korea, the 
British and their European allies pushed the United States to end the war. 3 
There were a number of important reasons why the United States found it difficult 
to satisfy the demands for greater flexibility at talks with the Communists to cease 
hostilities. Most important among these was the unpredictable and uncontrollable 
Syngman Rhee, the South Korean President, who attempted to subvert the process of 
the negotiations. He often intervened to slow the pace of armistice negotiations. He 
demanded that the war be continued until all foreign Communists were expelled from 
the Korean peninsula and the nation was unified under his goverment. Eisenhower 
seriously underestimated Rhee's opposition to the armistice. After the initial stumbling 
in relations with South Korea, Eisenhower adhered to a policy of persuasion, 
concession, subtle coercion and threats to win over Rhee. These tactics were in part 
successful, but, in many cases, they were equally matched by Rhee's ability to achieve 
his own objectives. The Prisoners of War (POWs) issue in particular almost destroyed 
the prospects of an armistice. The United States considered that it could be exploited 
for propaganda purposes. The Communists-North Korea and the People's Republic of 
0ý the fxFIOttAtj, 6V% Ot Ae POW (, 5stAe ýy tke Awkte&&w%S 
Yý China-did not approve pending the negotiations. 
This chapter examines the sequence of developments during the Korean War. 
Firstly, the war situation during the Truman era will be summarised. Secondly, how far 
Rhee, as a small states' leader, manipulated and influenced the conduct of the United 
States by exploiting the world's political contraposition during the Korean War will be 
considered. The preponderance of scholarship on international relations emphasises 
Burton 1. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenge in Crisis, Credibilily, and Command (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 130-138. 
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interactions among the great powers and looks at small states simply as pawns in the 
arena of great power politics. This perspective claims that the great powers control and 
dominate small countries, if they remain in the sphere of influence of major powers. 
However, great powers cannot always translate their power into effective dominance 
over small countries. A small power, if it pursues its goals effectively, can sometimes 
influence and manipulate a great power. Finally, this study examines the diplomatic 
interaction between the United States and South Korea, considering the dilemma of the 
United States regarding the behaviour of Rhee's Goverment. 
U. S. Engagement in the Korean War 
Following the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula on 25 June 1950, the 
United States began direct military involvement. President Truman intervened in the 
Korean conflict with a surprisingly swift movement. However, as the war appeared to 
become a stalemate, the two opponents realised that they had to acknowledge the 
possibility of an armistice. As the battle lines stabilised, pressures for a political 
settlement of the conflict mounted. The Soviet Union had obviously been receptive to 
the idea of a cease-fire since the early spring of 195 1. On 23 June 195 1, Jacob Malik, 
the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, suggested that a cease-fire be arranged as a 
first step in the negotiation process. The Truman administration was very much in 
favour of ending the war on the following terms which they regarded to be quite 
modest: a divided Korea, exchange of all prisoners of war, and an withdrawal of all 
Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 
and Co., 1981), pp. 81-83. 
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foreign troops. The war was considerably unpopular with Americans. The 
administration confronted strong pressures from Congress and the electorate to pull out 
or to bomb Manchuria and even China. In 1951 America's allies like Great Britain, 
major Commonwealth and some NATO members were considerably concerned about 
putting an end to the war through an armistice. They regarded Soviet Union as the chief 
beneficiary of the war since the USSR was not directly involved in the Korean War. 
There was a general notion that terminating the war would result in freeing Communist 
China from its dependence on the Soviet Union, thereby allowing their enmity to grow. 
Victory was not the key issue for American allies who were only interested in a fair 
settlement. "A divided Korea, a return to the status quo ante (at the thirty-eighth 
parallel), would meet their needs admirably. ýý5 
The Korean war entered a new phase in June 195 1. While the fighting continued 
on a reduced scale especially in terms of the ground forces, there would be no further 
advances and retreats along the Korean peninsula. The prime aim of the fight was now 
limited and directed to influence phases of negotiating positions at the cease-fire talks. 
It was clear, however, that instead of producing a quick settlement, the talks stressed 
out the 'political and ideological differences' between the two sides. 6 
One of the main obstacles to progress at the armistice negotiations was Syngman 
Rheeý the South Korean President, who pursued a policy of force to unify Korea. Rhee 
was bitter about the negotiations which he believed would partition the Korean 
peninsula. His fear was that the United States would abandon South Korea after the 
Barton J. Bernstein, 'Struggle over the Korean Annistice', in Bruce Cumings (ed. ) , Child of Conflict 
(Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1983), pp. 262-263. 
30 
armistice and lay it open to another invasion from the north. In spite of reassurances 
from Truman, he continued to obstruct the negotiations. 7 Rhee argued that "if the 
United Nations Command (UNC) action was prohibited by the United States or the UN 
General Assembly, then the UN Command should allow South Korean forces to march 
north on their own with at least some assistance. ,8 Rhee did not share the American 
view that it was possible to arrive at a political settlement with the Communists. This 
difference in perceptions was a result of South Korea's local interests and the United 
States' global interests. Truman and Rhee diverged profoundly in their assessment of 
the significance of the Korean War. Truman felt that any attempt to defeat the 
Communists decisively in Korea could spark a new world war with atomic bombs. 
Rhee opined that the time was ripe to attack the Communists, who lacked an atomic 
capa I ty, 9 Thus Rhee tried to jeopardise the United States' negotiating plans in his 
own interest. He pursued an unpredictable course of action. According to John J. 
Muccio, the American Ambassador in Korea, "Rhee was completely unpredictable and 
if one method failed to accomplish his purpose, he could be expected to try another if 
Callurn A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 19 8 6), p. 115. 
FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, pp. 644-45, Muccio to Acheson, 10 July 1951; Lbid., p. 1418, Muccio to Acheson, 
22 December 1951. 
Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Pamnun 
Book, 1978), p. 376. The UNC was established provisionally on 7 July and formally on 25 July 1950 
under General Douglas MacArthur. It was composed of sixteen UN members supplying combat forces. 
Of the ground forces operating in Korea when the armistice was signed, 64 per cent were from South 
Korea, 32 per cent from the United States, and 4 percent from other UN members. 
9 Ibid., p. 355. 
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he could get away with it. "10 The United States' pressure on President Rhee to stop 
obstructing the armistice negotiations continued to build while Rhee proceeded to 
publicly denounce the idea of an armistice. He exploited a number of rallies that, in 
most cases, were carried out by pseudo-governmental organisations controlled by Rhee 
himself President Truman became frustrated and impatient with Rhee. In his letter to 
Rhee on 4 March 1952, he insisted that South Korea was obliged to follow the lead of 
the United States in the United Nations Command and threatened serious consequences 
if Rhee persisted in his obstruction. ' 1 In response to the letter, Rhee dispatched a 
counter-proposal to Truman on 21 March 1952. He offered to accept the American 
position in exchange for more military aid and a mutual security pact. 12 Dean Acheson, 
Secretary of State, argued that a U. S. -South Korean mutual defence treaty was 
unnecessary so long as sufficient UN forces were deployed in Korea. He urged the 
President to assure Rhee that South Korea would not be abandoned by its allies. 13 All 
the same, Rhee would not relinquish his campaign for a mutual defence treaty with the 
United States. This combination of counter-offer and ingenious evasion was 
characteristic of Rhee throughout the armistice negotiations. He was accustomed to the 
value of brinkmanship and its limitations between great and small states. 
By February 1952, agreement had been reached on most of the key points of 
earlier disagreement: a line of demarcation, the establishment of a Military Armistice 
Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and referral of the troop 
10 FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, pp. 73 8-73 9, The Ambassador in Korea to the Secretary of State, 27 July 195 1. 
11 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, pp. 74-76, Harry Truman to the President Rhee, 4 March 1952. 
12 Ibid., pp. 114-115, President Rhee to Harry Truman, 21 March 1952. 
13 Ibid., pp. 185-186, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 30 April 1952. 
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withdrawal issue to a post-armistice political conference. 14 There were few indications 
in the spring of 1952 that the Truman administration realised its policy of nonforcible 
repatriation for prisoners of war would long delay the signature of an armistice 
agreement. 
From the beginning of the armistice negotiations, the Communists insisted on the 
return of all prisoners and the United States continued voluntary repatriation. The 
Korean War created difficult problems in dealing with POWs. Article 118 of the 
Geneva convention of 1949 on prisoners of war, which the United States had signed but 
not ratified, provided that "prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of hostilities. " 15 This provision was especially devised to deal 
with cases like those involving the Soviet Union, where, after World War 11, German 
and Japanese prisoners had been retained to aid in reconstruction. However, the United 
States and Great Britain forcibly returned the reluctant Russian soldiers who had 
defected to Germany's armies to the Soviet Union. Most of them were forced to go to 
labour camps and to meet their death. 16 The United States was perplexed with the 
situation which developed during the Korean War in which a great number of prisoners 
held by the UN forces refused repatriation. It produced a seemingly gloomy obstacle 
14 Walter Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Fro , Chapter 2,6,7, 
(Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1966). 
15 U. S. Department of the Army, Geneva Convention of 1949 for the Protection of War victims 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 129; Peter Lowe, 'Aspects of the Korean War', 
Intemational Studies, (1987/1), p. 12. 
16 Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986), p. 210; Bernstein, 'Struggle 
over the Korean Annistice', pp. 274-275. 
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when it was interwoven with the intensely ideological character of the annistice 
negotiations. 
Until July 195 1, the Truman Administration assumed that all POWs would be 
automatically returned to their countries after a settlement. Robert A. McClure, the 
army's chief of psychological warfare, raised the non-repatriation issue for both the 
humanitarian and propaganda aspects. 17 For the first time, the military side felt it 
attractive because of psychological warfare, but reluctant to accept because of violation 
of the Geneva convention and loss of UN prisoners. Nonetheless, Dean Acheson 
recognised the advantages to psychological warfare and its humane objectives. 18 On 8 
February 1952, Acheson urged Truman to endorse voluntary repatriation. Domestic and 
international public opinion was initially strongly in favour of this. More than anything 
else, forcible repatriation was strongly opposed by no less than sixty congressmen under 
the leadership of Senator William Jenner, and thus the administration could avoid a 
battle with Congress. Acheson was primarily concerned about morality and the Cold 
War and not domestic politics. There was clear evidence about Communist intentions. 
The North Korean and Chinese delegations strongly resisted voluntary repatriation. By 
February 1952, although the Communist governments had not agreed to it, Acheson 
urged a firm commitment to that position. On 27 February, Truman and the senior 
members of his administration took the decision of not returning the unwilling POWs. 
However, this policy did not produce any positive results and instead prolonged a costly 
17 NA, RG 319, G-3, decimal file 383.6, Brig. Gen. McClure to army chief of staff, 'Policy on 
Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners', 5 July 195 1. 
18 FRUS, 195 1, vol. 7, Acheson to George Marshall, 27 August 195 1. 
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war, lost the support of allies, and eventually contributed to Truman's political 
downfall. 19 
Differences arose between Washington and the military on how to proceed in 
negotiations with the Communists. General Matthew Ridgway and Vice-Admiral 
Turner Joy, Chief of the UN negotiating team at Panmunjom, thought that Washington 
was too accommodating to Communist pressure. They believed that "continuing 
concessions could only indicate weakness to the enemy and that the best course was one 
,, 20 of strength and firmness. However, the need to maintain the allies' cooperation 
forced the Truman administration to refrain from spreading the war along the Korean 
peninsula. As a result, the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was rejected. 
In February, the JCS tried to stress the use of atomic bombs, Chinese Nationalist forces, 
and guerrilla operations against Mainland China. The intention was to break the 
deadlock and compel the Communists to surrender to the American demands for an 
armistice, but their plan was rejected as being too dangerous. 21 Even so, tactical nuclear 
weapons were stationed in Korea by the Truman administration, and the military 
wanted to use them to break the stalemate. 22 
19 Bernstein, 'Struggle over the Korean Armistice', pp. 280-283. 
20 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 130. 
21 NA, RG 59, lot 61 D 417, State-JCS Meetings, Korea: Show of Forces, 6 February 1952; decimal file 
795.00/2-1452, Korea, Webb to Acheson, 'JCS Proposal for Show of Force in the Far East', 14 February 
1952. 
22 Shin Dong-A [New East Asia], (November, 1996), pp. 364-379. Philip Corso, as Chief of Special 
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The bombings were part of America's expanded naval and air war designed to 
force concessions from the Communists. On 29 April 1952, General Mark Clark 
replaced General Matthew Ridgway as UN Commander and almost immediately tried 
to resolve the POW issue. He insisted on bombing key targets in North Korea and was 
allowed to do so. In late June, the American Air Force bombed the Suiho hydroelectric 
power station near the river Yalu, thereby creating problems for the European allies. 
The State Department had failed to inform Great Britain before the attack. The attack 
caused an outrage in other nations participating in the UN effort in Korea, while Lord 
Alexander of Tunis, the British Minister of Defence in Washington at the time, was not 
informed at all. 23 
Clark told Washington that "a forceful action is more conducive to agreements 
with the Communists than a softer approach. ý524 The effects of that strategy were 
ambiguous as the Communists did not instantly react and showed no sign of 
compliance. The bombing did not cause the Communists to soften their position at the 
negotiating table. Clark and Harrison, who had replaced Turner Joy as Chief UN 
negotiator, eventually settled on five alternatives for the disposition of the POWs not 
desiring repatriation. Four of them involved the delivery of the POWs to the custody of 
neutral nations while the fifth provided simply for their delivery to the demilitarised 
zone where the prisoners would go to the side of their choice. 
25 They believed that the 
Communists would reject these proposals and that this would result in the termination 
23 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, pp. 356-358, Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department 
of State-JCS Meeting, 'Air Attacks on North Korea Power Plants', 25 June 1952. 
24 NA, JCS Records, decimal file 383.21, Korea, 10 July 1952. 
25 Hermes, Iruce Tent, p. 278. 
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of the armistice negotiations. Clark's willingness to risk the termination of armistice 
negotiations was wholly consistent with his desire to press for a military conclusion to 
the war. On 29 September he called for reinforcements, the expansion of the ROK 
force, the employment of two Nationalist Chinese divisions, the bombing of Manchuria 
and the employment of nuclear weapons in order to achieve a settlement on the U. S. 
terms. 26 However, Truman was not prepared to take dramatic measures which would 
mean further problems with the allies. Some of the allies, led by the British, were 
looking for all possible means to a compromise. It was initiated by India when Krishna 
Menon argued for the removal of the POWs from military control to the custody of a 
neutral commission consisting of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
India. The POWs would be held for an indefinite period for the choice of repatriation. 27 
The lack of allies' support for America's inflexible attitudes on the armistice 
negotiations forced Washington to accept Menon's proposal, with amendments on two 
issues, the composition of the neutral commission and the length of time the POWs 
could be held in custody. The Indian resolution was finally passed on 3 December 1952, 
opposed only by the Soviet bloc. 28 A solution to the POW issue was to be conveyed to 
the Eisenhower administration. 
26 Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 74-83; J. Lawton 
Collins, War in Peacetime: The HistoEy and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 
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27 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, pp. 476-477,485-486,570,640,643,646. 
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The Eisenhower Administration and Its Commitment to Korea 
Upon taking office in January 1953 the Eisenhower administration's most 
important foreign policy objective was the settlement of the war in Korea. During the 
Presidential election of 1952, Eisenhower had promised to bring an end to the conflict 
on an honourable basis. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 
regarded the concluding of armistice negotiations as a matter of the greatest urgency 
amongst their foreign policy aims. 29 
The end of the war was both a political and military dilemma for Dulles. 
Influential Republicans wanted to end the war by increasing military pressure on the 
Communists. To some Republicans it was then presumed that the Korean conflict 
would end with a great victory, that would serve as a prelude to the return of Chiang 
Kai Shek to power in China. 30 Dulles did not want a cease-fire in Korea. When Peking 
responded favourably to a proposed Indian compromise for a settlement in Korea in 
early 1953, he reacted with sorrow to the prospect of a premature settlement, and said, 
"I don't think we can get much out of a Korean settlement until we have shown before 
all Asia our clear superiority by giving the Chinese one hell of a licking. ,31 He would 
have preferred a clear-cut military victory, but he had to abandon his stand because 
Eisenhower had committed himself to ending the war. 
The obstacles blocking an early conclusion of an armistice, however, remained 
twofold: first, Communist intransigence on the principle of non-forcible repatriation of 
29 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 212-213. 
30 New York Times, 13 February 1952 and 4 March 1952. 
1 Emmet J. Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 104-105. 
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POWs, which had already delayed the talks for one and half years and led to an 
indefinite break of negotiations in October 1952; and second, President Rhee's 
uncompromising attitude towards Washington over the policy of reunification by force. 
The Eisenhower administration had no intention of changing current policy on non- 
forcible repatriation. If the policy were changed, the political damage would be too 
great. With respect to the problem of reconciling Rhee to an armistice rather than a 
military solution, his real intentions had not been tested and the result was uncertain. In 
the Spring of 1953, as the armistice negotiations had not progressed, Washington 
considered taking offensive action to secure a better position over the armistice. 
Eisenhower and Dulles made a series of threatening statements and took measures 
which included unleashing Nationalist China from the restraints Truman had imposed 
at the outbreak of the Korean War and announcing the possible use of nuclear 
weapons. 32 The consideration of using nuclear weapons characterised the Eisenhower 
administration's position towards the Korean War. The military leaders participating in 
the National Security Council (NSC) were inclined to use tactical nuclear weapons to 
inflict a devastating strike on enemy forces. 33 At the meeting on 27 March, the question 
32 Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1961), pp. 48-49; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: 
Doubleday, 1963), pp. 178-183. 
33 The NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947, which also mandated the establishment of 
a unified Department of Defen5e and a Central Intelligence Agency. It, consisting of the President, the 
Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other cabinet and subcabinet officials 
in an advisory capacity as required, is empowered to advise the President with respect to the integration 
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the departments of 
government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security. 
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of the use of atomic weapons in Korea was raised. It was referred to an ad hoc 
committee of civilian consultants that expressed the attitude that "we have gone to great 
expense to develop these weapons, we have tested them only in such tests as we could 
conduct ourselves, and we could certainly test them better under combat conditions. iý34 
In contrast, the State Department contemplated the political difficulties with its allies if 
using these weapons was not effective. There was also the possibility that the USSR 
might retaliate in kind. However, General Bradley argued, from the view of the 
military, that "the potential casualties involved in any stepped-up ground action 
,, 35 justified the use of every type of weapon. The Eisenhower administration examined 
the possibility of using the Nationalist Chinese forces to attack the Chinese mainland. 
This step was hailed by Republicans. Senator Knowland described the decision as a 
psychological campaign intended to keep the Communists guessing about America's 
future plans. To encourage Eisenhower to take a tougher position, Republican Senators 
and Representatives called for a full naval blockade of the China coast as a device to 
press the Communists to agree to an armistice. Besides, Dulles informed Peking 
through India that unless they agreed to an armistice, the U. S. would strike at their 
Manchurian bases. 36 These steps produced an immediate result. On 4 February 1953, 
34 NA, S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC Action No. 726-c. An ad hoc committee of civilian consultants 
was established on 25 February 1953 to study and advise the NSC on basic national security policies and 
programmes in relation to their costs. 
35 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, pp. 817-818, Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Dept. of 
State-JCS Meeting, 27 March 1953. An ad hoc committee of civilian consultants was established on 25 
February 1953 to study and advise the NSC on basic national security policies and progammes in 
relation to their costs. 
36 Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), pp. 518-520. 
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Chou En-lai requested the United States to return to the armistice negotiations that had 
been suspended since December 1952. 
Acting on his own initiative, General Clark broke the impasse by calling for the 
exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in a letter to the Communists on 22 February 
1953. On March 28, two days after Chou En-lai's return from Stalin's funeral, the 
Communists agreed to this proposal and to the resumption of the armistice negotiations 
which had been stalled since October 1952.37 On 8 April, North Korea freed the civilian 
internees, who returned to the West via Moscow. 38 On 10 April, the Liaison Groups 
agreed on the ground rules for the exchange, dubbed 'Little Big Switch', which started 
on 19 April . 
39 The necessity for an early armistice and the commitment to a political 
rather than a military solution to the Korean hostilities were basic to the US position. 
Yet, despite the successful conduct of Little Big Switch, the continuing deadlock over 
the question of non-forcible repatriation remained. Dulles focused on attempting to 
hinder the terms of the armistice already agreed. He questioned, in view of the changed 
situation and the possible desire of the Communists for an armistice, "whether the 
United States should feel bound by the other provisions in the armistice to which we 
had already agreed earlier. " He worried about the possibility of a permanence of the 
armistice unless one side or the other deliberately broke it. He thought this situation 
would enable the Communists to refuse to advance to any satisfactory political 
settlement in Korea. On the contrary, Eisenhower, much more cautious in his response, 
37 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 818-819, Clark, The Commander in Chief, UNC to the JCS, 28 March 1953. 
18 Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960) pp. 24-26. 
39 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 919, Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For Far Eastern 
Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 'Recent Development in Korea', 20 April 1953. 
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asserted that "it would be impossible to call off the armistice now and to go to war 
again in Korea. The American people would never stand for such a move. " 
Nevertheless, Dulles argued that the U. S. should push for a new agreement to reflect the 
United States' interests due to America's better position in negotiations. 40 
Normal negotiations were resumed at Panmunjom on 26 April after a gap of more 
than six months. The Communist proposal for the remaining prisoners of war who were 
not directly repatriated was based upon the prerequisite of sending them to a neutral 
state. This was met with strong opposition from the United Nations Command, who 
insisted upon keeping the prisoners who were not directly repatriated. Significant 
progress in this phase of the negotiations was made by the Communists. They changed 
their position and suggested a revised eight-point proposal on 7 May, the most 
important components of which were that "The remaining POWs not directly 
repatriated be kept in their original places of detention and be handed over to Neutral 
Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) which should arrange for their repatriation. " 
In addition the period of persuasion was to last no more than four months, instead of six 
months. General Nam 11, the North Korean Representative, also suggested that the fate 
of the remaining prisoners after this period should be decided at the political conference 
on Korea as already provided for in Article 4 of the armistice agreement. 
41 This 
proposal was fundamental because, for the first time, the Communists discarded their 
strict adherence to the clause of the Geneva Convention-the automatic repatriation of 
all POWs at the end of war. The Eisenhower administration realised that the new 
Communist proposal represented a significant shift in their position and appeared to 
40 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 139 
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offer a basis for negotiation of an acceptable agreement . 
42 By mid-May, as a result of 
the earlier UN General Assembly resolution, discussion shifted to their retention in 
Korea under the custody of a five nation commission headed by India. For the United 
States, the idea of neutral nations arranging the repatriation was appealing. The 
candidate countries included Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The 
other nation not being decided might be India, should Communist China and North 
Korea consent. The Eisenhower administration disliked, however, the prospect that the 
Indians on the commission might vote against the U. S., since the Indian position on 
POWs had to some degree been close to the Communist position. More than anything 
else, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to allow Communists troops from Poland 
and Czechoslovakia to be deployed in the rear of the UNC troops to supervise the 
POWs. In considering these questions, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, concluded: 
On the question of further instructions for Clark we have given our secretary a memorandum 
which in sum makes three points-first that we should accept the Indians right away as a member 
of the commission, second that we should propose that all forces be provided by the Indians alone, 
and third that we should stand on having a terminal date after which POWs would be released. 
43 
Most controversially, on 13 May 1953, the U. S. negotiators were instructed, at 
Clark's suggestion and with the authority of the JCS, that Korean non-repatriates should 
not be handed over to the repatriation commission under any circumstances. Instead 
1 NA, RG 59, Matthews files, lot 53 D 413, Clark to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 May 1953. 
42 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, p. 981-982, The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to Clark, 
7 May 1953. 
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they should be released as soon as the armistice agreement was initialled. This decision 
was related to Rhee and his government. Since April Rhee had informed Clark of his 
opposition to the resumption of armistice negotiations and warned that he would 
seriously consider the withdrawal of South Korean forces from UN operational control 
in order to take unilateral military actions. Not surprisingly, the Communists' response 
to the above proposal was severe. 44 The demands were rejected outright by the 
Communists. They thought this would paralyze the work of the NNRC. Chou informed 
Nehru of China's plan to withdraw all the concessions they had recently presented. 
Western allies criticised the American position. On 18 May, Ward P. Allen of the 
European desk in the State Department summarised their concerns. Great Britain 
suggested that they should not go so far as to let Syngman Rhee's attitude be decisive. 
In view of this situation, Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs, pointed out that the Communists would capitalise on the differences 
between the United States and its allies. Robert Murphy, Political Advisor to Clark, 
noted this criticism and recommended that Clark be flexible on the question of North 
Korean POWs. In late May, Clark requested and the JCS agreed that Clark should 
terminate rather than recess the armistice negotiations if common ground could not be 
found. 45 
The real problems for the United States were with Rhee who sought to wreck the 
armistice. President Rhee was strongly against, and was fomenting public opposition in 
44 Ibid., p. 10 10, Clark to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 May 1953; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 
pp. 425-426; Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victojy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 170. 
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Korea to, any armistice along the proposed lines. He maintained that North Koreans 
resisting repatriation be released immediately upon an armistice, rather than turned over 
to the custodial commission for processing in the same manner as Chinese POWs. He 
believed that South Korea would not be safe until all Chinese troops had departed the 
Korean Peninsula. He persisted, accordingly, in demanding the withdrawal of Chinese 
troops before the armistice agreement was signed. 46 Rhee abhored the idea of an 
armistice, fearing that it would guarantee a permanent Chinese presence in northern 
Korea that would result in the absorption of all Korea into China. Even though 
President Rhee realised the hopelessness of opposing any United States decision to sign 
an armistice, he still undertook to extract critical concessions from the United States-a 
mutual defence treaty, military and economic support, the retention of U. S. air and 
naval forces in South Korea, and simultaneous withdrawal of UN and Communist 
forces from Korea. 
Clark discussed with Rhee the critical situation which had derived from South 
Korea's attitude towards the UNC counter-proposal pertaining to the presence of 
Communist custodial troops in Korean rear areas. Rhee was adamant that no foreign 
troops would be permitted on Korean soil. Clark advised Washington that Korean non- 
repatriates should be released since South Korea's position in this matter did not yield a 
single point. Clark was very concerned that Rhee had questioned the possibility of 
South Korean security troops in POW camps releasing North Koreans without 
consulting him. 47 Rhee threatened to release the Korean non-repatriates unilaterally, 
rather than hand them over to the NNRC (Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission). 
46 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, p. 897, Memorandum of Conversation, 8 April 1953. 
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Indeed he had the ability to carry out this threat. While the Chinese non-repatriates were 
in custody on Cheju Island, the Koreans were on the mainland. In the event of a 
unilateral release, the prisoners could instantly disappear into the local community. 
Rhee's reaction on the prisoner issue was the strong warning of what was to come. 48 
On 25 May, Clark presented the final position to the Communists. His main 
points were as follows: 
1. Maintain present position on accepting five-nation custodial commission subject to all armed 
forces and operating personnel being provided exclusively by India. 
2. Agree Korean non-repatriates will be turned over to commission in same manner as Chinese. 
3. Agree that commission will act on all matters by majority vote. 
4. Support essential elements in terms of reference for commission to assure coercion and force 
will not be used against non-repatriates. 
5. Period of access to prisoners by North Koreans and Chinese to be ninety days. 
6. Agree to submit to political conference the question of remaining non-repatriates, with 
provision that failing to determine their disposition within 120 days (90 days access by the 
Communists and 30 days for consideration by political conference), their case will be referred to 
UN General Assembly. 49 
Rhee's response to the proposal was completely uncooperative. He declared it 
unacceptable to South Korea. 50 Public opinion was also negative. Yung Tae Pyun, 
Korean Foreign Minister, criticised the U. S. for not consulting with South Korea before 
submitting the final proposal, and threatened to withdraw the ROK forces from United 
47 Ibid., pp. 1008- 10 10, Clark to JCS, 12 May 195 3. 
48 Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 249-250; Callum 
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Nations Command control .51 However, Rhee moderated his intransigent stand a few 
days later. It was thought that a tough position may have been temporaý. 'jjj taken to 
extract further concessions from Washington in the course of all South Korea's 
agitation against the U. S. proposal. In his letter to Eisenhower, his message was milder 
in tone and he had omitted any reference to the Korean POWs or to the five nation 
custodial commission. 52 It was indicative of the decision on his part to avoid plunging 
into reckless adventure. The Eisenhower administration planned that if the proposal was 
not accepted by the Communists within a week, negotiations would be terminated 
rather than recessed. All previous agreements would have to be voided as to the 
immunity and neutralisation of the negotiations area, and all POWs would also be 
released. 53 Dulles passed a strong warning to the Chinese through the Indian 
Government that "unless an armistice was agreed upon, the United States would 
intensify the war. , 54 This action resulted from the 144 th meeting of the National 
Security Council, at which the policy-makers considered the use of atomic weapons for 
curtailment of war expenditure. Eisenhower stated that "it might be cheaper, dollar- 
wise, to use atomic weapons in Korea than to continue to use conventional weapons. ý555 
1 Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul, 29 May 1953. 
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His only real worry was over the possibility of intervention by the USSR. He feared the 
Chinese much less. 56 
At the meeting on 4 June, the Communists agreed to the main points of the UN 
Command proposal except that non-repatriates who might elect to go to neutral nations 
should be assisted by the NNRC and the Red Cross Society of India. Dulles told 
Eisenhower, "Barring unforeseen developments, it appears that the POW issue has been 
solved. ý, 57 Clark predicted that an armistice could be signed as early as 18 June. On 8 
June, a final text on POWs was agreed by both sides. 58 However, Rhee did not accept 
the agreement. Dulles met with senators to discuss current Korean questions and found 
them unhappy with the final agreement on POWs. Senator Knowland was requested to 
persuade Rhee not to obstruct an annistice. 59As Rhee had been affected by public 
opinion and interest groups, congressmen's persuasions were quite critical at that 
period. 
Once agreement was reached on the repatriation question, it was no longer a 
question of when the final armistice would be signed. It was now up to the United 
States to secure Rhee's accord in a POWs exchange and to carry through the extended 
obligations that an armistice agreement would impose. If hostilities had been 
concluded, another problem would have been raised: Rhee would be free to withdraw 
56 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 145 th NSC Meeting, 20 May 1953. 
57 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Dulles to Eisenhower, 4 June 1953. 
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the Korean Militga Armistice Negotiations (New York: Prager, 1958), p. 193. 
59DDE Library, Dulles Papers, Subject Series: Korea, Box 9,8 June 1953. 
48 
from the UN Command as leader of a sovereign state. This was recognised by Clark 
who informed the JCS of it in a telegram on 18 April: 
The possibility that Rhee may make independent use of ROK forces raises again the question of 
obtaining an agreement with the Republic of Korea which provides for UNC control of ROK 
forces during the post-annistice period. Current UNC authority over ROK forces was granted by 
Rhee personally, and exists only during the period of the continuation of the present state of 
hostilities. In my view the present state of hostilities will not legally end with the execution of 
armistice but Rhee may interpret this argument differently. 60 
On 24 April, as armistice negotiations resumed, Rhee threatened to withdraw his 
troops from the UN Command. The UNC had been concerned about breaking off the 
armistice negotiations since the South Korean army held two-thirds of the defence line 
against the Communist forces, where combat was suspended while the truce 
negotiations were being carried on. This would present an ideal opportunity for Rhee to 
take unilateral military action, thereby rendering him a bargaining source. 61 
In April, the term of the postwar security relationship, which was clearly 
contingent upon South Korea's acceptance of the armistice agreement, was still 
unresolved. Nevertheless, the main issues were already clear, centf-, ing around the 
demand for a mutual defence treaty with the United States. The South Korean Foreign 
Minister Yung Tae Pyun raised the subject of a U. S. -ROK mutual defence treaty in a 
conversation with American Ambassador Ellis 0. Briggs on 3 April. Secretary Dulles 
notified Pyun that the U. S. would consider a defence treaty after the Korean political 
60 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 918, Clark to JCS, 18 April 1953. 
61 Ibid., pp. 940-942, Clark to Collins, 26 April 1953. 
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conference worked out a peaceful Korean settlement. 62 In a letter to Eisenhower on 14 
April, Rhee reiterated his request for a security pact. On the same day, Major General 
Thomas W. Herren, Commander of the Korean Communications Zone, suggested to 
Clark that in view of the hostile campaign by Rhee against the armistice negotiations, 
the U. S. should accede to Rhee's request for a security pact between the two 
countries. 63 In his letter to Clark, Rhee did not feel prepared to agree to the armistice, 
unless a mutual defence treaty was concluded in advance of the withdrawal of the 
United States forces from Korea. 64 Clark recognised that the ROK withdrawal from the 
UN Command, growing out of dissatisfaction with an armistice agreement, was a real 
possibility and posed a threat to his power as LN Commander. The UN Command, 
which had originally served as the controlling mechanism through which the U. S. held 
operational authority over the Korean armed forces, broadened its role and functions as 
the war continued. It had served as the formal negotiating mechanism for UN forces in 
Korea since the armistice negotiations had started, and would likely be the key to 
political stability on the Korean peninsula in the post-war period. 
On 12 May the South Korean government asked that the armistice negotiations be 
deferred since they were in conflict with the American position. As this was rejected, 
President Rhee ordered the withdrawal of South Korean delegates from Panmunjom. 
The Eisenhower Administration expressed serious concerns over Rhee's opposition to 
62 Ibid., pp. 897-900, Memo of Conversation, by Young, 8 April 1953. 
63 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Fro , p. 
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the armistice. Eisenhower appreciated that Rhee's actions had stemmed in part from a 
feeling of apprehension in South Korea regarding its future security, and also from his 
desire to maximise his bargaining position with Washington. To allay Rhee's 
apprehension, the Eisenhower administration offered to hold informal discussions with 
the ROK looking towards a comprehensive agreement on military assistance and related 
matters. In addition, they were prepared to assist the development and maintenance of 
Korean ground forces at a level of 20 divisions (plus one Marine Brigade), provided 
assurances were given by the ROK of cooperation in the armistice agreement. 65 General 
Bradley explained that cutbacks in the ammunition programme intended for NATO 
would be required in order to maintain the ROK forces. 66 However,, Rhee did not regard 
the proposed statement as an effective substitute for a security pact. General Clark and 
Ambassador Briggs viewed the security pact as essential as a bargaining tool to soften 
the impact of concessions that the U. S. was about to make to the Communists at 
Panmunjom. They urged the Administration to express to Rhee a willingness to 
negotiate a mutual security pact. 67 
The question of entering into a mutual defence treaty with South Korea was 
enthusiastically debated and discussed by policy makers in the State and Defense 
departments. Most of the participants opposed it. Secretary Dulles was against it on the 
grounds that "it would be contrary to the principle of the UN action in Korea. 
" A 
mutual defence treaty would clearly weaken the UN mandate and impair the validity of 
65 NA, RG 59,795.00/5-1853, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, 15 May 1953 
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that mandate. The Truman administration avoided seeking Congressional authorisation 
for the Korean involvement which might undermine the UN character of the Korean 
commitment. For this reason, Dulles observed that under the circumstances, it might 
lead the other allies to reduce their military presence from Korea, and instead opt for a 
policy of imposing 'the Greater Sanctions' [see below]. Washington policy makers 
were concerned that it would lead the Communists to believe that the United States was 
not interested in the political unification of all Korea under a free government, and that 
it might acknowledge and give legal effect to communist control over a part of Korea. 
General Collins argued, from the military aspect, that "if we left forces in Korea for a 
security pact, we would be leaving forces in a place where in the event of global war we 
might not want to fight, so from a military point of view there were real disadvantages 
,, 68 to a security pact with the Koreans. In connection with this, a month later, Dulles 
revealed his apprehensions over a security pact that would bind the United States to 
unify Korea by force if the political conference following the armistice agreement was 
not successful. 
69 
As Rhee's opposition to an armistice was impeding the negotiating process, the 
Eisenhower administration believed that South Korea's continued objection to an 
68 NA, lot 61 D 417, Korean Negotiations, State-JCS Meeting, 18 May 1953; NA, RG 59,795.00/5-1853, 
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armistice agreement would necessitate some form of positive response by the United 
States. At a high level-meeting held on 29-30 May, alternative courses of action were 
considered for the purpose of counteracting the continued ROK hostility to an armistice 
agreement. The policy options upon which they rested were ftindamental to 
understanding the new terms of the United States' national security commitment to 
South Korea. Three options were considered by policy makers. The first was the 
question of proposing a security pact, the second was the question of authority for 
taking over the South Korean govermuent--'Plan Everready', and the third was the 
question of pulling the United States forces out of Korea. 
Each of these actions would have significant consequences for future U. S. -ROK 
security relations. The first approach was to gain Rhee's compliance with the armistice 
in return for a security pact. While this would be ambiguous the UN character of the 
original military commitment, the ideological incompatibility between a policy based 
on a UN mandate and one based on a unilateral security commitment, was no longer 
viewed as overriding. The second was a military coup led by the U. S. against President 
Rhee and his govermnent. It was prepared by General Clark on 4 May as a contingency 
plan to be implemented in the event of continued intransigence by the ROK toward the 
armistice agreement. General Collins preferred to take Rhee into custody. He wanted to 
proclaim martial law, enforced by ROK Army authorities who were loyal to the 
Commanding General of the U. S. Eighth Army, and establish a military government. 
He thought that otherwise, Rhee might do various things to embarrass or endanger the 
United States: release North Korean non-repatriates; offer a separate armistice; 
withdraw ROK forces from the UN Command; or stimulate riots or attacks on the 
foreign personnel working for the NNSC under the armistice terms. From a political 
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point of view, however, Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson was 
apprehensive about the possibility of putting the United States in a position where they 
were aggressors. The third option was regarded by the military as having serious 
political implications if the United States gave up South Korea after having fought for 
three years to protect it. Among these options, the first was the agreed national policy, 
although the feasibility of this course of action remained to be tested. The unknown 
factor was whether Rhee was prepared to pay the price for a mutual defence treaty in 
compliance with the armistice agreement and continued UN Command operational 
control over ROK forces during the post-armistice period. On the whole, most of the 
participants concluded that the decision would have to be made by Eisenhower who had 
final responsibility for the policy of the United States. 70 
In anticipation of drastic measures, a special message was sent to Clark, which 
withheld authorisation to proceed with Plan Everready, but did not specifically rule out 
any extreme course of action in an emergency. 71 On 30 May, Eisenhower agreed to 
inform Rhee that the U. S. was prepared to undertake immediate negotiations for a 
security pact with South Korea along the lines of the Philippine and ANZUS (Australia, 
70 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. I 114-1119, State-JCS Meetings, 29 May 1953; Hennes, Truce Tent, p. 447. 
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72 New Zealand and the United States) treaties. President Rhee's response to this was 
vague. Ambassador Briggs doubted if Rhee would be reconciled to an armistice by the 
offer to negotiate a mutual defence treaty. He thought it was an untimely offer as it was 
followed on May 25 by the UNC proposal without previous consultation with the 
73 ROK . As a result, the whole situation was greatly changed. For the most part, Rhee 
regarded the offer as a bargaining approach, encouraging him to renew his insistence on 
modifying the armistice proposal. 
The diplomatic seesaw during the months of June and July 1953 focused upon 
another stalemate. The task that the Eisenhower administration had to cope with was 
greatly complicated by Rhee's requirements for binding agreements from the United 
States prior to an armistice agreement. These were based upon a complete withdrawal 
of Chinese Communist and United Nations forces, not on the basis of an armistice 
along the lines of the 25 May proposal. This left a wide gap between Rhee and 
Eisenhower. 74 In a message from Collins on 3 June, Clark was told that as far as the 
United States was concerned, the introduction of the simultaneous withdrawal of 
foreign forces into the armistice negotiations was unacceptable. It was regarded as a 
sign of weakness and something that might jeopardise the American position in 
negotiations with the Communists. In connection with Rhee's proposal, Washington 
considered that firstly, there should be no commitment to withdraw all UN forces until 
the ROK and the UNC were satisfied regarding the security of South Korea; secondly, 
the actual presence of UNC forces in Korea was an additional deterrent against renewal 
72 NA, FE files, lot 55 D 338, South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, 30 May 1953. 
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of attack; and finally, the continued presence of UNC forces during the forthcoming 
political conference would improve the bargaining position of the ROK and UN 
delegations at the conference. 75 Most important was that any UN forces' withdrawal 
from Korea could render difficult the basic U. S. policy objective of retaining 
operational control over ROK forces. 
General Clark and Ambassador Briggs were authorised to discuss the terms of a 
security pact with Rhee, though they refrained from doing so whilst President Rhee 
continued his insistence on the simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces. In"meeting 
with President Rhee to deliver Eisenhower's letter containing an offer of a mutual 
defence treaty, Ambassador Briggs and Clark pointed out to Rhee that negotiations over 
a treaty could begin as soon as an armistice had been signed and accepted by South 
Korea, and tried to persuade him to take a reasonable approach to the armistice terms. 
However, their efforts were crushed and they were warned that if the United States 
signed an armistice, "South Korea would take action. 1)76 Clark and Murphy suspected at 
some point that the ROK might seek to engineer the release of North Korean non- 
repatriates. 77 Clark warned Rhee that this action would result in his own destruction 
and that of South Korea without American logistical support. Despite this bluff, in 
reality Clark was genuinely concerned about Rhee's ability to violate the armistice 
75 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1135-1137, Collins to Clark, 3 June 1953. 
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terms. He conjectured that Rhee could do this by any one of a number of methods, and 
there was little the UNC could do to stop him. 78 
Although negotiations on the remaining armistice items began on 9 June, 
President Rhee kept up his uncooperative and rude attitude towards the Eisenhower 
administration. Clark and Briggs' lack of success in persuading Rhee induced 
Washington's demand to moderate his stance against the armistice agreement. Dulles 
sent Rhee a letter on II June 1953 inviting him to a confidential meeting in 
Washington. He reminded Rhee of President Eisenhower's determination to unify 
Korea by peaceful means. Rhee replied he could not leave his country even for a short 
time, adding that "I wonder if you could make a trip here so that we may talk things 
,, 79 over face to face. In reaction to this letter, Dulles felt, on balance, that it would be a 
mistake for him to go to Korea before Rhee's position on the armistice had been made 
clear. He responded that he could not leave Washington at this time, but suggested that 
Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State, could go to Korea instead. Robertson 
was asked to go prior to the Bermuda Conference, as Rhee could be anxious about 
Churchill's influence on the Eisenhower administration with regard to the British will 
that the U. S. government take a more lenient attitude towards Communist China. 80 
Robertson's trip to Korea floundered on Rhee's bluffing tactics. Rhee was not placated. 
The situation in this period posed a dilemma for Washington and Seoul. If Rhee once 
accepted the armistice agreement, he would be disgraced before his people. Washington 
78 Ibid., pp. 1149-115 1, Clark to JCS, 7 June 1953. 
79 Ibid., p. 1167, Rhee to Dulles, 14 June 195 3. 
80 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, box 1, Memorandum for the President, 
14 June 1953. 
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realised these situations were crucial for Rhee and his government. For this reason, 
Robertson would have to concoct a face-saving formula. 
While the United Nations Command and the Communists were preparing the 
final details of the POW exchange, Rhee, in an attempt to blow up the negotiations, 
ordered a secret programme to release North Korean POWs who did not want to be 
repatriated. In the early morning of 18 June 1953, under the auspices of Korean guards, 
the prisoners at camp in Pusan, Masan, and other places inland were released into the 
local population. General Clark noted that " all hell broke loose at Rhee's order. "81 This 
incident brought into question the basic issue of whether the UN Command still 
exercised operational control over ROK forces. On learning of the prisoners' escape, 
the Communist negotiators abruptly suspended the negotiations. President Rhee dealt a 
smashing blow to the armistice process by ordering the escape. In his letter to General 
Clark on 18 June, he threatened to do still more damage by withdrawing South Korean 
forces from the United Nations Command and by refusing to abide by the armistice 
terms. One of the provisions of the armistice agreement was to be that within two hours 
of its implementation all forces would withdraw two kilometers from the demarcation 
lines. Rhee warned that he would ignore that provision. He threatened to maintain 
South Korean forces in place as a means of obstructing the creation of a demilitarised 
zone, which was the striking blow to the armistice agreement. 
82 All told, 35,400 
prisoners managed to escape by 30 June; only 8,600 remained in the camps. Failure to 
81 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1196, Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Northeast 
Asian Affairs (Young), 17 June 1953. 
82 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 150th NSC Meeting, President Rhee's Release of 
Prisoners of War, 18 June 1953. 
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take steps to prevent Rhee's expected action called out criticism from the Communists 
as well as Western allies and America itself The Eisenhower administration again 
asked senators and representatives who had an effect on Rhee to bring him into line. 
83 
O's -kO 
There was a question"'WW4. Eisenhower intended to direct Clark to carry out Everready. 
According to Sherman Adams, Assistant to President Eisenhower, Eisenhower told the 
cabinet members on the next day that "he wished the South Koreans would overthrow 
Rhee and replace him with a more moderate and reasonable leader. " He had no choice 
but to realise Rhee's position not only because Rhee had stable political power, but also 
because Eisenhower did not want a surrender to the Chinese by walking out of Korea. 84 
As a result of Rhee's release of the POWs, the armistice negotiations immediately 
went into recess until the Eisenhower administration regained control over Rhee and his 
adherence to the armistice. Washington's proposal for a mutual defence treaty had not 
been a satisfactory stimulus to gain Rhee's compliance. Accordingly, the Eisenhower 
administration considered various actions to meet the situation Rhee had created. 
America's alternatives included trying to bring him into line with its current armistice 
position or, if he was adamant, trying to effect his removal by Plan Everready. The only 
other alternative was for the United States to yield to Rhee. 85 Although President 
Rhee's actions highlighted his ability to defy his great ally in the interest of emphasising 
his country's need to pursue an independent policy, this was a dangerous policy. It 
could produce more concessions from the U. S., but it could also backfire on him. 
83 DDE Library, Dulles Papers, Subject Series, Box 9,25 June 1953. 
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84 Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of isenhower Administration (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 196 1), pp. 100- 10 1- 
85 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1225-1227, Briggs to Clark, 20 June 1953. 
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Washington applied more pressure in an effort to bring Rhee into line. In a letter to 
Rhee on 22 June, Dulles admonished Rhee that he had no right to release the prisoners 
or to withdraw from the UNC, affirming that those actions carried the risk of national 
disaster for South Korea. 86 
Unexpectedly, the Communists' reaction was surprisingly restrained. After a short 
recession, they agreed to resume the negotiations, but criticised strongly what they 
suspected was the implicit approval of the United Nations Command of the POWs' 
release. The POW issue had been the main obstacle in the way of an armistice 
agreement. The Communists were also just as worried as the United States about 
whether Rhee would obey the terms of an armistice agreement. The Communists asked 
if the Eisenhower administration could control President Rhee effectively, and if not, 
was Rhee bound by the armistice agreement? The UNC did not give a clear answer. 87 
There was a long and difficult time to bring Rhee into line with the U. S. To 
prevent Rhee taking anymore drastic action, General Clark warned Rhee that the ROK 
army lacked the resources to fight on alone and advised that "a post-armistice political 
conference was a good idea" for Korean unification. Rhee was told that the POWs 
could be delivered to the Repatriation Commission at the demilitarised zone, thus 
avoiding the need for Indian troops in Korea. Clark thought that Rhee was impressed 
with this alternative, but he would not commit himself. 
88 President Rhee tried to be 
conciliatory. His feelings were set out in a draft aide-memoire he sent to Clark on 23 
June 1953. He agreed to support the armistice agreement, and to carry out its terms, but 
86 Ibid., pp. 1238-40, Dulles to Rhee, 22 June 1953. 
87 Hennes, Truce Te , pp. 
451-453. 
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only because ROK forces were under the United Nations Command and had to obey its 
orders, not because the armistice terms had been accepted by the ROK government. He 
also agreed not to withdraw his armed forces from the United Nations Command 
unilaterally, and not to sign the armistice as a member of the United Nations delegation. 
But he attached the following additional conditions: 
1. The political conference must sit no longer than 90 days. If this period expires without agreeing 
upon the means of evacuating Chinese Communist troops from Korea, to be completed within 60 
days of the conference breaking up, the ROK forces will invade the north to unify Korea with the 
support of the United States. 
2. Before signing the armistice, the United States will enter into a mutual defence treaty with 
South Korea. 
3. The United States will provide South Korea with adequate military and economic aid. 
4. As to the prisoners of war, no foreign troops and Communists incloctrinators are allowed in 
South Korea. Communists Chinese prisoners will be disposed of as the UN plan. Anti-Communist 
North Korean POWs should be quickly questioned and released. '9 
Conditions I and 2 represented obvious difficulties for the Eisenhower administration. 
A 
-A, part from stipulating a discretionary time limit on the political conference, Rhee's F 
desire to commit the United States to military involvement conflicted with 
Eisenhower's policy of peaceful unification. Whether there was any bite to 
Washington's desire for peaceful reunification remained an important question. On 12 
June, Secretary Dulles stressed, in a letter to Rhee: "When we talk about unification of 
" Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 282-284. 
89 DDE Library, Mark Clark Papers, Rhee Aide Memoire, 22 June 1953; FRUS, Vol. 15, pp. 1240-1242, 
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Korea by methods other than war, we are not using empty phrases. "90 A second 
problem related to the question of whether a security pact would precede or follow an 
armistice agreement. As such a treaty would have to be submitted to the Senate for 
, approval, Washington policy makers assumed that a rigid time limit, therefore, could 
not be imposed by Rhee's Government. 
Giving the green light for a quick armistice agreement, President Eisenhower 
determined that General Clark should be given overall authority to conclude an 
armistice agreement with the Communists without Rhee's approval if necessary. On 25 
June 1953 Clark received a joint State-Defense message that included the following 
guidelines: there should be no forced repatriation of POWs; Rhee should be informed of 
U. S. intentions to proceed with the conclusion of an armistice; no commitment, or 
agreement should be made which would require total UNC withdrawal from Korea; 
however, this should not prevent the U. S. from taking any action which might caution 
the ROK leaders with regard to the consequences of non-compliance. In response, Clark 
advised Washington: "the sooner we sign an an-nistice, with or without Rhee's support, 
the better our position will be to handle Rhee when we are not worried about a 
Communist attack. "91 
Following the directions of Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, Robertson went to 
South Korea to obtain an agreement from Rhee that he would not obstruct the armistice. 
At the meetings with Rhee, he was subjected to severe criticisms over the U. S. attitude 
to the Communists. Rhee reiterated his opposition to the armistice terms in connection 
with the further detention of POWs, since they contained no mention of a Chinese 
90 DDE Library, Mark Clark Papers, Rhee Aide Memoire, 22 June 1953. 
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Communist withdrawal nor of the prospective political conference. Nevertheless, 
Robertson succeeded in drawing Rhee's attention to the need for U. S. -South Korean 
cooperation in a private meeting. Rhee finally indicated his acceptance of the armistice 
agreement with the following modifications: 
1. Moving remaining 8600 Korean anti-Communist POWs to demilitarised zone for take-over by 
NNSC, allowing Chinese POWs to remain in Cheju island under NNRC as now contemplated; 
2. Placing time limit of say 90 days on political conference discussions. I stated I thought this 
impossible condition but would present it to you; 
3. Economic aid and build-up of ROK Army to approximately 20 divisions as previously 
promised; 
4. Immediate guarantee of mutual defence pact which I indicated would follow general lines of 
pact with Philippines. 
92 
Robertson's private meeting substantiated Rhee's willingness to bargain for the 
best deal with the United States. President Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that it was 
encouraging, and agreed with points three and four although any guarantee of a mutual 
defence treaty was, of course, subject to Senate advice and consent in accordance with 
U. S. constitutional processes. With respect to point two, Eisenhower maintained that it 
was impossible for the United States to impose a time limit upon other countries which 
would be participating in the political conference, and promised that if the conference 
was not making progress, he would act in concert with the ROK by retiring from the 
conference. 
93 
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In consideration of the ROK's domestic situation, Rhee's aggressive and 
unequivocal attitude to the armistice agreement made it extremely difficult for him to 
change his objection to the agreement. In his report to Dulles, Robertson noted Rhee's 
dilemma, mentioned to him after a gigantic war anniversary rally, "You are like a hand 
extended to a drowning man, please help us find a way out. " Robertson was convinced 
that Rhee had tried to find an appropriate exit which would save his face and at the 
same time make reversal of his position seem logical to his people. He needed to 
convince the South Koreans that he had forced concessions from Washington. 94 
On 27 June, Robertson and Clark met with Rhee and delivered Eisenhower's 
reply to the four questions raised by Rhee in his first meeting with Robertson. After the 
presentation, Rhee reacted negatively and insisted that it did not fully reflect his own 
ideas. On 28 June, Rhee conveyed his aide-memoire to Robertson. He argued that on 
three points his wishes had not been met by Washington. In connection with a mutual 
defence treaty, Rhee re-emphasised South Korea's wishes to conclude such a pact prior 
to the signing of an armistice. With regards to this, he ignored the constitutional 
position of the Senate in defining the future U. S. security commitment towards South 
Korea. Secondly, he continued to insist on the immediate release of non-repatriate 
POWs who had undergone interrogation. Lastly he maintained that a combat operation 
should be resumed to expel Chinese troops from North Korea if the Korean political 
conference did not make any progress for the unification of Korea. 
95 
94 NA, RG 59,795.00/6-2753, Robertson to Dulles and Johnson, 27 June 1953. 
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Rhee intended to intimidate the United States to succumb to his demands. He 
emphasised that the ROK agreed to continue the present arrangement with the United 
Nations Command as stated in his letter to General MacArthur dated 15 July 1950, if 
the UNC cooperated and supported South Korea's policy by fighting on to victory. 96 
Rhee stated, however, that when his government decided to take its forces out of the 
UNC, he would notify the UNC in advance. 97 
On receiving this bad news, Secretary Dulles informed Eisenhower and concluded 
that Clark and Robertson should be given discretionary powers to increase pressure on 
Rhee. 98 On 29 June, another meeting was held and Robertson handed Rhee the original 
of the Korean aide-memoire with the remark that "as it contained so many inaccuracies 
and so much of it was irrelevant, it could not provide a basis for discussion and 
therefore was returned as unacceptable. "99 Since the United States could no longer 
delay answering the question the Communists had proposed on 4 June, Clark informed 
Rhee that the UNC was proceeding with armistice negotiations, and expressed hope for 
South Korea's support and cooperation. Finally, Rhee agreed to submit a revised 
version of his last aide-memoire. 100 
96 Department of State, Bulletin, p. 206, UN document S/1627,7 August 1950. President Rhee had 
assigned operational command of The ROK ground, sea, and air forces to MacArthur as CINCLINC in a 
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97 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1282-1284, Rhee to Robertson, 28 June 1953. 
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The United States believed that President Rhee would keep on persisting in his 
opposition to the armistice agreement to obtain concessions from it. Robertson reported 
to Dulles that Rhee was genuinely concerned that "the Communists might win more at 
the negotiations than they had won in military action. " In an effort to bring Rhee into 
line with the United States, Senior Republican and Democrat politicians, Senators 
William Knowland and Alexander Smith, and Congressman Walter Judd (all three of 
whom were bitterly anti-Communist and friends of Rhee), expressed their assurance 
over Rhee's cooperation with the U. S. by signing an armistice agreement. 10 1 Expecting 
to deliver to Rhee the administration's concern about Rhee's uncooperative attitude, 
Acting Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith sent a message to Robertson that Senator 
Walter F. George and other influential senators on whom the Eisenhower 
administration depended strongly for support for any programme for Korea had a 
growing lack of confidence in Rhee. 1 02 This action meant that the ratification of the 
mutual defence treaty would be dependent on what Rhee did between then and the time 
of Senate consideration of the treaty. 
Rhee, who was a shrewd negotiator himself, tried to take the initiative to raise 
-rke 
two principal issues: American's action in"*p'ost-Korean political conference period, andi6t 
Senatdstreatment of a mutual defence treaty. Rhee repeated again his strong desire for a 
pledge from the United States for joint military action in the post-conference period. 
Rhee fully understood the difference between the United States carrying on the war as a 
member of the United Nations or acting alone. Considering Washington's dilemma, 
he 
101 NA, RG 59,795.00/7-153, Telegram to Seoul, I July 1953. 
102 NA, RG 59,795.00/7-553,5 July 1953; FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1331-1332, The Acting Secretary of State 
to the Embassy in Korea, 5 July 1953. 
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expressed his hope that the United States could at least give him moral and material 
support in fighting alone for Korea's unification. He also recognised why American 
statesmen were reluctant to give such support if it meant a risk of large-scale hostilities. 
Rhee doubted whether the Senate would approve a mutual defence treaty because of the 
constitutional limitations upon the President's actions. He had a thorough knowledge of 
American history and knew of instances when the Senate had not always ratified 
treaties negotiated by a President. He realised that he had lost popular support in 
America and for this reason he felt there might be some doubt that the Senate would 
give its consent for a defence treaty with Korea. In reference to this, Rhee demanded 
from Eisenhower and Dulles assurances that the Senate leaders would act speedily on 
the treaty. Robertson replied that the Senate leaders were aware of Eisenhower's offer 
of a treaty and indicated their general approval. 103 Mr. Yung TaePyun, the Korean 
Foreign Minister, protested his concern over a lack of any concrete assurances against 
renewed Communist aggression. ' 04 In order not to delay the signing of the armistice 
agreement, Robertson urged Dulles that "Eisenhower confer with the Senate leaders of 
both parties to obtain the promise of their support for the treaty, " and advised Rhee to 
this effect. 
105 
As to the resumption of hostilities after the Korean political conference, President 
Eisenhower's flexibility was limited by his presidential campaign promise to bring the 
United States forces home and by his dependence on Congress. Robertson set forth the 
limits of Eisenhower's foreign policy vis-a-vis South Korea. He conveyed to Dulles his 
103 Ibid., pp. 1326-1329, Memorandum of Conversation, By Robertson, 4 July 1953. 
104 NA, RG 59,795.00/7-453, Meeting with President Rhee, 4 July 1953. 
105 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1336, Robertson to Dulles, 6 July 1953. 
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distress over Rhee's threat to resume hostilities alone after a joint withdrawal from the 
political conference as Rhee would never agree to place his forces under the United 
Nations Command for an indefinite time. 
106 
In his revised aide-memoire, handed to Robertson on 7 July, Rhee agreed that 
Senate's enactment of the treaty was not possible before the armistice. 107 Rhee 
harboured a deep fear during that period that not only would the annistice leave Korea 
divided, but that in the future Korea might be sacrificed to some great power as had 
happened in 1950. The United States' role in that event was not one to give him 
comfort. 
Rhee defined his final position on 9 July. His letter indicated retreat from many of 
his previously declared terms: 
1. He gave up the condition that the withdrawal of Chinese Communists troops and unification of 
Korea took place prior to the conclusion of armistice. 
2. He gave up the demand that all non-Communists POWs be immediately released to countries of 
their own choosing. 
3. He agreed that all anti-Communist POWs would be transported to DMZ and turned over to 
NNSC. 
4. He gave up his refusal to submit unification of Korea to political conference, and agreed to 
cooperate in the peaceful achievement of Korean unification with certain reservations. 
5. He gave up the demand that a defence treaty be ratified prior to the conclusion of armistice. 
ý11 6. He abandoned his request that America resume hostilities after the failure of the political 
conference. 
106 Ibid., p. 1330-133 1, Robertson to Dulles, 5 July 1953. 
107 Ibid., p. 1350, Robertson to Dulles, 8 July 1953. 
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7. For the first time in writing he fon-nally agreed not to obstruct the armistice. 'O' 
President Rhee's conciliatory attitude was not entirely satisfactory to the United States 
because he pointed out that the ROK could not sign the armistice. This would be 
another exit for Rhee to raise a bargaining method afterward. However, Washington 
responded favourably to it. Secretary Dulles thought it an acceptable basis for 
proceeding to negotiate an armistice agreement. 109 The reason Rhee retreated from his 
previously acclaimed terms was thought to be his consideration that South Korean 
forces could need time for replacement or reorganisation, and that a unilateral decision 
might be possible, since he was confident that the Korean political conference could not 
achieve any satisfactory outcomes. ' 10 
Rhee and Robertson concluded their talks on July 11 and issued a joint 
communique predicting continued cooperation during the post-armistice period. In a 
letter to Eisenhower, Rhee guaranteed that he would not obstruct, in any manner, the 
implementation of the terms of an armistice agreement. "' Although progress had been 
made, scepticism remained because Rhee was quoted as saying, "we will not accept 
armistice, but we agree not to obstruct it for a period of three months. " 112 
Rhee's readiness to violate an armistice agreement was a critical question for the 
Communists as well. The plenary sessions at Panmunjom reconvened on 10 July. 
General Nam 11, North Korean Delegate, protested at Rhee's release of POWs and 
108 NA, RG 59,795.00/7-953, Robertson to Alexis Johnson, 10 July 1953. 
109 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1362, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, 9 July 1953. 
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asked for an assurance that he would not do something similar again. ' 13 He dismissed 
General William Harrison's assurances on II July, based on instructions from the JCS 
that the LNC would not support any aggressive action by South Korean Army units in 
violation of the armistice. ' 14 Debate on this issue continued for a few days. The next 
day meeting at Panmunjom Harrison assured the Communists that he had received 
suitable assurance from Rhee's Government that it would work in close collaboration 
for common objectives during the post hostility period. The Communists welcomed this 
breakthrough but pointed out that definite pledges would still be required. ' 15 In 
confronting the Communist press for further clarification of the specific answers, and 
about their attack on the South Korean Capitol Division and three other divisions 
beginning on the night of 13 July, Harrison suspected the Communists were delaying 
the negotiations. On 16 July, negotiations were temporarily recessed though Harrison 
reiterated assurances from South Korea. 116 Clark thought that, under the present 
condition, if the UNC took a firm and positive stand it might influence the Communists 
to conclude an armistice agreement. He was concerned about additional UN casualties 
and giving Rhee another opportunity to obstruct the armistice. 117 
112 Washington Post, II July 1953. 
113 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1364-1365, Editorial Note; Hennes, Truce Tent, pp. 480-481. 
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At the 19 July meeting at Pam-nunjom the UNC achieved a satisfactory outcome. 
It was decided to rely on liaison officers to determine all important issues: the location 
of a final demarcation line, the place for delivering non-repatriate POWs, the time and 
date of a cease-fire, and the arrangements for signing documents. The staff officers of 
both sides were able to settle three of the four outstanding details concerning the 
armistice. In the early morning of 23 July both sides agreed to a line of demarcation and 
the demilitarised zone. They also established a procedure for each side to turn over its 
non-repatriates to the Repatriation Commission in its own half of the demilitarised 
zone. The role of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was left to the 
Commission itself In its first meeting, the day after the armistice was signed, the 
Commission would begin to determine its own method of operation. 118 
At the meeting of liaison officers on 26 July, the Communists refused the signing 
at Panmunjom by supreme commanders, on the grounds that the UNC had refused to 
exclude Chinese Nationalist and South Korean press correspondents. The UNC 
maintained that these press observers would constitute no threat to the security of the 
Communist commanders, but agreed to the Communist side's proposal for initial 
signing by senior delegates at Panmunjom, with the supreme commanders signing later 
at their headquarters. 
119 
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At 10: 12 a. m. on 27 July 1953, U. S. General William Harrison and North Korean 
General Nam 11 signed the armistice documents at Panmunjom, without South Korean 
representatives whose participation was blocked by Rhee. 120 
In conclusion, as the cold war intensified in the 1950s, small countries within 
each bloc could manoeuvre to implement their own interests as long as they stuck to the 
ideology of the superpowers. Each of the two superpower's primary objective was to 
extend its own bloc amongst small and uncommitted states at the expense of its rival 
and preventing the other rival from expanding its influence on its own allies. Small 
allies require, however, the existence of the other bloc in order to maintain their value 
as allies for their own bloc. 121 Under this circumstance, small allies could convert the 
alliance into an instrument of their policies with superpowers. According to Astri 
Suhrke, the initial commitment of a large power to a small state may reflect any of the 
following considerations: a desire to control the activities of the small state, a desire to 
deny its territory to an adversary, a wish to support the legitimacy of a particular 
government, or an attempt to impress third parties by maintaining that particular 
alliance. Conversely, the small state's bargaining power stems from the same 
considerations. It can threaten the large ally's desire for control by attempting to trigger 
it into an unwanted conflict or by seeking a separate accommodation with the common 
120 Clark, From Danube to the Yalu, pp. 294-295; Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 489-490. 
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adversary. To make the small state desist from such moves, the large ally may feel 
obliged to offer certain rewards or concessions. 122 
As a small state's leader, Rhee pursued tactics of unreliability or concessions 
towards the United States. Together with his strong anti-Communist posture and solid 
domestic power, Rhee was effective in employing calculated proposals for bargaining 
purposes. is anti-Communist stance reflected not only the conviction of anti- 
Communist groups in Congress but also American public opinion. He manipulated the 
differences of American political groups and organisational interest groups. The 
bargaining methods he employed were bluffs, threats, intransigence, and 
unpredictability. They were used individually or simultaneously. When he conceived 
the intention of the Communists' willingness to negotiate an armistice agreement 
following Stalin's death in March 1953, he renewed his violent opposition to ending the 
war even though he realised his objections would not succeed since the Eisenhower 
administration was determined to end the war by means of negotiations. Once the 
Eisenhower administration was deten-nined to end the war, he threatened to withdraw 
his forces from UN control and to fight alone against the Communists until he unified 
Korea. If South Korean forces were used for unauthorised offensive operations, it 
would provoke communist retaliation. Subsequently, the armistice would be postponed, 
engaging American forces in further hostilities. Rhee's threat to take unilateral action 
was less credible, but, at the same time, his propensity for rash action increased. Rhee 
knew that his conditions were unrealistic, but equally worthwhile since they presented 
a way in which South Korea could extract major concessions from the United States. 
Without a formal American commitment to preserve the security of South Korea, the 
122 Astri Suhrke, 'Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances', World Politics, 25(1973), pp. 508-509. 
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political position of Rhee would have been in serious jeopardy. When the larger ally 
depends on supportive actions by small allies in order to advance its interests, small 
allies increase their bargaining power not only in one issue but also to affect other 
issues to maximise its overall influence. 123 Although Rhee was not successful in 
attaining his main objectives-unification of Korea and immediate withdrawal of 
Chinese Communist forces, and promulgation of a mutual defence treaty before the 
armistice-his methods were quite effective for bargaining purposes. American 
officials in South Korea recommended an early conclusion of the mutual defence treaty 
and aid programmes. Immediately after Rhee's sudden release of POWs the Eisenhower 
administration speeded up its response to Rhee's demands to prevent further incidents. 
The release of POWs put the Eisenhower administration in a delicate dilemma, 
jeopardising its effort to come to an agreement with the Communists. Moreover, the 
Communists clearly believed that without South Korea's support, any armistice 
agreement with the United States would be irrelevant. Creating such doubt was Rhee's 
deliberate intention when he decided to release the North Korean prisoners. 
124 He tried 
to discredit the United States in the eyes of the Communists and, by doing so, stop any 
attempt to reach agreement with the Communists at Pam-nunjom without any 
concessions from the United States. 
The United States failed to persuade Rhee to accept an armistice agreement 
without reprisals. Since the United States had to pay attention to its global priorities and 
123 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 10- 11 - 
124 Chang Jin Park, 'The Influence of Small States upon the Superpowers: United States-South Korean 
Relations as a case study, 1950-1953', World Politics, 
28 (1975), pp. 112-113. 
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objectives that limited the conflict to Korea, they were often forced to soften their 
position, and submit to Rhee's tactics. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration not 
only agreed to conclude a security pact with South Korea, but also to spend billions of 
dollars on its rehabilitation, thereby guaranteeing Rhee's position following the war. 
Rhee's ability to influence the United States remained limited in spite of his 
potent bargaining. As a small country's leader, he could not change U. S. policy, but 
only exploit the situation insofar as their interests coincided. This success was possible 
only under circumstances where the United States was dedicated to maintaining its 
global policy, containment of Communism, and in doing so, support its small ally, 
South Korea. 
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2. Post-Armistice Issues and the Korean phase of the 
Geneva Conference, 1953-1954 
The Korean Armistice Agreement was a temporary measure to secure a complete 
cessation of hostilities and all other acts of military forces in Korea until a final 
peaceful settlement was achieved. After the armistice agreement was signed, the main 
issue highlighted was a Korean political conference. In February 1952, at Panmunjom, 
the decision was taken giving rise to the Korean political conference. This resulted from 
a compromise between the determination of the United Nations Command to confine 
the discussions on stopping the fighting to military matters, and the view of North 
Korea and the PRC that no peaceful solution could be achieved unless major political 
tensions were eased. ' The Korean armistice agreement indicated that a political 
conference should be convened within three months to settle the question of the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean 
question. 
The precise subject matter of the Korean political conference was vague and 
nothing was dealt with in the Korean armistice agreement about the place, the 
participants, voting procedures, and so on. Prior to Korean attendance at the 1954 
Geneva Conference, three controversial issues had to be resolved: (a) the Soviet 
1 FRUS, 1952-1954, The Geneva Conference, vol. 16, pp. 193; Sydney D. Bailey, The Korean Annistice 
(London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 150. 
2 The Korean Armistice Agreement, Article IV, 'Recommendation to the Governments concerned on 
Both Sides', 27 July 1953. 
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Union's participation and in what capacity; (b) the status of the PRC; and (c) India's 
participation as a neutral nation. 
While the United States had no objection to Soviet involvement on behalf of the 
Communist side, the PRC claimed the right to participate as a neutral. The status of 
the PRC had become a delicate and complicated question for the Eisenhower 
administration, which could not help being aware of the conservative congressmen's 
concerns that the conference would enhance recognition of the PRC. More importantly, 
Rhee would not dispatch his delegation if the U. S. showed any sign of diplomatic 
recognition of Communist China. Finally, Rhee made it clear from the beginning that 
Indian influence, which was boosted by Great Britain, should be curbed as much as 
possible by the U. S. Dulles too was suspicious of India's position in the forthcoming 
conference. 
In the context of U. S. -South Korean relations, the Korean political conference at 
Geneva between 26 April-15 June 1954 was manifested in another bargaining seesaw 
between the two governments. Rhee's apparent capriciousness conduced to his 
advantage prior to and during the conference. The Eisenhower administration desired 
Rhee's acquiescence in the conference as was the case with the armistice agreement but 
it would meet with Rhee. From Rhee's point of view, any political 
conference was taboo, since he had been opposed to any truce without unification, and 
was aspiring for a resumption of war even after the truce. One of the main objectives of 
those who pursued the idea of a political conference was to utilise it to relax tension 
still prevalent in Korea even after the Korean armistice and to settle the new system of 
division in Korea. Rhee's Government did not want this kind of settlement. Rhee 
thought that the conference was fraught with dangers: while the Communist side was 
well united, the West was fragmented in his view; the situation would 
be unpredictable 
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if India were to participate in the conference as Britain and the Communists had been 
advocating; and the conference might even turn out to be a gamble in which the fate of 
Korea would hang in the balance. 
The American idea of the conference was like an extension of the American 
hegemony in world affairs. The conference was to be organised as a two-sided 
arrangement, not a roundtable, in which the allies led by the United States would 
confront the Communist side across the table. Accordingly, there was of course to be 
no room for the neutrals. Furthermore, the propaganda value of the conference was its 
main element in the mind of the Americans. 3 The United States had a plan to keep the 
Korean political conference as small as possible and limit it to the nations that had 
armed forces in Korea. 4 Dulles thought that a very large conference would be less likely 
to accomplish results than one with rather limited participation. ' 
On this point, the Eisenhower administration was in accord with South Korea. As a 
matter of fact, the American and South Korean proposals for the conference had more 
in common with one another than with any other of the allies, although they had 
prepared them separately without prior consultations. 
This period offers an ideal case study of small state behaviour in response to 
superpower influence. Together with U. S. -South Korean relations between 1953 and 
1954ý it is important to explore more fully why the Korean political conference in 
Geneva was originally convened and why it failed to reach any agreement on Korean 
NA, RG 59, Decimal File, 396.1/6-1654, The Geneva Conference, Fifteenth Plenary Session on Korea, 
15 June 1954. 
FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, p. 1456, State-JCS Meetmgs, 31 July 1953. 
NAý RG 59,795.00/8-153, Special Korean Briefing Meeting, I August 1953. 
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unification. States come into conflict with others when they have different objectives. In 
this case, the larger partner, like the United States5 had a wide range of methods such as 
use of force, offers of rewards, and persuasion, with which to deal with smaller states. 
The smaller state like South Korea had no resource except bargaining with the United 
States. Within this paradigm, some questions arise us to how and to what extent Rhee 
and his goverm-nent could negotiate successfully with the Eisenhower administration 
and what were the sources of South Korea's bargaining power vis-a-vis the United 
States. 
As stipulated in Article IV., no. 60 of the armistice agreement, 6 the United States 
and Communist China, after two months of communications,, agreed to hold 
preliminary talks at Panmunjom for the purpose of deciding the location, the date, and 
the composition of the Korean political conference. During the period from the Korean 
armistice up to the preliminary talks, the leading participants in the Korean political 
conference were engaged in deciding their respective roles and objectives concerning 
Korean interests at the forthcoming conference. The preliminary talks, which began on 
26 October 1953 and continued until 12 December 1953, were insulting between the 
U. S. and the Communist delegates, and unproductive, with the matter of composition 
proving the most difficult problem to resolve. Rhee's recalcitrance vis-a-vis the 
Eisenhower administration arose again when the Panmunjom talks collapsed without 
any agreement. He was equally unyielding when the Four Powers' foreign ministers 
meeting in Berlin in February 1954 decided that the Korean part of the conference 
The Armistice Agreement had recommended that a political conference ... of both sides should 
be 
convened within three months to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. 
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would be held in Geneva and combined with the Indo-Chinese issue during April-June 
1954. Once again the U. S. government had to negotiate to get Rhee's cooperation as it 
had in establishing the Korean Armistice. 
The day after the armistice was signed, Secretary Dulles announced his visit to 
Korea to discuss with Rhee a number of common concerns about the development of a 
common position at the political conference, economic aid, and a United States-South 
Korea mutual defence treaty. 7 Secretary Dulles left for Korea on 2 August 1953. From 
their first meeting on 5 August, they talked about the political conference and agreed 
that: the agenda should be confined to the Korean question only; the allies' participants 
should be kept to a small number in order to control them more easily as the 
Communists would succeed at the conference by having absolute control of their 
delegates; and they would leave the conference after 90 days if they were not satisfied 
with the Communists' proposals. 8 
At their final meeting on 7 August, although Rhee and Dulles were mainly in 
accord about the nature of the Communist menace and how it should be dealt with, they 
disagreed over the question of how to achieve Korean unification. While Dulles 
adhered to a peaceful method, Rhee insisted again on unification by military means. 
Both engaged in 'brinkmanship' with a gambler's instinct to win all that they could. 
Rhee seemed desperate to obtain a firm U. S. commitment after the Korean political 
conference and, in that case, he needed to know whether the United States would 
U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, pp. 176-177,10 August 1953. 
8 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1468-147 1, Memorandum by Young, 5 August 1953. 
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resume the fighting. 9 To this Dulles firmly reiterated that President Eisenhower and he 
could not give any such commitment to resume war in connection with South Korea. 
Both were forced to play roles they could not avoid. Although they tried to persuade 
each other, they could not reach an agreement. The principle of Korean unification was 
left unsettled with Dulles' pointed argument that "the United States could not let 
President Rhee or his government decide what the United States should do, nor let 
President Rhee or his government overrule our judgment on what action to take. "10 On 
8 August, the joint communique announced that South Korea and the United States 
would withdraw from the political conference after ninety days if it failed to achieve 
peaceful unification. II Dulles gave a pledge that he would not exchange LN recognition 
of the People's Republic of China for agreement on Korean unity, thus restricting the 
scope of the meeting before it had actually been agreed to. 
12 Rhee gained virtually 
nothing from his negotiations with Dulles. Rhee's strong efforts to obtain a more 
definite U. S. commitment pending the failure of the political conference, or to insert 
automatic U. S. military involvement in the draft mutual defence treaty, were not 
accepted by Dulles. Dulles warned Rhee that the U. S. Senate and Congress would not 
acceptit. 13 Rhee's bargaining position through these meetings was not as substantial as 
before the armistice was signed. Once he had agreed to the armistice, his greatest 
bargaining tactic-obstructing the armistice-was no longer valid. The unsettled 
Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 ( Paninun Book 
Company: Seoul, 1978 ), pp. 429-43 1. 
10 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1486-1489, Memorandum of Conversation, 7 August 1953. 
" U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, pp. 203-204,8 August 1953. 
12 NA, RG 59, Department of State Press Release, no. 453,28 July 1953. 
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problem-how to achieve Korean unification-along with Rhee's unpredictability, 
however, enabled him to manoeuvre and embarrass the Eisenhower administration 
before and during the forthcoming Korean political conference. 
The Korean political conference was highly controversial about the selection of 
the participating countries. After the Korean armistice was concluded, the Eisenhower 
administration laid out some principles for the conference: the political conference 
should represent the two belligerent sides and it was not to be a 'roundtable' conference 
with the participation of neutrals; the conference would deal only with Korean 
problems; but this did not exclude the possibility that if the Korean Conference went 
well, it might with different membership be transformed into another conference to deal 
with other subjects. The inclusion of South Korea was so indispensable that no 
conditions should be attached to the political conference which could reasonably lead to 
non-participation by Rhee's Government. 14 Accordingly, Dulles was very concerned 
nU about Rhee's attitude over the political conference. In his message to Walter Bedell 
Smith, Under Secretary of State, he stated that "we faced the problem of Rhee's going 
along with the political conference since we had to use up all the bargaining power we 
possessed to get President Rhee to go along with the armistice. "15 
The participation of India had been a troublesome issue before the Panmunjom 
preliminary talks began. The United States and South Korean governments were in 
concurrence over the Indian involvement in Korean issues. This scepticism had its 
13 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1484, Memorandum of Conversation, 7 August 1953. 
14 Ibid., pp. 1492-1493, Dulles to Lodge, 13 August 1953. 
15 Ibid., pp. 1495-1496, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the 
Under Secretary of State, 14 
August 1953. 
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origins in the question of how to deal with POWs during the Korean War. In October 
1952 the United States introduced a resolution to the UN General Assembly, to 
reinforce the American position concerning the nonforcible repatriation of POWs. In an 
effort to break the deadlock on POWs, Krishna Menon of the Indian delegation made a 
proposal in November 1952 to turn over the prisoners to a neutral commission outside 
of the control of the United Nations Command. The commission would handle the fates 
of the POWs at the hand of the Communists, of which the provisions for disposing of 
non-repatriates were of particular concern to the U. S. and South Korea, as the proposal 
suggested that the POWs who refused repatriation would remain captives until they 
accepted a return to their homelands. For this reason, following the Korean cease-fire, 
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), which consisted of India, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, in conjunction with Indian armed 
forces, were responsible for approximately 23,000 POWs unwilling to be repatriated. 
Rhee's Government threatened to interfere with the movement of the Indian Force from 
Inchon to Panmunjom, so the forces had to reach Panmunjom by helicopter because the 
South Korean government would not allow them to pass overland into their territory. 16 
The PRC and North Korea were adarnant that the conference should be a round 
table discussion with neutral state participation so as to expedite the proceedings of the 
conference. The participation of neutral states was favoured by the Commonwealth 
countries, such as Great Britain, Canada, and Australia, which were obviously partial to 
the idea of a role for India in the Asian problem. The problem of Indian participation 
developed into a major diplomatic conflict between the United States and Great Britain. 
Britain intended to press for the UN membership of the PRC in the political conference 
16 Bailey, The Korean Annistice, pp. 142-143. 
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with the support of the neutral countries, particularly India. The Indian position 
regarding the issue was to be understood in terms of the pursuit of its role and status in 
world politics. India attained the status of a great diplomatic power with worldwide 
influence through its diplomatic manoeuvres during the Korean War. This was quite a 
jump as an ex-colony and a newly independent country, for which the British support 
was of course an important factor. Great Britain on its part could make good use of 
India for its own diplomatic objectives through reinforcing it as a kind of mouthpiece 
for the third world countries. In any case, the political conference was a good chance for 
India to confinn and enhance its status and role in world affairs. World opinion was 
also inclined favourably towards Indian participation. As the participation of India was 
a delicate subj ect in relations with Rhee's Government, the United States persuaded 
India not to take part in the conference in return for supporting Mrs. Srimati Vijaya 
Lakshmi Pandit as President of the General Assembly. Great Britain was discontented 
with the U. S. attitude towards India. " 
The bitterness between Korea and India during the Korean War made it 
impossible for the United States to persuade Rhee to accept Indian involvement. ' 8 The 
United States came to realise the implications of the problem of Indian participation and 
used the South Korean opposition to India as a ground for its own objection. Faced with 
17 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1493-1495, Memorandum by Lodge, 14 August 1953. 
18 Since Rhee had always objected to a forcible repatriation of the POWs, he regarded India as pro- 
Communist as the Nehru government issued a proposal on POWs in 1952 that seemed to create the 
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission(NNRC), the real purpose of which would be to send the 
prisoners home against their will. After the Korean armistice was concluded, 
Rhee adamantly refused to 
hand over Korean non-repatriates to the NNRC and 
he did not permit any Indian troops on South Korean 
soil as neutrals or anything else. 
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Britain's demand for India's role in Geneva, Dulles cautioned Eden that if Great Britain 
was so anxious to have India in the conference, it should persuade Rhee to agree to 
this. " At the same time, the U. S. attempted to effect India's voluntary withdrawal from 
the Korean political conference. " Despite these U. S. efforts, India went on actively 
promoting its own case even after the British had given up on this. 21 Despite a series of 
persuasions, the United States was unable to prevent Krishna Menon from arriving in 
Geneva and playing an informal role on the edge of the conference. 22 
Preliminary Political Talks at Panmunjom 
As stipulated in the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United States and 
Communist China would hold talks after two months of communications. 23 The 
19 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 27 August 1953. 
20 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1500-1501, Allen to the Department of State, 26 August 1953. 
21 Ibid., pp. 1521-1524 and 1531-1534. Menon asked Dean to give him a mission to Beijing to transmit 
the American view to the Chinese, and told Dulles that India should be in the conference because the 
Communists insisted on its participation. 
22 FRUS, vol. 16, The Geneva Conference, p. 332, Memorandum of Conversation, I June 1954; PRO, FO 
371 110563/FK 1071/495. 
23 For details, FRUS, vol. 15., p. 153 1. Communications between the United States and Communist China 
began with Secretary Dulles' initiative on 14 August 1953. At the request of the Secretary, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, the U. S. Ambassador to the UN, contacted Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold as to whether 
the Swedish embassy in Peking could ask if Chinese Premier Chou En-lai intended to hold a Korean 
political conference. On 17 August, the Swedish embassy replied that Chou desired the conference. On 
12 October, when the United States accepted the Communist suggestion of Panmunjom as the site, the 
conference came to be held. 
85 
Eisenhower administration appointed Arthur H. Dean, the Deputy to the Secretary of 
State for the Korean Political Conference, to discuss with the Communists-North 
Korea and the PRC-at Panmunjom the date, location and other organisational 
questions of the conference. He met with the Chinese delegate Huang Hua and his 
North Korean counterpart Ki Sok Bok. However, the colloquy had scarcely begun 
when disputes arose over the agenda. The preparatory talks, which began on 26 
October,, were unproductive with the matter of composition of the conference proving 
the most difficult problem to resolve. The Communist side demanded that the content 
of the conference be agreed upon first and the United States insisted that the settlement 
of a time and place should be given priority. They also disagreed over who would attend 
the conference. As to the problem of Soviet participation the Eisenhower administration 
was not opposed. However, it insisted that the Soviet Union should be in the conference 
as representing the Communist side. 24 The American motive behind its insistence on 
Soviet participation was to not allow China a recognition of its international status. 
Insisting that the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, and Burma should be invited as 
neutrals, the Communists refused further discussions with the U. S. delegation. 
After three weeks of insignificant talks at Pamnunjom, delegates of the United 
States and the Communists agreed to discuss simultaneously any items on the agenda 
on 14 November. " This marked a retreat from the assertion by the Communists that the 
composition issue should be solved first. In return, the Communists repeated their 
previous claim that the Soviet Union should participate as a non-voting neutral. In 
reaction to this, Dean proposed the idea that all five members of the Neutral Nations 
24 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1155,1170 and 1494. 
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Repatriation Commission (NNRC)-Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, Switzerland, and 
Sweden-be invited as observers. " On 20 November, the State Department instructed 
Dean to seek full participation of the Soviet Union as contemplated in the General 
Assembly resolution of 23 August 1953.27 In order to facilitate the talks, the State 
Department proposed the participants' solution, that is, fifteen UN nations plus South 
Korea and five NNRC members. " A few days later, Dean obtained South Korean 
29 
agreement to the five NNRC members as observers. 
The preliminary discussions at Panmunjom dragged on through November and 
half of December 1953 without resolving the basic differences of the opposing sides 
over composition. At Dean's suggestion, the outstanding issues were discussed at the 
subcommittee level and after two weeks a plan was devised for simultaneous discussion 
of composition, time, and place of the proposed Korean Political Conference. On 30 
November, Ki Sok Pok, North Korean delegate, submitted a plan for the political 
conference to begin at New Delhi on 28 December which included five neutrals-the 
Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. Neutrals would have the right to 
25 NA, RG 59,795.00/11-1453, Telegram p140712z, 14 November 1953. 
26 NA, RG 59,795.00/11-2053, from Munsan-Ni, Dean to Dulles, 20 November 1953. 
27 At the Seventh Session of the GA, resolution 711 (VII) was adopted calling for UN participation at the 
Korean political conference limited to those nations "contributing armed forces under the Unified 
Command in Korea" which desired to be represented plus the Republic of Korea. The resolution also 
called for participation by the Soviet Union if the other side desired it. 
28 NA, RG 59,795.00/11-2353, Memorandum of conversation, 'Ambassador Dean's Proposals Re 
Composite List and Observers for Korean Political Conference', 23 November 1953. 
29 NA, RG 59,795.00/11-2653, Dean to Dulles, 26 November 1953. 
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take part in the discussion, but decisions at the conference would be by unanimous 
agreement of the signatories of the armistice. " 
The Communist side's insistence that the Soviet Union be considered a neutral, 
South Korea's opposition to India's participation, and the general inability to agree to 
the kind of role neutral nations would play at the conference proved in the end to be 
insurmountable problems. At a meeting with Rhee and his associates, Dean had to 
acknowledge South Korea's firm position: they insisted upon (a) listing the USSR on 
the other side, (b) the other 15 UN members contributing forces could not vote, and (c) 
no neutrals could be invited under any conditions whatsoever. " In this connection, 
Rhee's extreme insistence could pave the way for his bargaining with the U. S. to meet 
his objectives even though he was not fully satisfied with the outcomes. 
In response to the Communist proposal of 30 November, Dean put forward a 
'package proposal' on 8 December which attempted to maintain the principle of a two- 
sided conference (with the Soviet Union as a voting member on the Communist side) 
while allowing for limited neutral nations' participation. It was rejected by the 
Communist side on the grounds that it did not recognise the Soviet Union as a neutral 
and that it unreasonably limited neutral participation. Four days later, the negotiations 
ended acrimoniously with charges and countercharges between the representatives of 
both sides. Huang Hwa of the PRC accused the United States of perfidy in conniving 
with Rhee in the release of POWs in June 1953. In return, the U. S. representative 
30NAý RG 59,795.00/11-3054, Telegram 119,30 November 1953. 
1 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1649-165 1, The Representative for the Political Conference (Dean) to the 
Department of State, 7 December 1953. 
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branded the PRC and North Korea as Soviet agents, the remark which had outraged the 
Communist delegates. Dean used it as the reason for recessing. " 
As the preliminary talks with the Communists were stagnant, the Eisenhower 
administration began to worry again about a possible resumption of hostilities by 
President Rhee. Unable either to withdraw from Korea or to join Rhee's attempt in the 
renewal of fighting, the Eisenhower administration took every practical measure to 
prevent unilateral action. To this end, the United States prepared a plan which included 
an immediate termination of military and economic support to South Korea in the event 
of South Korean forces' attack on the Communists. 
33 
At the same time, the administration took advantage of Vice President Richard M. 
Nixon's previously planned visit to Korea, which was another setback to Rhee. 
Eisenhower felt that Truman had neglected the Asians, and hoped that Nixon might 
cultivate some friendships in that part of the world. 34 Nixon arrived in Korea with a 
letter from President Eisenhower on 12 November 1953. In his talks with Rhee, Nixon 
was assigned a delicate diplomatic task. Eisenhower wanted Nixon to get Rhee to 
32 Department of State, Bulletin, pp. 877-878, Dean's proposal of 8 December and 21 December 1953; 
Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 360. 
33 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 6, 'U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, ' NSC 170/1,20 
November 1953. 
34 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 (New York: Simon and Schuster 
Inc., 1987), p. 315. Eisenhower thought that Nixon needed to k4 publicly associated with something 
other than Red-baiting. It all started at an NSC meeting in March 1953 when Eisenhower casually asked 
Nixon to visit as many Asian countries as possible. Nixon put nineteen, plus Hong Kong and Okinawa, on 
his itinerary. Eisenhower asked him to carry a specific message to Rhee. 
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guarantee that he would not launch an invasion of North Korea. In an attempt to obtain 
such an assurance, Eisenhower warned that if South Korea initiated military action 
while the Communists were complying with the armistice, the South Koreans would 
"face disastrous defeat and might well be permanently destroyed. " Nixon believed he 
had received Rhee's confirmation that South Korea would not provoke hostilities 
against the Communists without prior consultation with Eisenhower, so that 
Eisenhower could give a clear assurance to the Senators when the treaty was submitted 
in January 1954.35 The task was difficult, not only because Rhee was constantly making 
public statements about his intentions to invade, but also because Nixon agreed with 
Rhee and disagreed with Eisenhower. Nixon, like Dulles and much of the military, had 
opposed the armistice that Eisenhower had accepted in July 1953. They wanted to fight 
on to victory, just as Rhee did, not abandon half of Korea to the Communists. 
President Rhee did not give any explicit assurance that he would not renew hostilities. 36 
Given this situation, the Eisenhower administration could not help worrying that if 
Rhee came to believe that the U. S. was not adamant against involvement, or that it 
could not keep from becoming involved even against its own wishes, it was highly 
I likely that Rhee would initiate hostilities. 
37 
When Nixon pressed Rhee again, Rhee emphasised the advantage for the United 
States and the free world that his unpredictability was a constant check on the 
35 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 37, Eisenhower to Rhee, 4 November 
1953; Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2, Draft letter, 3 November 1953. 
36 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 37, Rhee's letter to Eisenhower, 16 
November 1953. 
37 NA, RG 59,795.00, Korea, Proposed reply by the President to Rhee, 18 December 1953. 
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Communists. " He said in conclusion: "Any statements I have made about Korea acting 
independently were made to help the United States; in my heart I know that Korea 
cannot possibly act alone. " That was the assurance Nixon needed but did not really 
want. Returning from his mission, Nixon reported to a National Security Council 
meeting his impression of Rhee's complexity, and stressed making a distinction 
between his public actions and his private thoughts. " 
Following the deadlock of the Panmunjom preliminary talks in mid-December 
1953, the issue of who would participate in the political conference became more 
delicate and complex. China's opposition to the Soviet Union as a full participant at the 
conference was fully exposed. As the Chinese regarded themselves as the principal 
Communist power concerned with Korean matters, they could not understand the 
reason for U. S. insistence on the Soviet Union's participation on the Communist side, 
and as a voting member. The American insistence at Panmunjom that the Soviet Union 
attend the conference as a full voting participant was put forward as a counter-argument 
to the Chinese Communist demand that the Soviets be invited as a non-voting neutral. 
The Chinese view was that the Korean question was primarily a Chinese problem which 
did not concern the USSR. The Chinese did not understand why the United States in 
effect did not accept them as the number one spokesman with regard to Korea. They 
thought that if the USSR was not a member of the conference nor a signatory, the 
bargaining power of the Chinese Govermnent over a guarantee either of South Korea or 
of all Korea would increase greatly. However, in fact, the United States were aiming to 
diminish the status and prestige of the Chinese Government through the USSR's 
38 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1609, Draft telegram from Nixon, 13 November 1953. 
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participation in the political conference. " Great Britain was for the Soviet participation 
but did not want the conference to founder on this issue. 41 
Peking's opposition to Moscow as a full participant led the State Department to 
examine the possibility of holding the Korean political conference without the Soviet 
Union's participation. Concurrently, on 30 December, Dean recommended to Dulles the 
consideration of the non-participation of Russia, which was followed by leading State 
policy-makers' endorsement. 42 Secretary Dulles was prepared to reconsider the U. S. 
position in view of the present estimate that the conference would fail to achieve major 
agreements on Korea's future and was likely at best to do no more than arrange a 
modus vivendi to supersede or supplement the Armistice Agreement. He felt that Soviet 
adherence to such an arrangement was not essential. " 
The breakdown of the negotiations at Panmunjom was a cause of rising anxiety 
amongst the Western allies about the future of non-repatriated POWs. With pressure 
building from some UN members, in particular the UK, the United States tried to 
resume the talks. In relation to this, Secretary Dulles asked Ambassador George V. 
Allen to conduct a high-level approach to India requesting that it act as matchmaker for 
the revival of talks. While Washington policy-makers made efforts to ease these 
39DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 175hNSC Meeting, 15 December 1953. 
40 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1690-9 1, the Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to 
the Department of State, 3 January 1954. 
41 PRO, FO 371/110540, Crowe Memo, 'Korean Political Conference', 7 January 1954. 
42 NA, RG 59,795.00/ 12-3053, Murphy to Dulles, 31 December 1953; RG 59,795.00/1-654, Merchant 
to Dean and Murphy, 6 January 1954. 
43 NA) RG 59,795.00/1-754, Dulles to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 7 January 1954. 
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obstacles, the deterioration of dialogue which had been caused by mutual insults 
between the United States and Chinese delegates was a further impediment to the 
resumption of negotiations. 44 The obstacle could be overcome by Dulles' suggestion 
that "expunging the Panmunjom record was removed under same qualifications" where 
the U. S. withdrew the charge that "Chinese Communists were Soviet agents. "" 
However, the Communists showed no concern or interest in the problem of retracting 
the perfidy charges. " 
While the desirability of the political conference without Moscow's participation 
was discussed in the Eisenhower administration, the release of non-repatriate POWs by 
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on 23 January 1954 drew attention. 47 The 
44 For details, see pp. 88-89. 
45 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1691-1692, Dulles to the Embassy in India, 4 January 1954. 
46 lbidn p. 1714, Young to the Department of State, 9 January 1954. 
47 NA, RG 59,795.00/5-1853, Smith to Dulles, 18 May 1953; Se-Jin Kim (ed. ), Documents on Koreaný 
American Relations, 1943-1976 (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976), p. 175. 
Pursuant to the terms of reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, signed at Panmunjom on 
8 June 1953 as an annex to the Armistice Agreement, the LTNC transferred all non-repatriate POWs to the 
NNRC on 24 September 1953. During the ninety days after the NNRC took over the custody of the 
POWs, the Chinese and North Korean explainers asked the non-repatriates to return to their home 
countries. Paragraph II for NNRC tenns of reference, however, provided that "at the expiration of 90 
days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the NNRC, access of representatives to 
captured personnel ... shall terminate 
[23 December 1953], and the question of disposition has been 
agreed to by the Political Conference within 120 days [22 January 1954] after the NNRC has assumed 
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matter referred to the UN General Assembly. U. S. secured pledges from its allies that in such an event, 
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93 
terms of reference of the NNRC in the Korean armistice agreement indicated that if no 
solution emerged within one hundred and twenty days of the NNRC assuming control, 
either the remaining prisoners would be released as civilians or the matter would be 
referred to the UN General Assembly. By the end of 1953, the NNRC was faced with 
the fact that the fate of more than twenty thousand prisoners was to be settled within a 
month by a political conference whose details had not yet been finalised. Although 
China was opposed, 48 the Eisenhower administration pushed the Indian government to 
suggest that the NNRC should declare the POWs' status as civilian. On 5 January 1954, 
Ambassador Allen requested full cooperation with the plan, and cautioned R. K. Nehru, 
Secretary of Extemal Affairs, about the likelihood of the mass breakout by the 
Communist POWs and of the Indian Custodial forces' firing to maintain order unless 
they were released on that date. " Realising that India could be responsible for such an 
incident, the Indian government authorised the chairman of the NNRC, K. S. Thimayya, 
to enact the release of non-repatriates to the United Nations Command. " On 14 January 
19543 he informed General John E. Hull, the new United Nations Commander, that the 
NNRC would return all the non-repatriates on 20 January. " Nevertheless, the Indian 
government decided to submit the final disposition of non-repatriate POWs to the UN 
48 NA, RG 59,795.00/12-2953, U. S. Embassy in London to Dulles, 29 December 1953. 
When Chou En-lai talked with Indian Ambassador Nedgan Raghvan, Chou delivered his government's 
objection to the release of non-repatriated POWs on 23 January 1954. 
49FRUS, Vol. 15, pp. 1696-97, Allen to Dulles, 6 January 1954. 
50 Ibid., p. 1725, Young to the Department of State, 15 January 1954. 
51 U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, p. 114,25 January 1954. 
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General Assembly on 10 January. " The Indian government intended to have both UN 
and Communist commanders retain the POWs until the UN General Assembly passed 
judgment. India's main objective was to soothe the Chinese Communists' fury over the 
decision to turn over the non-repatriates to the UNC because they regarded the release 
as a psychological and diplomatic defeat. In its reply to the Indian action, the United 
States opposed the resumption of the Assembly, maintaining that the special session 
would not serve any useful purpose with regard to the POWs and the Korean Political 
Conference. Secretary Dulles suspected that India would seek to bring up the Korean 
Political Conference issue and demand the invitation of Communist China and North 
Korea to the General Assembly. " 
The United States acknowledged that Anthony Eden supported the Indian appeal 
for a resumed session. 54 When Dulles discussed the issue with Eden in Berlin on 23 
January, Eden excused himself on the grounds that the special session would merely 
pass a resolution expressing appreciation to India and the other NNRC member nations 
for their work in handling the POWs. In reply Dulles stressed the United States' chief 
responsibility for Korean problems, and criticised other allies' attempt to maximise 
their national interests through the Korean Political Conference. Dulles warned Eden 
52 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 130. 
The UN General Assembly adopted a Brazil-India joint draft resolution which requested the President of 
the General Assembly to reconvene the eighth session, with the concurrence of the majority of member 
states, if in the President's opinion developments in respect of the Korean question warranted such 
reconvening, or one or more member states made a request to the President for such reconvening by 
reason of developments in respect of the Korean question. 
53 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1728, Dulles to the U. S. Mission at the UN, 20 January 1954. 
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that the United Kingdom "could not be allowed to play this game. "" This attempt by 
India to reconvene UN General Assembly on 9 February in order to deal with remaining 
POWs problems was defeated because of insufficient UN members' support. 56 
On 23 January, UN Commander General Hull set free 22,000 Chinese and North 
Korean non-repatriates and proclaimed their civilian status. " The Eisenhower 
administration welcomed this news. At the meeting of the National Security Council, 
Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that this release of 
prisoners "constituted one of the greatest psychological victories so far achieved by the 
free world against Communism. 5ý58 
Since the problem of the USSR and the type of conference seemed impossible to 
solve with the Chinese and North Korean Communists at Panmunjom, Kenneth T. 
Young, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, 
recommended a change of venue from Panmunj om and a move to open new talks, 
rather than resuming the present ones. This was seriously considered by high ranking 
officers in the Department. " On 26 January, surprisingly, the Communists asked for the 
unconditional resumption of the Panmunjom talks recessed since mid-December. But 
the U. S. felt that there was no immediate need for the Communists to reconvene the 
54 Ibid., p. 1734, Parkman to the Department of State, 20 January 1954. 
55 Ibid., The U. S. High Commissioner in Berlin to the State Department, 24 January 1954; Anthony Eden, 
Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1960), pp. 69-70. 
56 Bailey, The Korean Armistice, p. 148. 
57 U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, p. 152,1 February 1954. 
58 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 18 1" NSC Meeting, 21 January 1954. 
59 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1721-1722, Young to the 
Department of State, 13 January 1954. 
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talks since the POW issue had resolved itself. 60 The U. S. believed that Peking feared 
being deceived by the Soviet Union and the Big Four Powers in Berlin regarding Asian 
problems and, therefore, preferred resuming talks with the U. S. at Panmunj OM. 6 ' The 
preliminary talks at Panmunjom failed to settle any issues with regard to a forthcoming 
Korean political conference. The problem of the Soviet Union's participation would be 
turned over to the Berlin Conference to decide. However, China suffered another bout 
of frustration because the U. S. chose to negotiate about this directly with the Soviet 
Union at Berlin, and even more so as China was invited by the Soviet Union to the 
Korean Political Conference. 
The Berlin Conference 
During the latter part of 1953 and early 1954, the Communists launched a peace 
initiative. This was due to the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in March 1953, 
after which the collective leadership needed to reduce international tension. On 28 
September 1953, the Soviet Union sent a proposal to the United States, France and 
Britain, calling for a five-power conference, including Communist China, to examine 
ways of reducing international strain. Approximately 10 days later, Chou En-lai 
announced support for the Soviet proposal. The Communist motives were regarded as 
being designed to weaken Western unity. At that time, as the Eisenhower administration 
60 Ibid., pp. 1736-1737, Young to the Department of State, 26 January 1954; ibid., Smith to U. S. Delegate 
at the Berlin Conference, 28 January 1954. 
61 Kenneth T. Young, Negotiations with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953- 
1967 (New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 32. 
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maintained an intransigent attitude towards the Soviet bloc, the British and French 
govermnents were cautious about Soviet intentions. 
The question of convening the Korean political conference was at last resolved at 
the Berlin Conference, convened in January and February 1954 to discuss German and 
Austrian matters. On 9 January 1954, Chou claimed the settlement of urgent Asian 
problems through consultation amongst the big powers involved. " Concurrently, 
Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, suggested a five-power international 
conference to deal with the situation in Asia on 25 January. The Soviet Union wanted a 
five-power conference on a wide range of problems. There was initial opposition from 
the United States, but Great Britain and France were eager to see a solution to the 
disputes in the region, 63 while the Eisenhower administration would not endorse any 
action which might be construed as even tacit recognition of Communist China. Public 
opinion in Britain and Western Europe had been greatly excited by the prospect of an 
end to the Cold War. 64 
At the beginning of the conference, Secretary Dulles clashed with Molotov, who 
had proposed a five-power conference, to include the Peking regime, to seek measures 
for reducing tension in international relations. Dulles, on the other hand, who thought 
that non-recognition of the People's Republic of China would diminish its international 
62 Zhai Qiang, 'China and the Geneva Conference of 1954', The China Quarterly, 129 (1992), p. 107. 
63 FRUS, vol. 16, p. 415, Press Release, 19 February 1954. 
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and the Origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954', The Historical Journal, 37,1 (1994), p. 156. 
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influence, refused to discuss global issues with China. " In reality the five-power 
question was to prove an extremely dangerous one for the Western alliance and its unity 
at Berlin. Whereas the Eisenhower administration had pursued a strict containment 
policy towards Communist China since the Korean War, British policy was a 
combination of containment and compromise, not containment and confrontation. Any 
attempt by China to extend its influence by force was to be resisted, but in other 
circumstances British policy rested upon acceptance of the facts of the situation, the 
avoidance of provocation, and gradual progress towards more normal trading and 
diplomatic relations. The British government always insisted that the end of fighting in 
Korea should be followed by efforts to normalise relations with China, including a 
resolution of the Formosa question and of the status of China's seat at the UN. 66 For 
this reason, Anthony Eden presented the idea of a five-power conference limited only to 
Asian issues. He was deeply worried that the increasingly perilous situation in 
, 
67 
Indochina would threaten Great Britain's interest in Malayo, 
Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault suggested to Dulles that 
the forthcoming Korean Political Conference be expanded to discuss the Indochina 
issue. The French govenunent wanted to talk with Peking about the future of Indo- 
China because of China's role with the Viet Minh, whose considerable amount of war 
material was supplied by Peking. 68 Dulles had earlier objected to any French talks with 
65 David Mayers, 'Eisenhower's Containment Policy and the Major Communist Powers, 1953-56', The 
International Histoa Review (February 1983), pp. 65-66. 
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the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists until France improved its negotiatinj- 
position with a military victory. The situation began to change with the deterioration of 
the French military position and with strong French domestic pressure to end the 
Indochina War. Bidault urged Dulles to put Indochina on the Geneva agenda. He 
warned Dulles that France might desert the project of the European Defence 
Community, which was then the top U. S. priority. Ultimately, Dulles had to submit to 
French pressure. 69 
At the same time, Eden had to use all his powers of persuasion to secure 
American acceptance of a conference with China. He proposed another formula to 
"meet the bear without parting us from the eagle" by simply dropping the distinction 
between inviting and invited powers. " The United States would invite the allies and the 
Soviet Union would ask China and North Korea. Through this solution, the Eisenhower 
administration would be saved from being at the conference on equal terms with China, 
thereby recognising it as a great power. Dulles wanted to insert in the final communique 
69 PRO, FO 371/109278/311, Minutes of 4th plenary session, Berlin, 28 January 1954. 
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Germany signed an E. D. C. treaty. By the time the Berlin conference commenced in January 1954 the 
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a statement that China's participation would not mean diplomatic recognition by the 
United States. Molotov accepted such a provision in a marginal schedule of the Berlin 
Conference. 71 At any rate, it gave the Peking regime a chance to stand equal with the 
four big powers. 
The conference finally agreed to summon an international meeting to restore 
peace in Korea and Indo-China. In a communique the four ministers from France, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed that the political 
conference should be held at Geneva on 26 April 1954.72 In addition to these four 
powers, Geneva brought together most of the other countries with an interest in the 
Korean and Indo-Chinese problems. This included the People's Republic of China 
(P. R. C. ) which, by its participation, brought to an end a period of diplomatic isolation. 
All the invited states agreed to participate in the conference except South Africa, which 
decided to leave Korean matters to the countries much more directly concerned. " 
The Berlin Conference provided a crucial basis for West European unity. In the 
view of public opinion in France at the time, the United States aroused French criticism 
as to whether the conference was sacrificed for the sake of Washington's global anti- 
Communism policy. Great Britain also regarded Dulles' refusal of China's participation 
74 
as unreasonable and neglectful of the interests of its allies. Nevertheless, Dulles was 
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obliged to defend himself in America against those who objected to any negotiations 
with Communist China at Geneva. When news of the Berlin agreement reached 
Washington, conservative Republicans declared that it amounted to actual recognition 
of the Peking regime. During the ensuing months William Knowland, the Senate 
epublican leader and the most formidable member of the congressional Chinese lobby, 
vehemently criticised Dulles for having agreed to take a seat with the Peking regime. 75 
South Korea complained that it had been ignored during the Berlin Conference and 
76 made a point of condemning the Berlin agreement. By the end of March such criticism 
was to have some effect. Aware of this, the United States attempted to play down the 
75 Henry W. Brands, JR., 'The Other Geneva Conference', Pacific Historical Review, 56 (1987), p. 67. 
The China Lobby encompassed the various organisations and individuals that emerged after World War 
11 as a powerful pressure group for U. S. support of the Nationalist Chinese government under Chiang 
Kai-shek in its struggle against Communist forces under Mao Tse-tung. After Mao's 1949 victory and 
Chiang's retreat to the island of Taiwan (then commonly known as Formosa), the China Lobby bitterly 
criticised the U. S. decision not to aid Chiang, accusing the Truman administration of losing the Chinese 
mainland to communism. In August 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson released the China White 
Paper defending U. S. policy not to intervene in the Chinese civil war on behalf of Chiang's corrupt 
regime. In the early 1950s, the lobby actively backed Chiang's return to the mainland. As it became 
apparent that this was unfeasible, its emphasis shifted to the defence of Taiwan and the international 
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Geneva Conference. 77 Throughout the conference, Dulles remained sensitive to 
indications of congressional and public criticism of the administration's conduct at 
Geneva. His behaviour there must have pleased his political detractors. Dulles even 
refused to shake hands with the Chinese premier when the latter approached him at 
Geneva. 78 
The Eisenhower Administration's Inducement of Rhee 
It was a period of tension and hard bargaining in Korean-U. S. relations --- the two 
months between the times when the Conference was agreed in Berlin and when South 
Korea finally agreed to take part in it. South Korea complied in the end but only after 
obtaining promises, both pragmatic and political, from the United States to support its 
programme of military build-up and also to pursue some of their common policies 
during the conference. 
South Korea initially opposed the conference because it had less leverage in a 
multilateral conference. Rhee predicted no useful results from multinational conference 
talks with the Communists. He was concerned over an indefinite delay of Korean 
unification and feared that a 'package deal' for both Korea and Indochina would emerge 
from secret understandings amongst the great powers. He suspected the likelihood of 
turning over South Korea to the Communists in return for westernisation of Indo- 
77 New York Times, 26 March 1954. 
78 C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 1003. 
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China. 79 This suspicion mainly resulted from his independence movement for Korea 
during the Japanese colonial period. At that time, the U. S. had recognised Korea's 
annexation by the Japanese in compensation for the Philippines through a secret 
treaty. 80 
Any political conference was a taboo for Rhee, who was opposed to any truce 
without unification and had aspirations for a resumption of war even after the truce. In 
this sense, the South Korean opposition to a political conference was not just for the 
sake of principles. One of the main objectives of those who pursued the idea of a 
political conference was to utilize it to relax the tension still prevalent in the Korean 
peninsula even after the conclusion of a truce, and to settle the new system of division 
in Korea. Rhee was naturally averse to this kind of settlement. There were of course 
many additional reasons for Rhee to oppose the conference. Firstly, the conference was 
fraught with dangers. While the Communist side was well united, the allies were 
fragmented in their views and policies. The situation would be unpredictable if India 
was to participate in the conference as Britain and the Communist side had been 
advocating. The conference might even turn out to be a gamble in which the fate of the 
country would hang in the balance. This appeared to be bome out when Washington did 
not seek any prior understanding from South Korea, let alone consultation, when they 
agreed to hold the political conference during the Berlin Conference. They did not hurry 
79 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 16, pp. 18-19, Briggs to the Department of State, 19 February 1954; 
KPR, Foreign Ministry, 726.23 1954/137, Pyun to Secretary Dulles, 3 March 1954. 
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to notify Rhee's Government about this agreement. As a result, Rhee was suspicious 
n U. about U. S. policy towards Korea. 
Secondly, from the South Korean point of view, the conference would only 
improve the position of the Communists, both morally and politically. The Communists 
had already been condemned as aggressors by the UN. It would only compromise the 
effect of the resolutions for the UN side to be in a meeting like this, sitting at the same 
time with the aggressors. Besides, it was to be expected that such a conference would 
also enhance the international standing of Communist China. Rhee thought it was a 
conference in which South Korea had everything to lose and nothing to gain. 
President Rhee tried to assert his limited influence on the United States by 
asserting that the Korean political conference could not be competent without South 
Korea's presence. On II March, President Rhee wrote to Eisenhower about his 
seemingly unilateral action to unify Korea, and preconditioned the ROK's attendance 
at Geneva on whether the United States would "either (a) agree to assist South Korea in 
military efforts to unify Korea or (b) strengthen the ROK forces in accordance with his 
requests. "" As a result of Rhee's letter, the exchange of ratifications for the Mutual 
Defence Treaty, which had been scheduled for March 18, was to be postponed until 
Rhee promised further cooperation with the U. S. position. The Eisenhower 
administration rejected Rhee's alternative proposals, although it suggested the 
possibility of developing a mobilisable reserve in South Korea. " On receiving the reply, 
81 DDE library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 37, Rhee to Eisenhower, 11 March 1954. 
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although Rhee did not state whether South Korea would attend the conference or not, " 
Rhee decided not to boycott the conference, but he wanted to know U. S. intentions 
regarding his request for additional ROK divisions and on U. S. policy after the 
conference, which was unlikely to succeed in agreeing a political settlement of Korean 
unification. " 
South Korea used its decision on participation as its main bargaining lever in 
discussions with the United States. President Rhee tried to evade talks with the United 
States prior to the conference in order to have a free hand at the conference. The 
Eisenhower administration criticised Rhee's Government for failing to provide a ROK 
representative at consultations over the line to be taken at the Geneva conference. " 
Secretary Dulles was also worried about unity with South Korea in achieving maximum 
effectiveness to prevent the Chinese Communists from gaining any political advantage 
at Geneva. " 
Undeterred, Rhee held to his course, but he softened his stance with pathos. 
Rhee's Government came up with modified proposals, asking for a substantial increase 
in the fighting capability of its armed forces including immediate training and 
equipping of up to 20 new ROK divisions. 87 On 8 April, Rhee notified Eisenhower that 
South Korea's attendance at Geneva was conditional on a U. S. assurance of 
83 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1774-1775, Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to NSC, 26 
March 1954. 
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strengthening his forces. " The Eisenhower administration contemplated its response to 
Rhee's last appeal and decided to save Rhee's face. At the meeting of the National 
Security Council, Eisenhower gave directions that although Rhee was still requesting 
excessive costs in military enforcement, the administration should not reply to President 
Rhee "by throwing a wet fish in his face. "" 
In view of the very limited time left before the conference, the United States 
consulted its allies on the general position to be taken at Geneva. On 7 April, the United 
States notified the representatives of the allies of its main goals at Geneva, which were 
the maintenance of the integrity of South Korea, no agreement on any decision without 
joint U. S. -South Korea endorsement, and the achievement of South Korean unification 
policy. 90 Commonwealth representatives opposed such principles and preferred all- 
Korean elections for a new Korean government. As a result, the Eisenhower 
administration needed to reach a compromise between South Korea and the 
Commonwealth position. On 12 April, Alexis Johnson, the Coordinator for the Geneva 
Conference, outlined the U. S. plan for Korean unification at Geneva. They proposed 
holding an election under international observation for the ROK Assembly throughout 
both North and South within the framework of the present ROK Constitution, possibly 
accompanied by a popular election for President. " During the following week, in order 
to soften President Rhee, General Van Fleet had been chosen by Eisenhower as his 
88 KPR, 726.23 1954/137, Rhee to Eisenhower, 8 April 1954; DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Dulles- 
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Special Representative to survey military establishments in the Far East, including 
South Korea. " 
In his letter to Rhee on 16 April, Eisenhower confirmed the programme for the 
continuing improvement of the ROK forces with additional U. S. assistance. At the 
same time, Ambassador Briggs was instructed to intimate to Rhee that final action on 
any plan for aid should depend on South Korea's continuing cooperation with the U. S., 
including South Korea's attendance at the Geneva Conference. " As the result of 
Eisenhower's confirmation of additional U. S. assistance, Rhee ultimately agreed to 
send Foreign Minister Pyun to Geneva because he had secured his objective and a face- 
saving resolution from the United States. On 19 April, even though Rhee expressed his 
reluctance to participate in the conference, he issued a statement on South Korea's 
attendance at the Geneva Conference. Dulles was 'gratified' to receive this news. " 
Even though the Eisenhower administration succeeded in luring South Korea to attend 
the conference, the United States would find itself at Geneva in the embarrassing 
position of having major differences on the Allied side. 
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THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
The Geneva Conference on Korea was called pursuant to Paragraph 60 of the 
Armistice Agreement and the Berlin communique. The two belligerent sides were to 
meet to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, observing that the 
establishment by peaceful means of a unified and independent Korea would be an 
important factor in reducing international tension. While the conference was held from 
26 April to 15 June, none of the countries concerned with the Korean problem 
seriously attempted to come to any agreed conclusion for Korean unification. The 
United States realised that the conference could at best be a temporary expedient for 
complementing the Korean armistice agreement. The U. S. government decided that its 
delegates would not accept any invitations to gatherings to which the Communist 
Chinese or North Koreans had been invited. " The Western allies held different opinions 
from the U. S. over the objectives of the conference. France was so involved in Indo- 
China that it could not be engaged in the Korean question. The Commonwealth 
countries, Britain in particular, began looking for an alternative to the rigid bipolar 
world situations, focused around "American hegemony unprecedented in history in both 
its intensity and scale. ý96 Purely from the point of view of its results, the leading 
position of the United States in the Western bloc was reconfirmed through this 
conference. Nevertheless, in spite of America's tough stance against the Soviet bloc, 
95 FRUS, vol. 16, p. 118, Johnson to Dulles, 20 April 1954. 
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Great Britain took advantage of this conference to improve its relations with 
Communist China as it had always wanted to do. 
The most important thing for the ROK was that it was the first major international 
conference in which South Korea participated as a sovereign state. " South Korea was 
an important element in terms of substance throughout the conference, from the 
beginning to the end, influential in helping to define organisation, negotiations and 
conclusion. " 
Much time was spent on the Allied side in discussions of the seating 
arrangements which had remained a matter for conflict up until its opening, reflecting 
the differences in the ideas of the major participants. The American idea was a two- 
sided arrangement but the British wanted a round table around which all the participants 
would be seated together. As the British expected that the United States would not 
attend the conference if the seating arrangements were not satisfactory, the seating was 
arranged according to the alphabetical order with a podium, but the form of the 
conference was a two-sided one as the U. S. had insisted. Dulles was determined that the 
South Korean delegation should be seated next to the U. S. delegation so as to prevent 
the South Koreans from going in a different direction during the conference. 99 
97 Yung Tae Pyun, Woegyo Yeorok [A R6sum6 of Diplomacy] (Seoul: Hankook Ilbo Sa, 1959), p. 118. 
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The discussions on Korea, which eventually comprised 15 plenary meetings and 
one restricted meeting, were arranged by rotating the chairmanship amongst Prince Wan 
of Thailand, Molotov, and Eden. 100 When the Geneva Conference began, the American 
delegation found itself coping with what seemed to be an almost insuperable problem: 
how to bridge the gap between Rhee and the European allies, who were willing to make 
compromises in Korea to ease the threat of a general war; and how to prevent an 
overriding influence by the European allies in the affairs of East Asia. If the gap could 
not be bridged, the Eisenhower administration would be forced to choose one side or 
the other. Such a decision, of course, would have symbolised the failure of American 
policy. The goal of the administration was to avoid having to make such a choice. 
Accordingly, the American delegation went to Geneva with three alternative Plans- 
labelled A. B. and C-for the unification of Korea. 
Plan A was projected to attract Rhee. It called for unification through 
incorporation of North Korea into the existing Republic of Korea: new elections would 
be held only in North Korea; the constitution of the ROK would become law for all of 
Korea, and Rhee's Government would remain in power. Plan B called for elections in 
North and South Korea to establish a Korean National Goverment within the ROK 
constitutional structure. Plan C, which was similar to a unification scheme forwarded 
by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden for Germany, was intended to appeal to the 
Europeans; it offered the greatest chance for a successful resolution of the Korean 
problem. Under this plan, both the government and the constitution of the 
ROK would 
be dissolved; country-wide elections would then select delegates to a constitutional 
100 Department of State, Pamphlet No. 5609, The Korean Problem at the 
Geneva Conference, released in 
October 1954. 
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convention that would create a new Korean state. Mutual phased withdrawals of foreign 
military forces from Korea would proceed, mediated by the new commission. The 
South Korean government strongly opposed the plan because the ROK would be 
superseded, and it would be on a par with the North Korean regime. 
Plan A was not welcomed by the Commonwealth countries because they regarded 
it as unreasonable and bent towards Rhee's Govemment. 101 The Commonwealth and 
many countries of the world preferred Plan C to Plan B on the grounds that Plan C was 
more objective and impartial vis-a-vis the present Korean authorities. Another argument 
for this plan was that the same general plan proposed by the three powers for Germany 
should be applied to Korea. Between the two extremes was Plan B, which was thought 
by the U. S. to be an acceptable choice for the allies. An all-new legislative assembly 
would be convened following elections throughout the entire country and elections 
would then be held for president. An indication that the primary focus of the 
Eisenhower administration was keeping its alliance system, rather than the unification 
of Korea, was the fact that none of the three plans were thought to have much chance of 
gaining Communist approval. "' 
Substantive discussion began on 27 April 1954. Foreign Minister Pyun proposed 
South Korea's unification policy which would entail, under United Nations supervision, 
elections in North Korea only. He announced that elections had already occurred in 
South Korea to the satisfaction of the UN and one hundred seats were left for the North 
Korean representatives. North Korea rejected the proposal. Instead, its Foreign Minister 
101 Brands, 'The other Geneva Conference', p. 73; Foot, A Substitute for Victory, p. 204. 
102 FRUS, vol. 16, pp. 82-87, Van Hollen memorandum, 9 April 1954; Lbid., pp. 105-111,16 
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Nam 11 proposed: an all-Korea committee should be established to prepare for elections 
in the whole of Korea and to facilitate contact between North and South; withdrawal of 
all foreign forces was essential within six months, while there should be agreement that 
the all-Korea elections established a government representing the whole country. 'O' 
Under the North Korean plan a government with representatives from both Koreas 
would be set up to administer all Korea while a nation-wide election was being held, 
giving the North Korean regime an equal voice in such a government. Also, such a 
government would be in complete charge of supervising the election without outside 
interference. This meant that the United Nations would play no role whatever in the 
settlement of the Korean issue. Questions were raised about the proposed all-Korea 
committee and whether it would represent the two parts of Korea proportionately to 
population. North Korea's rejection of the role of the UN was based on the following 
charges: (1) the United Nations itself had been a belligerent in the Korean War; (2) 
United Nations resolutions on the Korean War lacked validity since the Soviet Union 
and Connnunist China did not participate; (3) United Nations supervision in Korea 
would constitute foreign intervention; and (4) the Geneva Conference had nothing to do 
with the UN and was not committed to accepting any decision of the UN. 104 
103 FRUS, vol. 16, pp. 148-150, The United States Delegation to Dulles, 27 April 1954; U. S. Department 
of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, 26 April - 15 June 1954 (Washington, 
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On behalf of the allied side, Dulles criticised the North Korean proposal which 
made no mention of the United Nations or its resolution of 7 October 1950, calling for 
supervised elections in the northern part of Korea. "' In response, Chou En-lai 
condemned South Korea and the United States for creating obstacles to peace by 
concluding a mutual defence treaty, and by Rhee's threatening a march to North Korea. 
Chou argued that the PRC fully supported North Korea's proposal with provision for 
all-Korean elections without foreign intervention, which should include the withdrawal 
of foreign forces, and vehemently denounced the United States intervention policy 
towards Asia. "' Dulles, however, rejected the all-Korea committee plan, and criticised 
the fact that the proposal demanded equal representation from North and South Korea, 
disregarding the fact that South Korea controlled over three-quarters of the Korean 
population while North Korea ruled only one-quarter. 1 07 
In the meantime, most of the allies other than the U. S. and South Korea were at 
first reluctant to participate in the debate. This was due to their unwillingness to support 
South Korea's position that Chinese military troops should withdraw from North Korea 
while UN forces would remain in South Korea. 108 They also ducked South Korea's 
insistence that elections for unification should be held in North Korea only. This was 
considered to be unreasonable not only by the western allies but also by international 
public opinion. There was pressure to present a revised South Korean proposal which 
would go further to meet the Communist position from Great Britain and the 
105 Document relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva, pp. 14-20. 
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Commonwealth. On 29 April at a meeting with chief delegates of the other allies, 
Dulles emphasised that the primary issue was the quality of supervised elections in 
Korea rather than the territorial scope of elections. But Eden and other Commonwealth 
representatives insisted that something should be done immediately to counter 
Communist plans. 109 That day Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey suggested 
that "elections be held throughout Korea not only on the basis of proportional 
representation between the North and South but also under the UN supervision. " 
Delegates from the West European allies presented a similar plan. Paul Henri Spaak, 
the Belgian Delegate, expressed the view that while North Korea's conditions for 
elections were unacceptable, the North Koreans had a much sounder position in terms 
of general public impression than did the South Koreans. Accordingly, the allies 
expressed their hope that South Korea should be induced to counter with a proposal for 
all-Korean elections under effective supervision of the United Nations, for the allies' 
unity. "' It would make clear that a failure to reach agreement on Korea was the fault of 
the Communists and it would also prevent the Communists from winning a propaganda 
victory. 
As anticipated prior to the conference, the Allies' disunity was disclosed. Dulles 
criticised the European allies for not defending the United Nations or the United States 
position in connection with the Communists' verbal insults. 
' 11 He tried to intimidate 
Eden by threatening that "the close United Kingdom-United States relationship would 
be harmed if Britain's passive attitude continued. " Eden accepted the making of a 
109 FRUS, vol. 16, p. 156, Second Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, 29 April 1954. 
110 Ibid., pp. 161-165, The United States Delegation to the Department of State, 29-3 0 
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speech in support of America, and explained the Western countries' objection to the 
South Korean election formula. Eden suggested to Dulles a restricted meeting in order 
to promote the conference. "' 
At a restricted session on May 1, with the four main powers, Communist China, 
North and South Korea, Dulles proposed four points to discuss: elections to be under 
UN auspices; scope and character of elections; disposition of foreign troops in Korea; 
and provision to protect Korean independence, including the demilitarisation of border 
areas. The Communist side, however, rejected the UN observation of elections because 
the United Nations was a belligerent in the Korean War, whereby the UN had lost its 
competence and moral authority, and thus was not a neutral party in the Korean 
problem. Instead Peking suggested a 'Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission' to 
undertake this task. This proposal was turned down by Dulles on the ground that the 
role of the UN was ignored. The restricted session held on Korea thus only confirmed 
that both sides had no intention of modifying their positions. "' In an effort to 
downgrade the importance of the conference, Dulles returned to Washington on 3 May, 
leaving Under Secretary Smith to head the American delegation. 
Meanwhile, in Seoul and Geneva, delegates of the State Department engaged in 
painstaking negotiations with the South Korean leaders to encourage them to accept the 
United States' position. At the meeting with Dean and Briggs, Rhee agreed to elections 
for both the National Assembly and the Presidency in North and South Korea, but in 
11 1 PRO, FO 371 110559 FK 1071/419,1 I'h Plenary Session, 22 May 1954. 
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return he required the complete withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces as well as 
complete surrender of the North Korean army to South Korea before the elections. "' 
This requirement to accomplish the negotiations for Korean unification was quite 
unrealistic. However, South Korea believed that unless it insisted on its own policy, 
neither ally could help South Korea. Since the United States, as the leader of the free 
world, had to listen to other allies' opinions, it was sometimes forced to follow a 
majority view. So long as South Korea kept to its position, the United States could 
avoid any negative stand by pointing to South Korea's intransigence. "' 
In answer to Plan B, which the American delegation thought was the most 
practical under all circumstances, Rhee's Government had a basic fear that plan B was 
merely the first step in a whittling-down process. Rhee's Government objected to the 
plan. Its reasons against were (1) the plan derogated from the sovereignty of the ROK 
Government; (2) it lacked authority to hold the proposed elections under the ROK 
constitution; (3) announcement of such new elections for Assembly and President 
would cause great consternation in Korea and the people would think the Communists 
had gained too much from this concession; (4) in effect, Rhee's resignation would be 
required if the plan were accepted; and (5) it was utterly impossible to hold elections 
while Chinese Communist forces were in Korea and until the ROK got complete 
administrative control of North Korea. "' Nevertheless, Rhee personally agreed to have 
114 KPR, Foreign Ministry, Political Affairs, 726.23/137, Summary Record of the call on Rhee by Dean, 
2 May 1954. 
115 Pyun, Woegyo Yeorok, p. 82. 
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elections in South and North Korea in response to Dean's question whether Rhee would 
accept them under the condition that the Chinese Communist troops withdrew. "' 
Rhee's tactics in calling for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from North Korea 
were apparently double-edged. On the one hand, this insistence was part of his hard- 
bargaining approach to negotiations with America: an apparently unreasonable position 
might later be bartered for a commitment to greater military support. On the other hand, 
in the unlikely event that the Communists accepted, such acceptance surely would be 
premised on the simultaneous withdrawal of American and other United Nations troops. 
Since the T-N forces acted as a check on Rhee's ambitions, this result would not be 
unwelcome --- the decks then would be cleared for action. "' Secretary Dulles worried 
not only about the withdrawal of Chinese forces which was recognisably impracticable, 
but also about withdrawal of UN forces. American decision makers believed that the 
withdrawal of LN forces, which was regarded as a major deterrence to renewed 
hostilities from both Koreas, could wipe out the armistice and renew the conflict. "' 
Disastrous events, including the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the opening of the 
Indochina session on 7 May, shifted world attention from Korea to Indochina. Few 
thought Korea was so urgent. Because there was no fighting in Korea, matters could be 
allowed to remain in their present state for the time being, even if no agreement was 
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made. When Eden met Molotov for discussions on Korea and Indochina on 5 May, they 
agreed that the continuation of the status quo in Korea was inconsequential. 
Accordingly, the Korean Political Conference took a back seat to the Indochina 
conference. "' 
While the Big Five Powers concentrated on the Indochina situation, South Korea 
continued to confuse the United States in drafting details of their proposal. Suddenly, 
the South Korean delegation developed its own new position. On 15 May, Foreign 
Minister Pyun handed a new fourteen-point proposal to Robertson. The proposals 
primarily maintained: (a) South Korea agreed to all-Korean elections, provided they 
were under UN supervision; (b) the elections should be held within six months; (c) 
Communist Chinese troops should complete their withdrawal from Korea one month in 
advance of the election date; and (d) phased withdrawal of the UN forces might start 
before elections, but must not be completed before effective control over all Korea was 
achieved by the unified government and certified by the UN. However, the modified 
version still would not permit simultaneous elections in South and North Korea unless 
the Constitution of South Korea were amended before the election 
121 
This move was obviously designed to avoid the consequences of accepting the 
political status of the North Korean regime and at the same time maintaining the 
legality of South Korea, which had already been recognised by the United Nations as 
the only legal government existing in Korea. The major difference between the United 
120 Ibid., p. 2 10, Smith to Dulles, 6 May 1954. 
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States draft and Pyun's proposal was that Pyun specified in detail the withdrawal of 
foreign forces. Pyun emphasised their insistence on total withdrawal of the Chinese 
Communists before elections. Robertson stressed again the importance of the U. S. - 
ROK agreement and 16-nation endorsement for the single basic proposal on Korea. "' 
The United States tried to persuade Rhee to accept the U. S. proposal before the 
meeting of the allied delegation on 21 May. Realising that Rhee did not accept the U. S. 
draft and concerned that Rhee might instruct Pyun to amend his draft to a less 
acceptable form, the U. S. delegation in Geneva decided to support Pyun's position with 
minor changes. Finally, all delegations agreed that the ROK's proposal was far better 
than North Korea's because the ROK had agreed to the principle of an all-Korean 
election, even though they did not give wholehearted support. During discussion of the 
withdrawal question, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, supported by Eden, 
stressed the importance of trying to modify prases of Chinese withdrawal and the 
requirement of the ROK constitution for all-Korean elections. Pyun insisted on South 
Korea's firm position for Chinese withdrawal because the ROK's agreement on all- 
Korean elections was premised on the assumption that Chinese Communist forces 
would be withdrawn first. 
123 
On the following day, Pyun outlined the South Korean criteria providing for the 
elections under UN supervision in North and South Korea within six months. These 
included complete withdrawal of Chinese forces one month before the election and 
122 FRUS, vol. 16, p. 279-281, Smith to Briggs, 18 May 1954; KPR, 726.23 1954/137, U. S. Draft, 18 
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withdrawal of the United Nations forces when complete control over the whole of 
Korea had been achieved by the unified Government of Korea. The United States 
considered this proposal favourable and advantageous vis-a-vis free world opinion and 
the allied delegations in Geneva. The United States delegation was concerned lest 
Rhee's Government take any action to reverse the situation. A few days later, Rhee 
claimed that Pyun had exceeded his authority in putting forward this plan and was on 
the verge of recalling him from Geneva for the failure to include a provision for 
surrender or withdrawal of North Korean Communists. 
124 However, Rhee's 
condemnation of Pyun's proposal was a diplomatic action for American eyes because, 
quietly, Rhee praised Pyun's accomplishment on his return from the conference. 125 
On 22 May, China revised North Korea's earlier plan, and proposed that all- 
Korean elections be supervised by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which 
would be composed of neutral nations that had not participated in the Korean War. 
Chou emphasised the importance of Chinese entry to the UN, by arguing that the 
nil absence of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations made UN 
resolutions on Korea illegal and rendered the UN incapable of dealing with the Korean 
question. "' The United States and its allies rejected the Communists' emphasis on 
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discrediting the United Nations' role. This basic disagreement was in no way 
negotiable for either side. Confronted with this stalemate, the United States seriously 
contemplated termination of the Korean phase of the conference. The Eisenhower 
administration believed that the longer it continued the more chance there was that the 
Communists would exploit the American disposition by attempting to appeal to its 
allies through some formula which would evade the basic issue of the UN role in a 
Korean settlement. "' On I June, Secretary Dulles instructed Smith that the break-off of 
the conference should be on the UN issue and that "this should be our final position. 55128 
With the lapse of time, the allied side had revealed their split over the method of 
all-Korean elections. On 5 June, at the thirteenth plenary session on Korea, Molotov 
proposed an appropriate international commission to supervise the holding of free all- 
Korean elections. North Korean Nam Il and Chou En-lai reiterated their position that a 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be established. "' These proposals 
from the Communists were seemingly aimed at further taking advantage of differences 
amongst the allied side. Two days later, Dulles confirmed that the break-off of the 
conference was decisive while the allies were united and the position of the United 
States was better than that of the Communists. "' President Rhee also wanted the 
Korean phase to be tenninated without ftirther delay. "' 
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The United States delegation worried that the Communists would perpetuate the 
Korean phase of the conference for the purpose of making a major propaganda issue 
out of the United States' breaking-up the conference while they still wished to 
negotiate. In addition, continued sessions would only renew possibilities for deepening 
rifts amongst the allies, and in turn this might have some effect on their respective 
public opinions. 
132 Even on the strategy of terminating the conference the U. S. 
delegation wanted to do it on the authority of the UN, while most of its allies with the 
British Commonwealth argued for doing so on free elections in Korea. Up until the end 
of the conference, the U. S. delegation believed that the British delegates were in contact 
with Menon, conspiring with him behind their back and persuading others to join it 
against the U. S. position. 133 It was because of disunity in its own side that the United 
States rushed the conference to an early conclusion and that the West allowed a 
considerable propaganda advantage to the Communists in the final session. The United 
States on its part had neglected coordinating policy and strategy with its allies, 
engrossed in the problem of South Korean participation until very near to the opening 
of the conference. 
At the fourteenth plenary session on II June, Eden pointed out that two issues- 
the authority of the UN and the question of free all-Korean elections-were primary 
points which had divided the UN and the Communists, and complained that neither side 
showed any sign of reaching an agreement. "' It was clear that nothing more could be 
132 FRUS, vol. 16, p. 360, The United States Delegation to the Department of 
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achieved on the Korean phase in Geneva, and on 14 June, Secretary Dulles indicated his 
approval of the termination of the conference. 135 
The final meeting was held under Eden's presidency on 15 June. Delegations of 
both sides asserted their respective views. Each side blamed the other for the failure of 
the conference. No immediate reconciliatory gestures were made. "' A declaration, 
signed by the sixteen delegations whose countries had participated in the Korean War, 
restated the principles which the UN side had consistently supported, and noted that "it 
is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the 
people of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none. ""' The 
Korean phase of the Geneva Conference was concluded. 
In sum, throughout the discussions on the Korean question, the United States 
blocked any proposals submitted by the Communist bloc and insisted that the 
unification of Korea be entrusted to the United Nations. Dulles and his supporters 
feared that if the first phase of the Geneva Conference should succeed, then the second 
phase on Indo-China might also have concrete results. In that case the outcome would 
be a victory for the Communist bloc. 
138 
Shortly after the conference had failed, the Eisenhower administration was again 
preoccupied by Rhee's commitment to undertake a unilateral military offensive to unify 
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Korea, which he had disclosed in confidence to Eisenhower. In order to prevent Rhee's 
risky steps, Eisenhower invited him to visit Washington. Though Rhee at first refused 
to leave Korea, he later decided to accept the invitation. 139Rhee's reversal resulted 
from a number of factors which might have convinced him to visit the United States to 
put forward his ideas concerning the development of an anti-Communist alliance in 
Asia, which combined Asian manpower with American guns and equipment. The 
influential factors for his change of mind were: the rapid deterioration in the Indochina 
situation and Possible collapse of French military and diplomatic efforts; and the fear 
that U. S. policy against communism in Asia may have been softened by the influence of 
Great Britain, which had sought to relax tensions in the bipolar system and had a certain 
influence over the United States through its leadership of the Commonwealth 
countries. 140 He went to Washington on 26 July 1954. Among other things, he had the 
opportunity to address a joint session of Congress. His attitude on unification, however, 
did not change at all. Eisenhower and his associates were quite concerned about Rhee's 
unpredictable manner which might cause the administration to be embarrassed. For this 
reason, when Eisenhower met Rhee at the White House, there were no microphones 
provided because Rhee might try to sound off publicly in the presence of Eisenhower 
on Korea. Eisenhower also had considerable difficulty with Rhee and confessed, 
"he is 
a stubborn old fellow, and I don't know whether we'll be able to 
hold him in line with 
us indefinitely. "141 
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At the meeting with Washington's policy-makers, Rhee argued his military plan 
for Korean unification though this would work only if the United States were willing to 
resort to military measures. He and other ROK officials were told that the United States 
would not support unilateral military action by South Korea under any circumstances. 
President Eisenhower strongly expressed his objection to another war in Korea which 
would result in all-out global war. At the same time, Rhee was notified that the U. S. 
was redeploying from Korea four divisions (additional to the two divisions already 
redeployed) and one regimental combat team. This withdrawal was to be completed 
about the end of 1954.142 Upon his return to Korea, Rhee mounted an acrimonious anti- 
American campaign against the U. S. redeployment. 143 In order to cope with Rhee's 
possible continued intransigence against cooperating with U. S. policy in Korea, the 
Eisenhower administration considered other courses of action. These included: 
suspending all economic aid; reducing its relations with Rhee's Government to a 
minimum requirement for the maintenance of formal diplomatic relations; continuing 
military aid only on a minimum basis; and contacting Rhee's political opponents as 
well as selected ROKA commanders. 144 In the end, Rhee's Government subsided so as 
not to clash with the U. S. precipitately. Attempts to obtain from President Rhee a 
formal assurance in writing that he would not initiate unilateral military action at any 
time against the Communists were unavailing. However, in the Minute of the ROK- 
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U. S. negotiations signed by the ROK on 17 November 1953, the ROK undertook to 
cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea, and agreed to leave its 
forces under the operational control of the UNC. 145 
To sum up, in many respects the failure of the Korean Political Conference was to 
be expected. There was no fighting in Korea; neither North and South Korea were on 
the verge of collapse nor on the verge of victory; and none of the great powers were 
ready to pay the substantial price of unification. Russia and China did not want a border 
with American- supported South Korea threatening their sovereignty. If there had been 
even the faintest hope for reunification on the part of the Western side, it clearly 
emerged that the chances looked even slimmer in view of the development of Soviet- 
North Korean and Chinese-North Korean relations following the truce. According to the 
announcements of 8 August 1953 on the Soviet aid plan for North Korea, and on the 
agreements of 23 November 1953 between North Korea and China, it became even 
more obvious that neither the Soviet Union nor China had any intention of giving up 
North Korea. It was taken for granted by the West that North Korea would be rapidly 
incorporated into the Chinese economic sphere, judging from the reports of the Swedish 
Representative in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 14' Despite the ultimate 
American goal in Korea-a united and independent free Korea-the United States 
145 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
OCB 387.4 Korea [Armistice] (File #2) 3,2 December 1954. 
146 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 121, Progress Report on NSC 170/1, 'U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea', 25 March 
1954; PRO FO 371/110550, Allen to Scott, Draft Telegram, 27 July 1954. 
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opted to strengthen South Korea through economic and military assistance as a staunch 
anti-Communist ally. As a result of the failure of the conference, the military 
confrontation between the North and the South was left unresolved. 
The Eisenhower administration thought that unification could be attained through 
economic means. Unification might ultimately be achieved when South Korea 
accomplished such economic development that it would be an irresistible force 
attracting North Koreans. "' For the two Koreas, political and economic reconstruction 
was a more urgent matter, so long as the unification of Korea could not be settled on 
their respective terms. Thus the status quo of 1he Korean peninsula remained acceptable 
to all parties concerned. 
Communist China profited most from the Korean phase of the conference. As a 
participant for the first time in an international conference, the Peking regime 
demonstrated that Asian problems could not be solved without China's cooperation. 
The Chinese government maximised their opportunity to promote their world power 
status. The United States, which had been sandwiched between South Korea and its 
European allies, had difficulties in shaping a common position for the UN side. 
North Korea gained a great deal at the Geneva Conference which provided the 
Pyongyang regime with its diplomatic debut on the international level. This might well 
have been the primary objective of its decision to participate in the conference. North 
Korea apparently enjoyed the diplomatic exposures of its regime which the Geneva 
Conference provided. 
147 NA, RG 59,795.00/8-153, Memorandum of Conversation, I August 1953; FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1503, 
Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 27 August 1953. 
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As the leader of the free world, the United States had to respond to its allies' 
different views and also to consider the Korean problem as part of its global policy. 
This dilemma gave South Korea a certain leverage. Under the circumstances, South 
Korea could take a position equally with the great powers in the discussion of the 
Korean problem. "' 
Throughout the conference, the Communist side commanded an edge over the 
Western side which fuelled propaganda and left them with the relative advantage of 
maintaining a united front. The United States found that it was more difficult to engage 
in collective diplomacy with the allied diplomats than in collective defence with allied 
troops. The allied nations had different objectives and scope about the conference. The 
South Korean position was fundamentally different from either American or British 
positions. "What was rational for the British was unthinkable for the South Koreans, 
while something worthwhile to the Americans, was a foolhardy idea to the South 
Koreans on which they should risk their national future-an illusion morally 
unacceptable and practically impossible. 
, 149 
Even on the strategy of tenninating the conference the United States opted to do it 
on the authority of the UN, while most of its allies with the British Commonwealth 
nations argued for doing so on the issue of free elections in Korea. It was because of 
this disunity in its own camp that the United States rushed the conference to an early 
conclusion, and the West handed a considerable propaganda advantage to the 
Communists. The United States itself had neglected coordinating policy and strategy 
148 Richard C. Allen, pe, An Unauthorized Portrait 
( Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle 
Co., 1960), pp. 178-179. 
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with its allies, fettered by the problem of South Korean participation until very near to 
the opening of the conference. 
150 
There was a great gap between the idea and reality in the conference particularly 
on the part of the United States and South Korea. According to their opinion, the 
conference was an occasion for them to judge the aggressors in front of the world 
public. However, in actuality, it was only an occasion on which to deal with problems 
unsolved on the battlefield. Thus the American and South Korean position was not 
acceptable even to their allies. The United States appeared at times uncertain of their 
attitude between idea and reality. What may have seemed rational to the rest of the 
world was mostly impracticable in real life. The Eisenhower administration regarded 
President Rhee's argument as unreasonable, i. e., that North Korean forces as well as all 
Chinese should either withdraw beyond the border or surrender before any elections 
were held. Foregoing this, Rhee asked what if the Communist forces would not abide 
by the results of elections and were to disobey the goverment established thereafter, to 
which the U. S. Government could offer no satisfactory reply. 151 
As Robert Keohane describes well in his account of the dilemma of the United 
States and its small alliance partners, there are times when the superpower cannot easily 
translate its enormous military, economic, and political strength into effective influence 
over smaller states. U. S. -ROK relations before the conclusion of the Geneva 
Conference provides a clear illustration of this phenomenon. Even though Rhee had 
agreed to the armistice, the continued question of Korean unification, along with his 
149 j. Y. Ra, Non-ended War (Seoul: Jeon Ye Won, 1994), pp. 265-266. 
150 FRUS, vol. 16, pp. 338-342. 
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unpredictability, enabled him to manoeuvre and embarrass the U. S. government before 
and during the Geneva Conference in 1954. Once again the Eisenhower administration 
had to negotiate with Rhee's Government when four big powers agreed to hold a 
conference in Geneva for a peaceful settlement of the Korean and Indochinese 
problems. Rhee opposed attending the conference until the United States promised 
further military assistance to his country. 
While the United States viewed the situation in terms of its global context, the 
South Korean government suspected that the U. S. would seek an agreement with the 
other superpowers at the expense of South Korea. As Annette Fox argues, "while the 
great power might be almost the whole concern of the small state, the latter was only a 
small part of the concern of the great power. 5152 President Rhee once again tried to 
behave recklessly towards the Eisenhower administration before and during the Geneva 
Conference. He evaded consultations with the American officials, delayed South 
Korea's attendance at the conference, and demanded firm American support for the 
ROK's position at the conference. Rhee went so far as to declare the probability of 
unilateral military action against North Korea if Washington ignored his demands. 
However, more advantageous to South Korea was the fact that the U. S. had to devote 
itself to negotiating with Rhee, principally to avoid being blamed not only by the 
Communist bloc but also by its allies for the failure of the conference if it could not 
persuade South Korea to attend. Rhee's bargaining position was further reinforced by 
the fact that the major powers were more concerned with their individual interests than 
15 1 KPR, 726.23/137, Sununary Record, Rhee-Dean, 26 April 1954. 
152 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War 11 (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 18 1. 
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with Korean issues. Britain and France wished to settle Indochinese problems through 
compromise with the PRC. The Chinese government attempted to improve their 
international status and wished to be treated as an inevitably influential power in Asian 
problems. Distracted by the diverse interests of their allies at the Geneva Conference, 
the Eisenhower administration could not but re-evaluate the important role South 
Korea, which had been a mouthpiece for American hard-line anti-Communist policy 
since the Korean War, could play as a faithful client. This tendency was enhanced by 
the French force's surrender at Dien Bien Phu on 8 May in the midst of the conference. 
The Eisenhower administration eventually came to view staunch anti-Communists like 
Rhee with vital sympathy. Under the circumstances, Rhee had far more opportunity to 
exploit the situation to South Korea's advantage during the conference than before. 
It is not clear whether Rhee was pursuing in his confrontation with the United 
States a pragmatic line of policy or whether he was really aiming at a resumption of 
hostilities in Korea. One thing is clear, however, that Rhee played his meagre hand 
rather well, in fact made the best use of it and led the conference itself to a satisfactory 
conclusion although in a negative sense. For President Rhee, even though 
he did not 
achieve the unification of the Korean peninsula, did secure other crucial objectives. 
South Korea was to be militarily strengthened by forming a security pact with the 
United States, and by gaining huge amounts of American military and economic 
assistance. This support would give him tremendous political power 
just before his 
resignation. 
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The Bilateral Military and Security Relationship 
After the Korean War ended, the United States' main objectives towards the 
Korean peninsula were to control South Korea, its ally, and to deter its enemies, such as 
the PRC and North Korea. I Syngman Rhee, having only accepted the armistice in July 
1953 reluctantly, once again set out to bluff the Eisenhower administration over the 
issue of security matters which could greatly affect the survival of South Korea. As the 
initial U. S. commitment to South Korea, which was designed to check Soviet and 
Chinese expansion in the Far East, had resulted in greater American appreciation of 
South Korea's strategic importance, Rhee could again exert disproportionate bargaining 
power over Washington with regard to military affairs. For as long as the United States 
was dedicated to the policy of contaimnent of the Soviet bloc, South Korea was able to 
exploit the United States significantly, while some actions that were in conflict with 
American security interests were restrained by the United States. 
This chapter traces the circumstances in which President Rhee sought means to 
strengthen and consolidate American commitment to South Korea by advancing South 
Korea's value as an ally; and how Rhee exerted his influence over the U. S. despite the 
considerable American assistance in South Korea. 
1 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Policy Paper Subseries, NSC 170/1: U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, 20 
November 1953. 
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U. S. National Interest and its Security Policy in East Asia 
U. S. foreign policy changed significantly in the 1950s as a result of the Korean 
War. While the desire to check and resist the growth of communism on a global level 
had, in Europe and the Middle East, manifested itself as containment of Soviet 
expansionism and aggression, in Asia there was a new opponent, Communist China. 
China was regarded as a close ally of the Soviet Union whose behaviour had come to be 
seen as equally hostile. East Asia had become an important new front and U. S. national 
security requirements were altered to reflect this. The defence budget was enlarged and 
the size of the armed forces increased as the U. S. entered into a series of pacts with 
many non-Communist Asian states, which included the provision of both military and 
economic assistance. U. S. military presence in the Western Pacific increased 
significantly. 
The last years of the Truman administration and early years of the Eisenhower 
administration saw the negotiation of a series of pacts between the U. S. and the friendly 
Asian governments of Japan, South Korea, Formosa, and the Philippines, coinciding 
with the increased deployment of U. S. armed forces in the Far East and Western 
Pacific. The Soviet Union had been expanding towards neutral Third World countries 
and the Eisenhower administration sought to undermine this strategy through two 
channels. Firstly, non-neutral states were to be strengthened through regional alliances 
134 
and individual nation-building and, secondly, neutral states would be nullified through 
covert action. 2 
As a long-range goal in East Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisaged the 
emergence of a regional security pact with which the United States and possibly other 
major Westem Powers would be associated and which would form the political and 
economic basis of an integrated military structure of indigenous armed forces, 
supplemented and complemented by the mobile forces of the United States and other 
associated nations. The Eisenhower administration expected that once this military 
posture had been sufficiently developed to permit the parent alliance to deal with Red 
China from a position of strength through a combination of political, military and 
economic pressures, a separation of Red China from the Soviet bloc could ultimately be 
brought about, possibly followed by the reorientation of mainland China to the West. 3 
As a comprehensive regional security arrangement for East Asia was a long-term aim at 
that time, the Eisenhower administration, in the meantime, fostered bilateral and 
multilateral treaties among the countries of the area as an alternative. 
The U. S. signed a security pact with Australia and New Zealand that became 
known as the ANZUS Pact. In 1954, Secretary Dulles initiated the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a collective security association comprising the U. S., 
Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
Officially, its main aim was to protect Thailand from possible Chinese attack or 
2 Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Cengn: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 120. 
DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, Box 10, United States Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East, 9 
April 1954. 
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subversion. However, compared to NATO, SEATO was relatively ineffective, lacking 
NATO's joint command structure. Congress had insisted that any U. S. action in defence 
of its Asian allies should first pass through traditional constitutional procedures. While 
NATO military activities were governed by formal treaty rights and obligations, action 
in the name of SEATO would be subject to various executive orders and agreements, 
and Congressional resolutions. 4 
The main adversary against whom these forces were arrayed was of course 
Communist China. Reviewing U. S. policy in the Far East at the meeting of the National 
Security Council, the policy makers decided not to adopt any kind of soft policy, 
representing the objective of peaceful coexistence with Communist China. 5 The 
Eisenhower administration anticipated a renewal of hostilities in Korea triggered by the 
Soviet Union which could launch an amphibious invasion of Japan in conjunction with 
Chinese Communist forces. The attack could be launched concurrently with campaigns 
in East Asia, in the Middle East and in Western Europe where the USSR was capable of 
6 
undertaking concurrent strategic air operations. So as to cope with these possible 
Soviet hostilities, the U. S. was devoted to setting up overseas military bases all around 
the rim of the Soviet bloc. In its political objectives, the United States regarded the 
Harold C. Hinton, Thre, - and A Half Power: the New Balance in Asia (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1974), p. 54. 
5 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 21 It" NSC Meeting, 18 August 1954. 
6 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Central Intelligence Agency memorandum 
for the Intelligence 
Advisory Committee, NIE 11-4-54: Soviet Capabilities and Probable 
Soviet Courses of Action through 
Mid-1959,13 August 1954. 
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overseas base system as a major instrument of U. S. foreign policy and as a key to its 
survival as a nation. 7 
The predominant official and public American view of Peking for about a decade 
after 1950 was that it was expansionist, both by its own nature and by virtue of its 
presumed status as a Soviet satellite. Being expansionist, it must be contained militarily 
and to every possible extent isolated politically. For the U. S., the central immediate 
problem was the capacity of the non-Communist countries to hold out, or to be assisted 
to hold out, against the political, economic, and military thrust of the Chinese 
Communists. Subsequently, the United States directed its efforts in East Asia to foster 
the determination and to enlist the combined strengths of those non-Communist 
countries to oppose any aggressive advances by Communist China. Washington policy- 
makers felt that to the extent that Communist control in China could be disrupted and 
Communist China circumscribed by effective regional opposition in East Asia, 
dependence upon United States military power in that area would be decreased and the 
United States' freedom of action in its global strategy vis-a-vis the USSR enhanced. 
Fundamental to the establishment of a non-Communist position of strength in 
East Asia was the rehabilitation of the Japanese military forces, not along the lines of 
the ultra-national military attitude of pre-World War 11, but along democratic and 
liberal 
lines that would enable Japan to exert a stabilising influence in East Asia. The 
U. S. 
government realised the risks of fostering Japanese military rehabilitation 
but 
considered it essential to develop the Japanese military structure to ensure 
that Japan 
would become capable of providing for its own security and 
becoming a contributor to 
KPR, 773.1 US/406, The Statement by Secretary Dulles 
before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 4 June 1958. 
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collective security in the Western Pacific. To achieve this, the United States would have 
to seek to reduce the friction and to resolve the differences which then constituted 
major obstacles to a collective security arrangement in East Asia. Secretary Dulles had 
in mind a Northeast Asia Military Pact with the U. S., Philippines, Formosa, ROK, and 
Japan as parties. However, the problem of Japanese-Korean relations was to be one of 
8 these obstacles to effective defence arrangements among the countries concerned. 
By 1954, in the name of containing the new Sino-Soviet bloc, U. S. world-order 
interests were expanded to include Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, South 
Korea and Taiwan in Northeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand in the Southwest 
Pacific, and Pakistan and Iran in Southern Asia. For the United States, 1954 was a year 
when its defence had been rebuilt and its nuclear stockpile was expanding rapidly. In 
seeking to deny the growth and expansion of Chinese Communist power and influence, 
the U. S. largely followed two different but complementary lines of action. On the one 
hand, they sought to maintain a strong military posture in Eastern Asia as a means of 
deterring China, while on the other hand, U. S. policy was also to build up the strength 
and stability of the free Asian countries around the Chinese periphery. Towards this 
objective, Japan, as the only real competitor to Communist China, was considered a 
crucial ally. From a military perspective, Japan constituted the northern anchor of the 
offshore island chain and provided important U. S. military bases 
in close proximity to 
the sources of Sino-Soviet power in the Far East. The bulk of U. 
S. tactical air strength 
in Asia was based in Japan; the U. S. operated extensive repair and maintenance 
facilities there for land and naval forces; and the logistical support 
for U. S. 
DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 
8, Future steps in Southeast Asia, 24 July 1954. 
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commitments in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia was still dependent in large 
measure upon Japanese bases. 
In order to defend U. S. interests in thý Far East and Pacific area in the long term, 
the U. S. planned to: maintain the security of the Pacific offshore island chain as an 
essential element of U. S. security; develop the military organisation of the Manila Pact 
and the collective defence capabilities of the member nations; and promote the 
participation of South Korea, Japan, Nationalist China and the Philippines in a 
collective defence arrangement in which the United States would participate, and seek 
to link eventually with the Manila Pact. 9 
Besides this, the fundamental purpose of U. S. national interests in East Asia was 
to seek stabilisation of the region by maintaining a balance among the major powers. 
The equilibrium in this region was essential to peace and security, not only for this 
region but also for the world. Due to the unique strategic location and the violent 
history of the Korean peninsula, the maintenance of peace there was a primary interest 
of U. S. foreign policy. During the post-Korean War period, the Eisenhower 
administration had recurrent fears that either the Communists or Rhee would initiate 
new hostilities. In the event that Rhee was the trigger, Washington policy makers 
prepared a contingency plan for active U. S. participation in the replacement of Rhee. 10 
For the same reason, the U. S. also disagreed with Chiang's Taiwanese govemment's 
DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Department of Defense 
Subseries, 'Regional Chapters of the Department of Defense International Security Plan', 9 May 1955. 
10 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 175flNSC Meeting, Report by the Vice President, 15 
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offensive actions against mainland China. " In response to the possibility of another 
North Korean attack, Washington prepared NSC-170/1, which identified possible 
military reactions to such a contingency. Some of the alternatives included offsetting 
Communist China's capabilities with atomic bombs, occupation of Hainan and other 
off-shore islands, raids on the mainland by Nationalist Chinese forces, and a naval 
blockade of China's coast. 12 UNC forces, therefore, would stay in South Korea to 
prevent any likely threat to the equilibrium as long as the division in Korea remained 
advantageous to the overall U. S. strategy in East Asia. 
Largely, though by no means exclusively, in connection with its effort to contain 
Communist China, the United States became involved, in the 1950s, with economic aid 
programmes for practically every non-Communist Asian country. There were large 
military aid programmes for South Korea, Nationalist China, and South Vietnam, as 
well as smaller ones for Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In 
addition these countries, except for Japan which was relatively prosperous, received 
substantial amounts of a special type of economic aid known as defence support, much 
of which consisted of consumer goods, and the announced purpose of which was to 
help them support higher defence budgets than would have been possible otherwise and 
to combat inflation by mopping up excess purchasing power. 
In factý in asserting and exercising its role as leader of the free world, the U. S. 
frequently turned to the Military Assistance Programme as a major foreign policy tool. 
11 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Administrative Subseries, Regional Country Policy Statement on Local Wars or 
Local Aggression, 16 September 1959. 
12 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 7, NSC 170/1,20 November 1953. 
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The actual effect was often to increase the political power of authoritarian governments 
and military elites. Such a tendency was generally regarded by the United States as an 
inevitable byproduct of the entire containment policy, one of whose strategies was 
strengthening indigenous forces on the principle of, to use one of the Eisenhower 
administration's slogans, 'Let Asians fight Asians'. 13 
The United States commitment to South Korea grew out of American 
involvement in the Korean War. The biPolar image of the war which informed 
American decision making during the Korean War continued to condition U. S. strategic 
thinking throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s. The Mutual Defence Treaty 
confirmed the American security interest in Korea as part of an effective system of 
regional security. Korea, integrated into the U. S. -led alliance system, became the 
beneficiary of the military and economic assistance that it had so desperately sought. 
However, the existence of a security alliance between the two countries was not a 
guarantee of a smooth or balanced relationship between the Rhee and the Eisenhower 
administrations. The two countries were far too dissimilar in virtually every respect for 
this to be the case. After an exchange of ratifications of the Treaty, efforts to further tie 
the ROK into the U. S. security system through the Westem Pacific security 
arrangement had been started by emphasising to the ROK the need 
for satisfactory 
working relationships between the ROK and Japan. During the 
Eisenhower 
administration this grand scheme was to fail because the ROK 
heightened its public 
criticism Of U. S- security policies and its propaganda attacks on 
Japan. The U. S. 
continued its efforts to formalise broad security arrangements with 
the ROK, but it 
13 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, 
Conference in President's Office, 28 May 
1954. 
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would prove impossible to do so, particularly with respect to arrangements involving 
Japan. 14 The Eisenhower administration sought to normalise diplomatic relations 
between South Korea and Japan, and to develop military and economic relations 
between them and the United States. However, this American plan encountered strong 
objection from its client state-South Korea-and was continually frustrated by 
President Rhee, who was suspicious of U. S. attitudes towards Japanese rehabilitation 
after the Korean War. 
The primary objectives of U. S. -South Korean military relations was the defence 
of South Korea against any possible external aggression and the protection of U. S. 
national interests in the region. The principal means of securing these objectives 
included a mutual defence treaty, a U. S. military presence in South Korea, and U. S. 
military assistance to ROK forces. This relationship was characteristically unequal 
because South Korea was heavily dependent upon the United States. However, the two 
countries' military relationships were not always harmonious as South Korean President 
Rhee sought to exert his bargaining power against the U. S. goverment, in spite of the 
asymmetry of capability between the two countries. The U. S. reevaluation of South 
Korea's strategic value enabled Rhee to exploit the Eisenhower administration on his 
terms even though his bargaining power had apparently decreased considerably, 
compared with the situation during and after the Korean War. 
14 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 50, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to Korea, 2 December 1954. 
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The Mutual Security Pact 
Following the Korean War, South Korean demands for an American commitment 
to security became more continuous. Foreign Minister Y. T. Pyun called for a security 
pact, noting that the United States had entered into a tripartite mutual defence treaty 
with Australia and New Zealand. 15 The opening of armistice talks distressed the South 
Koreans because there was nothing more important to them than the unification of their 
country. President Rhee wanted the United States and the UN allies to win the war and 
thus reunite his country. In addition to the desire for unification, the uncertainty of the 
future might have bolstered Rhee's negative attitude towards accepting an armistice 
agreement. Furthermore, it was clear that the United States and other UN forces would 
be withdrawn once an armistice had eventually been agreed. This might have meant a 
repetition of the national disaster. Rhee knew that a series of pre-Korean War American 
policies-the hasty troop withdrawal in 1949 and the defence perimeter in East Asia 
excluding South Korea, declared in January 1950-had invited the North Korean 
attack. He wanted a firm guarantee from the United States before agreeing to an 
armistice that it would prevent further aggression from North Korea in the future. 
However, the Eisenhower administration had not been willing to negotiate a security 
pact with the ROK because of their reluctance to assume such commitments on the 
Asiatic mainland and also because of the divided position of Korea which made the risk 
of war an abnormal hazard, which was not the case with the island countries. 
' 6 
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From the beginning of the armistice negotiations, Rhee had tried to deter the 
talks. Having serious troubles with Rhee, the Eisenhower administration considered 
alternatives, not only conciliatory, but also in the form of threats. 17 At the climax of this 
seesawing-the Rhee-Robertson negotiations in July 1953-South Korea was to 
receive concessions from the United States such as a mutual defence treaty, long-term 
economic and military aid, and possible joint U. S. -South Korea withdrawal from the 
Korean Political Conference. 
The day after the armistice was signed on 27 July, Secretary Dulles announced 
that he would visit Seoul to discuss with Rhee a number of common concerns. From 
their first meeting on 5 August, Rhee and Dulles grappled with each other over a 
bilateral security pact. In response to Rhee's assertion that "our whole life and hope 
depended on concluding the mutual defence treaty, " Dulles argued that it should be like 
the U. S. treaty with the Philippines and emphasised that the treaty should be drafted in 
such a way as to guarantee U. S. Senate ratification. He asked Rhee not to press the 
United States to add language which would not really add to the security of Korea but 
which would cause trouble with the Senate. 18 Rhee insisted that the treaty, crucially, 
should include the phrase that "an attack against Korea was an attack upon the United 
States forces, " as well as a pledge of immediate and automatic war in the American 
draft. When Dulles protested that this would violate the constitutional provision that 
only Congress could declare war, Rhee vehemently claimed that "the whole thing was 
17 Its threat included termination of military assistance, unilateral withdrawal of UN forces and the 
custody of Rhee by a military coup if he continued to refuse cooperation with the UNC or took 
independent military action. 
18 
-FRUS, 
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of no value without that. "19 Despite this ardent appeal, Rhee gained virtually nothing 
from his negotiations with Dulles. None of Rhee's determined efforts to insert 
automatic and immediate U. S. military involvement in the draft treaty were accepted by 
Dulles. On 8 August 1953, Secretary Dulles agreed with Rhee to draft a mutual defence 
treaty in Seoul. He worked out the details of the treaty with his South Korean 
counterpart, Minister Pyun, and the Treaty was finally signed on I October 1953 in 
Washington, D. C. 
The Mutual Defence Treaty had two main purposes: (1) To prevent any renewal 
of Communist aggression in Korea by miscalculation; (2) To give to the government 
and the South Koreans formal assurance of the commitment of the United States in the 
event of external aggression. 20 The treaty was composed of six articles, and stated: (a) 
the parties involved would attempt to settle any international disputes they might be 
involved in by peaceful means; (b) the two parties would consult with each other 
whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of 
either of the parties was threatened by external armed attack; and (c) the most important 
point, each party recognised an armed attack on either of the parties' territories as a 
danger to its own peace and security, and declared that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
21 
Great Britain regarded this treaty warily because it might result in a reduction of 
the possibility of a peaceful solution to the Korean problem by irritating the 
19 Oliver, erican Involvement in Korea, p. 427. 
20 U. S. Congress, Senate, Commission on Foreign Relations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 83 rd Congress, second session, Mutual Defense Tregy with Korea 
(Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 2-3. 
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Communists prior to a forthcoming political conference in Geneva. Given Rhee's 
vehement desire to march north to unify Korea, the treaty might well be taken by Rhee 
as approval of unilateral activity. For this reason, the British government pressed the 
Eisenhower administration to slow the pace of its progress towards a treaty with South 
Korea. However, Britain's efforts did not lead to any change in America's 
commitments towards Korea as the treaty was a crucial part of the U. S. 's bargaining 
position with South Korea for an armistice. 22 The U. S. Senate approved the treaty, on 
the same day as did the Korean National Assembly, on 26 January 1954 by a vote of 
81-6.23 It provided South Korea with the protection it needed by placing that country 
within the United States' sphere of security in the Far East. 
Its provisions were largely equivalent to the treaty with Japan, as Rhee demanded, 
but not to the NATO treaty, as he had asked. An exchange of ratification was scheduled 
for 18 March 1954, but the Eisenhower administration called it off at a few days' 
notice without substantive explanation as a means of applying pressure on Rhee to 
comply with American PoliCY. 
24 The final act was not consummated until November 
1954. In the meantime, Rhee used pressure tactics to ask for still further strengthening 
of the treaty provisions. Rhee sought to obtain modifications in the language of the 
treaty with a view to eliminating the provision for termination after one year's notice 
21 KPR, 741.14-Treaty 624/228, Mutual Security Pact, signed at Washington on I October 1953. 
22 DDE Library, J. F. Dulles Papers, Subject Series: Korea, Telephone Conversation with Ambassador 
Makins, 31 July 1953; PRO, FO 371 110604 FKI 193/4A, Crowe to Joy, 4 February 1954. 
23 Department of State, Bulletin, p. 208,8 February 1954. 
24 FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 1769-1770, Progress Report, 26 March 1954. 
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and to committing the United States to supporting unilateral ROK military action to 
eject the Communists from Korea. He desired to modify the language of the treaty 
along the same lines as Article IX of the Mutual Defence Act between the United States 
and Japan. That article provides that the applicable provisions shall "remain in force 
unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments. " Rhee was informed by Ambassador 
Briggs, as a result of instructions by Dulles, that the U. S. could not agree to any 
modification. 25 In view of Korea's geopolitical position, the United States prepared to 
withdraw its security guarantees to Korea if it recognised a need to change its Korean 
policy in the future. The treaty finally came into force on 17 November 1954. 
Doubtless the treaty showed the U. S. intention to protect South Korea militarily 
against future Communist aggression. 26 But the treaty itself contained some limitations 
in terms of the extent of American military commitment to Korea. First, the treaty 
specified that U. S. obligation would be limited only to the event of external armed 
attack on South Korea. It implied that any aggressive military action initiated by South 
Korea would be excluded from American assistance. In other words, the United States 
As a result of Rhee's letter of II March 1954, notifying that the ROK might take unilateral action, the 
change of ratification was being delayed pending further assurance of South Korea's continued 
cooperation with the U. S. 
25 KPRý 741.14 Treaty-624/228, the U. S. -Japan Security Treaty; NA, RG 59,795.00/6-254,2 June 1954. 
Rhee was anxious about the termination clause of Article VI: "This Treaty shall remain in force 
indefinitely. Either party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party. " On the 
contrary, the termination clause of the Japanese Treaty stated: as both Parties agree other satisfactory 
individual or collective security arrangements, it will have come into force. In reality, this termination 
clause made it impossible for Japan unilaterally to cancel rights granted the U. S. by the treaty. But, at that 
time, Rhee wanted this shackle because it guaranteed the security of South Korea without question. 
26 KPR, 729.13 US 1951-70/215, A Summary of The US Public Commitment to the Defence of ROK. 
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aimed to prevent South Korean forces from advancing north in pursuing the goal of 
unification by force. Second, U. S. involvement in a future war in Korea was uncertain. 
The provision of "in accordance with its constitutional processes" implied that there 
was no complete guarantee of congressional consent if the President decided to support 
South Korea. In this sense, American participation in another war was not automatic. 
Therefore, it was questioned whether the United States had the genuine will to again 
defend Korea in a renewed war. However, the presence of American ground forces, in 
particular those deployed along the likely invasion routes, provided the next best 
guarantee that the United States would respond immediately to an attack across the 
demilitarised zone. The trip-wire nature of these American forces was very important 
because South Koreans viewed their presence as a major deterrent against another 
North Korean invasion. In this instance, it was the psychological element of deterrence 
that was deemed to be important, both to reassure the South and to restrain the North. 
Whatever ambiguities it had, the treaty provided South Korea with significant benefits 
from American military protection. For the United States, it legitimised the continuation 
of the U. S. military presence in Korea. 
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The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) 
and the Denunciation of the Armistice Agreement 
The Korean armistice agreement established the NNSC to ensure respect for the 
complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed forces. A crucial role in 
supervising the Armistice was assigned to the NNSC, 27 composed of officers from 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. The UNC and the Communist sides 
agreed to provide the NNSC and its inspection teams with logistic support and full 
protection, and to ensure full freedom of movement for it to carry out its functions. 28 
Although the Communist Command-North Korean and the PRC-had 
originally proposed the NNSC and suggested the four nations comprising it, they 
obstructed its activity in North Korea from the outset, and successfully evaded effective 
NNSC inspection of their forces in North Korea. Meanwhile the UNC complained that 
equipment replacement restrictions, based on paragraph 13d of the Armistice 
Agreement, had been imposed on it by the Commission, which permitted the 
introduction of replacement combat units into Korea only when such replacements were 
of the same type, model, and series. The armistice agreement provided against the 
possibility that ports other than the designated ports of entry might be used for 
reinforcing purposes. It provided for mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNIT) 
27 The NNSC was based in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and was charged with supervision, 
observation, inspection, and investigation in order to ensure full respect for the annistice, including 
inquiring into alleged violations and monitoring the non-introduction into the Korean peninsula of 
reinforcing military personnel and equipment. 
28 4 Korean Armistice Agreement', The United States and The Korean Problem, Documents 1943-1953 
(Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 100-108. 
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which could be dispatched whenever the Commission agreed to do so, in order to check 
on violations alleged by either side. The Commission and its inspection teams were 
unable to function unless there was unanimous agreement among members present and 
an equal number of neutrals operating on each side. On several occasions the United 
Nations Command had demanded that investigations be made to look into violations 
which intelligence reports clearly indicated had been made by the Communist 
Command. The refusal of the Polish and Czech members to agree to such investigations 
blocked the missions. Furthermore, the Swiss and Swedish members stuck to this 
interpretation of an armistice clause inflexibly. 29 
During the first year of the armistice, the UNC had reported 287,343 permanent 
arrivals of personnel and 362,122 departures, while the Communist side reported only 
12,748 permanent arrivals and 31,201 departures. Communist reports on combat 
material were also much lower than those of the UNC. Official protests were made by 
the UNC about the illegal introduction into North Korea of combat aircraft, but all 
attempts by the NNSC to investigate the allegations were thwarted. Between 28 July 
1953 and 31 May 1955, the UNC reported the movement of 16,141 combat aircraft, but 
the figure reported by the Communists was zero. 
30 In this period, both parties became 
accustomed to violating the armistice agreement. The Communists 
had charged the 
United Nations Command with nearly 400 violations of the armistice agreement and the 
UNC had admitted about 30 of these to be accurate. The UNC, on the other 
hand, had 
charged the Communists with over 50 violations of the armistice and 
the Communists 
29 FRUs, vol. 15, P. 1806, Memo 
by Twining to Wilson, II June 1954. 
r an Annistice, p. 175. 0 Bailey, The ex e 
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had admitted only two of these .31 The four NNSC members never agreed on any 
substantive issue and the Czechs and Poles invariably supported Communist 
allegations. 
32 
The United Nations Command and Rhee's Government came to believe that the 
military balance in the Korean peninsula was being upset by the clandestine 
introduction of advanced military equipment into North Korea in violation of the 
Armistice agreement. To restore the balance U. S. officials in Korea determined that the 
Armistice provisions should be altered to permit an upgrading of military forces south 
of the demilitarised zone to match that which was occurring in the north. A necessary 
change was the elimination or curtailment of the functions of the NNSC and its 
inspection teams in order to ease the deployment of newly-sophisticated weapons into 
South Korea which had been prevented by the armistice agreement and should be 
inspected by NNSC. The South Korean govenunent also bitterly resented the presence 
of Communist representatives in the south, whom they accused of seeking intelligence 
and fomenting propaganda. President Rhee demanded that the NNSC be abolished and 
1 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
'Communist Compliance with the Armistice Agreement in Korea and the Functioning of the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission', 23 November 1954. 
32 DDE Library, C. D. Jackson Papers, Memorandum to Mr. Luce, 5 August 1954. 
For instance, two former South Korean Army soldiers escaped from North Korea on 10 December 1953. 
The UNC proposed a joint MAC letter to the NNSC requesting the investigation of a violation of 
Paragraph 51 of the Armistice Agreement by forcible retention. Because the Communists called the 
charge "groundless fabrication" and refused to agree, the UNC made a unilateral request to the NNSC to 
investigate the case. The Poles and Czechs took the view that the violation occurred in North Korea, but 
since the escapees were at Munsan-ni, an 
investigation in the South could not reveal what was going on in 
the North. On 22 December 1953, the NNSC informed the UNC that its request was not agreed to. 
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that the inspection teams, of which there were five on each side in the designated ports 
33 of entry, plus ten mobile teams, be removed from the ROK . 
South Korea raised this troublesome issue first. On 30 July 1954, the Provost 
Marshal, General Yong-duk Won, issued a press release threatening South Korean 
action against the NNSC unless its Polish and Czech members left South Korea 
immediately. 34 His action was the opening round of a campaign to oust the NNSC from 
South Korea. Subsequently the acting Korean Foreign Minister demanded NNSC 
withdrawal from South Korea by midnight on 13 August. 35 However, as the United 
Nations Command was obliged to protect the NNSC, this could lead to clashes 
36 between demonstrators and guards of the UNC. While on one occasion the UNC 
refused to permit inspection of an alleged violation requested by the Communist side, 
citing past Communist obstruction, other Communist-requested inspections continued 
for several months without major incident. American Ambassador Briggs and General 
John E. Hull, the UN Commander, sought to restrain the ROK, lest apparent coercion 
hamper delicate international negotiations to eliminate the problem. 37 
In order for this issue to proceed rapidly, the United States consulted with the 
Allied countries that had contributed forces to the UNC. They agreed that the Swedes 
and Swiss should be encouraged to announce to the MAC (Military Armistice 
Commission) that because of their inability to carry out their responsibilities in the 
north, they would withdraw their personnel from NNSC inspection teams in both North 
33 NA, RG 59,795B. 11/6-2154, Briggs to Dulles, 21 June 1954. 
34 NA, RG 59,795.00/8-154, Telegram C 69173 from CINCFE to JCS, I August 1954. 
35 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1857, p. 1862 n. 2, p. 1864 n. 1. 
36 NA, RG 59,795.00/9-254, CINUNC to the Chief of Staff, United States army, 2 September 1954. 
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and South Korea to the DMZ until they could be convinced of Communist willingness 
to cooperate. When the U. S. approached Great Britain and France with this suggestion, 
the Americans found them inclined towards the Canadian proposal that the UNC should 
attempt to negotiate for a strengthened NNSC with the Communist command. 
Following this, the French then proposed a compromise position which Britain strongly 
supported. Under this compromise the Swiss and Swedes announced that: (a) the terms 
of the NNSC and the manner in which they were being implemented were inadequate to 
permit effective supervision and thus changes in these terms should be negotiated by 
military commands; and (b) they would withdraw their personnel from the teams until 
satisfactory arrangements for more effective supervision could be negotiated by the two 
cor=ands. 
38 
The development of differences between the Swiss and Swedish Governments 
concerning the French plan was not encouraging. 39 The Swedes proposed both 
reduction of personnel and withdrawal of the teams to the DMZ, but the Swiss gave no 
support. In January 1955 the Swedes and Swiss responded to continued pressure 
applied by the U. S. in coordination with Great Britain and France, all of which favoured 
the abolition of the NNSC, or, if that could not be arranged, a substantial reduction in 
NNSC activities. The ics were worried that any progress from the Swiss and Swedish 
govemments would be delayed. The concem of the JCS stemmed from the fact that UN 
Commander Hull feared an incident in South Korea which might endanger the lives of 
the Communist members of the supervisory teams, or might lead to an armed clash 
37 FRUS, vol. 15, p. 1875, Smith to Briggs, II September 1954. 
38 Ibid., pp. 1910-1911, Dulles to Briggs, 
8 November 1954. 
39 NA, RG 59,795.00/12-1454, Embtel Stockhlom 475,14 December 
1954; 795.00/12-954, State 
Department to American Embassy, 
Stockholm, 498,30 December 1954. 
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between the U. S. and South Korea. To prevent this likely incident Admiral Radford 
recommended to the Defence Secretary that the UNC should "declare null and void the 
provisions o the Armistice Agreement which pertained to the NNSC, together with the 
provisions of paragraph 13C and 13D that the NNSC was created to enforce, if the 
Communists rejected the UNC proposal to dissolve the NNSC. ý540 
While the State and the Defense Departments agreed on general principles, they 
were unable to reach consent on a U. S. tactical position, with State favouring the 
Swedish slow-and-steady approach and Defense wanting total and immediate 
elimination of the NNSC. The Pentagon fully supported the unilateral declaration by 
the UNC, but the State Department objected that it was politically and legally 
undesirable to take action. Policy-makers were concerned that America's action to 
terminate the provisions unilaterally, thereby prohibiting the introduction of reinforcing 
personnel or weapons, would give the Communists reason to denounce the United 
States as the violator of the armistice. The most important thing was that the UNC 
40 FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 23, Part 2, Korea, pp. 15-16, Memo from Radford to Wilson, 2 February 1955. 
Paragraph 13c of the Agreement prohibited the introduction of "reinforcing military personnel" into 
Korea. Rotation and replacement of personnel was permitted but the aggregate totals of military 
personnel for each side were fixed at their levels at the time of the Armistice. Paragraph 13d prohibited 
the introduction into Korea of "reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and 
ammunition, " unless it was to replace damaged or worn-out equipment, and then only "on the basis of 
piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. " It was further provided in the Armistice 
Agreement that all reinforcement of men and equipment would be reported to the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission and would be brought in or taken out only through designated ports of entry 
(five in each zone) and that at these ports of entry would 
be stationed Neutral Nations Inspection Teams 
(NNIT) whose function it would be to check the actual movement of men and equipment 
in order to 
insure that the reporting of both sides was accurate. 
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had no authority to take the action that the JCS favoured. The abrogation of the 
provisions had to follow the same procedure as had been followed when the provisions 
had been drawn up, and it had to be done in the context of the same authority--the UN. 
It declared that the U. S. had to be given consent by the allies. 41 
In response to continued pressure from the U. S. in coordination with Great 
Britain and France, the Swedes and Swiss asked the U. S. and the Chinese Communists 
to find a way to terminate the activities of the commission, and made clear that they 
should reduce their personnel of the NNSC substantially if this was to prove 
impossible. 42 The Communist Command rejected the liquidation of the commission, 
but accepted a reduction in personnel by the four nations who had members on the 
commission. The U. S. responded that the Swiss and Swedes should attempt to persuade 
the Poles and Czechs to agree to a substantial reduction of the NNSC, and in the event 
of their efforts failing, they should withdraw their personnel entirely or downgrade to a 
nominal gToup stationed within the DMZ. 43 
General Hull sympathised with Rhee's official anti-NNIT campaign, and he 
promised Rhee that he would refuse to permit the NNIT to visit South Korea's 
installations without Rhee's approval. In this regard, the JCS granted Hull the 
discretionary authority to do this even though it could violate the armistice agreement. 44 
41 NA, RG 59, Lot 61 D 417, Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 4 February 1955. 
42 FRUS, vol. 23, p. 10, Dulles to Briggs, 27 January 1955. 
43 Ibid., pp. 41-42, the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, 25 February 1955. 
44 NA, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) (2), 2 March 1955; FRUS, vol. 23, p. 49, 
Telegram from JCS to CINCFE, 8 March 1955. 
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The South Korean government was reluctant to abide by the American position and 
expressed its dissatisfaction by further delay in dealing with the NNSC problem. 45 
At the NSC meeting in March, these problems came to the fore. President 
Eisenhower realised for the first time the likelihood of a violation of the armistice in 
view of the dangers posed for the UNC and the difficulties involving the NNSC. Either 
the liquidation or reduction in size of the NNSC would be hard work if done in such a 
way as to avoid resort by Rhee to liquidation by unilateral action. 46 As Eisenhower was 
very disturbed by the mounting tension and possible difficulty in South Korea in 
connection with the NNSC, he wanted Dulles to accelerate his effolts. 47 
On 25 March 1955, the Swiss formally stated their unwillingness to accept a 
certain reduction in NNSC activities. The Swiss envisioned a reduction of NNSC 
personnel within Article 40 of the Armistice agreement. Accordingly, the Swiss 
instructed their delegate not to station all members in the DMZ. 48 Within the 
NNSC itself, the Swedish representative proposed that "the NNSC be reduced to 
between 10 and 20 per country, all of whom would be stationed in the DMZ. 5549 In April 
the four NNSC members engaged in a discussion of this proposal. The Swedish 
representative was not supported by his Swiss counterpart, and was forced to accept 
45 NA, RG 59,795.00/3-455, Telegram 993 from Seoul, 4 March 1955. 
46 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 240'hNSC Meeting, 10 March 1955. 
47 DDE Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Memorandum of 
Conversation with Col. Goodpaster, 26 March 1955. 
48 NA, RG 59,795.00/3-2555, the Memorandum of the Conversation between Deputy 
Under Secretary 
Murphy and Swiss Minister Henry 
de Torrente, 25 March 1955. Article 40 of the Agreement stipulated 
that the number and personnel of the 
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in Korea could be reduced by 
agreement of the senior members of 
both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. 
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another proposal on 3 May: the four members of the NNSC recommended to the MAC 
that the number of stationary inspection teams be reduced from 5 to 3 in each of the two 
zones in orea and that the number of delegates in each of these remaining teams be 
reduced from two neutrals appointed by each side to one neutral appointed by each 
side. 50 This meant that whereas up until then the Communists had a right to keep 10 
delegates in South Korea, while the arrangement would reduce this number to 3. The 
U. S. felt it would still be in the same difficult position with Rhee's Govemment 
because this would still leave Polish and Czech inspectors on South Korean territory. 
This proposal was unacceptable both to South Korea and to the U. S. military 
authorities. Hence, although the Communist side in the Military Armistice Commission 
accepted the NNSC proposal, the UNC did not. 
In this period, the Eisenhower administration could not reach internal agreement 
on its own position. Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey was concerned that both 
the UNC and the Communists would be left free to build up their own forces as they 
wished if the NNSC inspection teams were to be abolished. General Hull acknowledged 
this apprehension. 51 On the other side, the Pentagon and the JCS argued confidently that 
the LTNC should declare those provisions of the armistice relating to the NNSC and 
paragraphs 13c and 13d null and void. They thought that this solution would: (a) have 
the advantage of removing this irritant in U. S. -ROK relations; (b) make possible the 
modernisation of U. S. -ROK armed forces; and (c) deter the Chinese Communists from 
attacking the islands of Quemoy and Matsu off Taiwan by emphasising U. S. readiness 
to fight on the Korean front if necessary. The State Department opposed these 
49FRUS, vol. 23, p. 64, New Swedish Position on NNSC, 7 April 19,55. 
50 Ibid., pp. 81-82, Memo from Sebald to Muiphy, 4 May 1955. 
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considerations because such unilateral US action would destroy the United Nations 
structure through which the United States was operating in Korea and could be used 
by some of its allies of the UNC as an excuse to free them from any obligation 
under the Joint Policy Declaration. 52 
The issue was discussed at the NSC meeting in May. Eisenhower authorised 
General Taylor to suspend the activities of the inspection teams if such activities 
jeopardized the security of the UNC forces in Korea. On the other hand, with respect to 
the abrogation of paragraphs 13c and 13d, the President indicated that such a U. S. move 
should be deferred pending consultation with the UNC allies, in case such action 
should endanger the United Nations Command structure in Korea. 53 In May, high 
officials of State frequently asked British and French diplomats to lend their 
government's compliance. However, the British and French refused and, instead, the 
two govermnents suggested that the proposal by the NNSC for a reduction was the best 
solution, and that the UNC should introduce more modem weapons covertly. 54 
There was another clash between State and Defense over the issue of the NNSC. 
Secretary Dulles did not like the idea of blindfolding the inspection teams in order to 
introduce advanced military weapons clandestinely which could result in violating the 
an-nistice. Instead, he preferred a method of giving the armistice agreement a reasonable 
51 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 245th NSC Meeting, 21 April 1955. 
52 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 85-87, Memo from Murphy to Hoover, 10 May 1955; NA, RG 59,795B. 00/5-1155, 
Hoover to Dulles, II May 1955. The Joint Policy Declaration, the so-called Greater Sanctions 
Statement, was issued by the UN allies, who had joined in the Korean War, on 7 August 1953 following 
the end of the War, warning that if the Communists violated the annistice, the allies would extend their 
retaliation not only to the Korean peninsula but also to mainland China. 
53 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 248h NSC Meeting, 12 May 1955. 
158 
interpretation. In reaction to this, Pentagon argued, from the military viewpoint, that as 
long as the NNSC continued to operate, the U. S. could be faced with a violation of the 
armistice if the NNSC carried out its intention to perform a special inspection in 
South Korea because Rhee would not allow any more such inspections . 
55There was a 
wide difference in opinion between the two departments. The State Department hoped 
that the reduction proposed by the NNSC would be accepted in the MAC, then, the U. S. 
could proceed openly to introduce modem weapons. However, Defense did not want 
any opportunity for the NNSC to inspect these new weapons. The problem would have 
to be decided by President Eisenhower himself . 
56 
For some time, Ambassador Briggs and his successor, William S. B. Lacy, were 
successful in preventing Rhee from the kind of drastic action which had concerned the 
Eisenhower Administration. On 2 August, the South Korean government demanded the 
withdrawal of the NNSC from South Korea and ordered the withdrawal of Communist 
forces from areas below the 3 8th parallel, including Kaesong and the Ongj in peninsula, 
which had been part of North Korea after the armistice. This basically stemmed from 
Rhee's dissatisfaction with NNSC negotiations and from his growing frustration with 
the U. S. -Soviet Summit meeting at which the two powers had paved the way 
for 
detente. However, the United States was truly concerned about the possibility of 
military action by Rhee to restore these areas. They were later relieved to receive news 
54 NA, RG 59,795.00/5-2755, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 27 May 1955. 
55 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 120-122, Memo of a Conversation, Department of 
State, 5 July 1955. 
56 NA, RG 59, Lot 61 D 417, Future Status of the NNSC, 29 July 1955; RG 59,795.00/8-355, 
3 August 1955. 
159 
of a report that General Hyung-keun Yi, Chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, objected to the retaking of these areas. 57 
On 6 August, South Korea delivered an ultimatum to the NNSC through the ROK 
representative on the MAC to withdraw its personnel from the ROK by 14 August. 
These demands were accompanied by planned demonstrations to suppress the NNSC. 58 
As instructed by Washington, Ambassador Lacy and General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the 
new Commander in Chief of the UNC, called on Rhee to withdraw his ultimatum and 
they prepared to defend the NNSC personnel . 
59Rhee did not stop the demonstrations, 
but on 14 August he issued a statement indefinitely extending the deadline given to the 
NNSC, and asked the protesters not to conduct their demonstrations in a violent 
mamer. 
60 
In Washington, State finally persuaded Defense to accept the reduction proposal 
on 3 May, with the understanding that the Swedish and Swiss would be requested to 
withdraw the NNSC completely by 15 October 1955. Both departments decided that if 
the Swedish and Swiss failed to take a final step by that date, the UNC should act at 
once to terminate NNSC activities within South Korean territory and to limit their 
actions to receiving reports from the UNC in the Demilitarized Zone. After further 
consultation with the allies, and with the Swedish and Swiss, the UNC was authorised 
57 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/1 1-955, Subject: President Rhee, 9 November 1955; PRUS, vol. 23, 
p. 181, no. 4. 
58 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 134-137, Lacy to the State Department, August 4 and 6 August 1955. 
59 Ibid., pp. 138-139, Lemnitzer to the Department of Army, 8 August 1955; 
Lbid., pp. 139-140, 
Lemnitzer to the JCS, 9 August 1955. 
60 NA, RG 59,795.00/8-1455, the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, 14 August 1955. 
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to accept the proposal. 61 The United States informed Rhee of these steps in confidence 
and asked him to stop the anti-NNSC demonstrations, since their continuation would 
make it difficult for the Swedish, the Swiss, or the UNC to take further action. 62 
On 29 August, a joint letter was signed by the senior representatives of both sides 
on the Military Armistice Commission, informing the NNSC that there were no 
objections to completing the reduction. This was accomplished by early September. 
Meanwhile, the Swedish and Swiss tried to negotiate with the Communists to make a 
removal of the NNSC personnel from South Korea. The Swiss were far more reluctant 
to take a step towards the total abolition of the NNSC than the Swedish. The Swiss 
government asked the United States not to push for the termination of the NNSC 
since it would be difficult for them as a neutral nation to comply with such a 
request without a sound legal basis. 63 There was no possibility of concluding the 
termination of the NNSC by the deadline date of 15 October because the Communist 
members of the NNSC would not relinquish the right to maintain inspection teams. 
None of the NNSC members wanted to withdraw from South Korea under duress 
imposed by either the ROK or the U. S. 
Though Defense did not want to alter the deadline, they finally agreed to postpone 
the date for unilateral UN Commander's action to I January 1956. It was the State 
Department who had emphasised the damage to U. S. public position, if the United 
States was responsible for violating the Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, State was 
concerned that while the UN General Assembly was still in session, the United States' 
61 NA, RG 59,795.00/8-1955, Termination of NNSC Activities in the ROK, 24 August 1955; 
795.00/8-2665, A Summary of Discussion with the Sixteen Countries, 26 August 1955. 
62 FRUS, vol. 23, p. 154, no. 2. 
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unilateral action would be criticized by many countries, besides the Communist 
nations. 64 This deadline was later postponed again. Although Rhee was by no means 
satisfied with the NNIT reductions, he had no choice but to postpone his deadline. In 
separate visits on 7 December, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, supported by 
General Lemnitzer and Under Secretary of the Army Hugh M. Milton, and 
Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, in turn supported by a Congressional group which 
included Walter H. Judd and Robert C. Byrd, had urged Rhee not to continue the anti- 
NNIT campaign. Zablocki, Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, and the other members of his subcommittee, who were in 
Seoul as part of a tour of the Far East, succeeded in winning from Rhee a promise to try 
65 to stop the demonstrations for 3 months to allow the U. S. to promote a solution. 
Meanwhile, the modem weapons issue was a matter of much urgency for the 
American military side. At the end of 1955 the U. S. military leaders considered an 
introduction of new weapons into South Korea. They wanted to dispatch all-weather jet 
fighters to offset jet aircraft infiltrated into North Korea, and to bring new tanks and 
new types of artillery. To do this they needed the NNIT out of South Korea. The 
UN Commander stressed a single action of suspending relevant paragraphs of the 
Armistice Agreement in order to expedite weapons modernisation and the dissolution 
of the NNSC. He doubted the Swedish and Swiss would accomplish their goals within 
the next few months. In addition, he emphasised the need to possess an atomic delivery 
63 NA, RG 59,795.00/9-155, Telegram from Bem, Ambassador Willis to Dulles, I September 1955. 
64DDE Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Box 1, Dulles-Robertson, 7 October 
1955; LR-US, vol. 23, Pp. 171-174, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 10 October 
1955. 
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capability into Korea. However, State did not agree because they favoured less extreme 
action, in which paragraph 13d should be reinterpreted voluntarily. 66 The Swedish 
Foreign Office raised the same point that the removing of the NNIT from South Korea 
based on a desire to introduce modem weapons would violate the Armistice. 67 
Though the modem weapons problem was a separate one from that of the NNSC, 
the two were interrelated. In many State-JCS meetings, this was one of the hottest 
issues. There was a tactical problem of whether to combine the two problems or handle 
them separately. The U. S. Embassy in Seoul reversed its previous position, and 
supported Lemnitzer's proposal to carry out both concurrently. Their reversal was based 
on a number of considerations including: (a) Rhee's impatience was becoming critical 
since he had been given assurance of the dissolution of the NNSC from the U. S. more 
than 18 months before; and (b) the Swiss and the Swedes could not be expected to 
dispose of the NNSC Problem in a satisfactory way by 10 March 1956, by which date 
Rhee's 90 day suspension of demonstrations would be over. 68 
By the spring of 1956 it had become apparent to all that the NNSC was not able 
to carry out its work effectively. The Swedes and the Swiss were committed to the 
policy of withdrawing the inspection teams and endeavored to get communist 
agreement. However, the Chinese Communist and the Poles counterproposed that the 
NNIT ought to be reduced from three to one in each Zone and that the mobile teams and 
65 FRUS, vol. 23, p. 195, no. 2. 
66 NA, RG 59,795.00/12-28455, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 28 December 1955; FRUS, 
vol. 23, pp. 209-213, CINCUNC to the Department of the 
Army, 30 January 1956. 
67 NA, RG 59,795.00/1-2456, from Stockholm, John M. Cabot to Robertson, 24 January 1956. 
68 NA, RG 59,795.00/2-356, Strom to the Department of State, 3 February 1956. 
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other NNSC personnel in the DMZ be substantially reduced . 
69 The Swedes and the 
Swiss rejected the Communist counterproposal, and stood firm on their proposal . 
70 The 
Pentagon was again irritated by the uncertainty caused by the prolonging of the 
negotiations. However, the State Department had never pressed Sweden and 
Switzerland to issue an ultimatum to the Communists. To do so, they thought, would be 
counterproductive. 
71 
Soon, a new problem arose. On 9 April 1956, a Chinese Communist note was 
received by the British representative in Peking for transference to all govermnents of 
the UNC. China proposed an international conference on foreign troop withdrawal and 
peaceful Korean unification. The note indicated, in reality, that the NNSC problem 
could not be solved until these problems were also solved. 72 While the allies gathered 
to discuss the Chinese proposal, contrasting opinions disappointed the U. S. 
73 Faced 
with the Chinese proposal of 9 April, Sweden and Switzerland wanted the U. S. to 
support the Communist counterproposal of January 1956, which was to reduce the 
NNIT to one team each in North and South Korea. However, the United States 
believed that the counterproposal would not eliminate existing problems with the 
NNSC, and would even create new problems. 74 
69FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 207-209, Robertson to Gray, 30 January 1956. 
70 Ibid., pp. 229-23 1, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 8 March 1956. 
71 Ibid., pp. 221-223, Gray to Robertson, 9 February 1956; NA, RG 59,795.00/2-1356,13 February 
1956; 795.00/2-956,15 February 1956. 
72 NA, RG 59,795.00/4-1256, Chinese Communist Note on the NNSC and Korean Issue, 12 April 1956; 
Department of State, Bulletin, P. 970,11 June 1956. 
73 NA, RG 59,795.00/4-3056, Chinese Communist Note on Korea, 30 April 1956 
74 FRUS, vol. 23, p. 255, Dulles to the Embassy 
in Sweden, I May 1956. 
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Rhee's Government strongly asserted again that the NNSC should be dissolved, 
and that the proposal to withdraw the NNIT to the demilitarised zone was unacceptable. 
The State Department warned South Korea that it would meet with irrevocable 
opposition among the allies. 75 Complete agreement on NNSC action was blocked 
primarily by the desire of France and the British Commonwealth countries for an 
interval between the announcement in the MAC and the actual removal of inspection 
teams from South Korea for the purpose of assessing the Communist reaction. 76 In the 
end, the British transmitted an agreed note on 28 May on behalf of the governments of 
the UNC. It rejected the Chinese proposal, and pointed out that the activities of 
Czech and Polish members of the NNSC in South Korea were an inequitable burden on 
the UN side, since the Communists had completely frustrated any effective supervision 
in North Korea. The UNC acted on 31 May by notifying that they would 
"provisionally suspend the NNSC activities and the NNSC would be moved to the 
,, 77 DMZ in seven days. 
On 2 June, the Chinese promptly responded that they were ready to accept the 
Swedish proposal of March 16 for withdrawal of the NNIT under the condition that 
they reserved the right to dispatch mobile inspection teams as needed. The British 
considered this acceptable in principle, and asked the U. S. to agree to the proposal. 
The U. S. declined the suggestion finnly because the proposal did not cure the defect 
with the operation of the NNSC and NNIT which was the primary reason for U. S. and 
South Korea's action. A few days later, the British asked the removal to be 
" Ibid., p. 262, no. 8,4 May 1956. 
76 NA, RG 59,795.00/5-756, Korean Briefmg Meeting, 4 May 1956; 795.00/5-2356, Memo, Second 
Korean Briefing Meeting in 16 May and 23 May 1956. 
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accomplished on a voluntary basis rather than by the UNC. The French government was 
also concerned over the hasty decision to proceed with the removal, and maintained that 
the action should be postponed. The United States declined both requests because it did 
not want to change the schedule for removal of the NNSC. This resolute refusal stirred 
the NNSC members, and, after discussion within the NNSC, all of the members of the 
NNSC agreed and informed the MAC of a provisional withdrawal to the DMZ with no 
change in the legal status of the NNSC on 5 June. 
At the 72nd meeting of the MAC on 7 June, North Korean and Communist 
Chinese representatives agreed to it, provided that the NNSC retained the authority to 
dispatch mobile teams as necessary. The UNC refused to accept the conditions for 
agreement, and the meeting was adjourned on the UNC representative's declaration 
that the UNC intended to effect the withdrawal as announced on 31 May. On 9 June 
1956, the UNC removed the 16 remaining NNSC personnel from South Korea to 
78 Panmunjom without incident. North Korea was furious about the suspension of the 
operations of the pro-Communist nations' inspection teams, and strongly denounced the 
UNC action as an open declaration of plans for large scale war preparation by the 
United States that could not hide extensive truce violations from the eyes of the 
inspection teams. 79 
Whereas the State Department preferred a gradual approach to modemisation, 
the Defense Department favoured prompt and straightforward action on both the NNSC 
77 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 273-274, the Department of State to the Embassy 
in Korea, I June 1956. 
78 NA, RG 59,795.00/6-656, the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, 6 June 1956; RG 59, NA 
Files, lot 59 D 407, Lemnitzer to Gray, 7 June 1956; RG 59,795-00/6-856, Memorandum of 
Conversation, 8 June 1956; 795.00/6-956, the Embassy in Korea to the 
Department of State, 9 June 1956. 
166 
and weapon limitations. State argued that soon after the NNIT was expelled from the 
area under the control of the UNC, the introduction of new weapons for U. S. forces 
should start under the liberal interpretation of paragraph 13d . 
80 The U. S. military 
decided that the I st July should be the target date for favorable action on Paragraph 
13d. State agreed and State and Defense determined that this matter should not be 
raised formally with allies because of the likelihood of leaks by them. 81 As some 
adverse reaction was anticipated, the problem of the interpretation of 13d had not been 
discussed with the allies. Eventually, the British govenunent apprehended the 
introduction of new military equipment into Korea, and asked the U. S. to prevent 
Rhee's precipitate action to unify Korea by force under this favorable situation. 82 
For a time State officials aired their complaint that the replacement of obsolete 
weapons, they thought, could be effected through a reasonable interpretation of 
paragraph 13d, but amazingly the Defense Department and the JCS had a plan to 
introduce atomic weapons that would cause a serious problem, even though such 
equipment would be supplied to U. S. forces around the world. 83 The JCS reacted 
strongly to the State Department plan and asked Ambassador Dowling and General 
Lemnitzer about certain procedural and timing details regarding the introduction of 
modem weapons. The JCS expressed their concern that the modernisation plan had not 
been authorised despite the fact that the NNIT had been removed to the DMZ. They 
argued that the need for modernisation of the UNC equipment including an atomic 
79Nodong Sim-nun [The Labour Newspapers], Pyongyang, II June and 14 June 1956. 
80 NAý RG 59,711.5611/5-256, New Weapons for our Forces in Korea, 3 May 1956. 
1 NAý RG 59, Lot 61 D 417, State-JCS Meeting, 23 May 1956. 
82 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 289-290, Memo between de la Mare and Parsons, 3 July 1956. 
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capability was sufficiently critical to justify positive action without delay, and that 
under a broad interpretation, such action could be taken without reporting to the 
TýNSC. 84 
At a State-Defense meeting in September 1956, the military side stood firm in 
support of their point. In particular, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the JCS, bluntly 
maintained the military plan to introduce atomic weapons into Korea. The JCS's claim 
was that reducing the cost of the US military commitment in Korea and reducing either 
the South Korean forces or the American contingent were inseparable from the question 
of modernizing the forces in Korea with atomic weapons. Accordingly, State and 
Defense lawyers were entitled to decide what items could be introduced under a liberal 
interpretation of the paragraph, and in what manner the U. S. should report such 
weapons. After due consideration, the lawyers determined that the LN forces could 
move in anything they wanted to with the exception of dual capability weapons--the 
280 mm gun, the Honest John missile, and Nike. Concerning the reporting issue, the 
NNSC would receive a report in general terms. 85 Subsequently the State Department 
maintained, in the absence of concrete evidence of the Communists' atomic capability 
in North Korea, that the dual conventional-nuclear capability weapons were not legally 
permissible. 86 State understood the military stance but, at the same time, also that the 
political disadvantages of such a course of action were greater than the military 
83 NA, RG 59,795.00/8-2256, Introduction of Modem Combat Equipment into Korea, 22 August 1956. 
84 NA, RG 59, Lot 59 D 476, Memo, Hemmendinger to Robertson, II September 1956. 
85 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 305-309, State-Defense Meeting, II September 1956. Until now the United States 
Government has classified the text which related directly to nuclear weapons in Korea. The weapons 
mentioned above were followed by classified lines. 
86 NA, RG 59,795B. 56/10-356, Introduction of Modem Combat Equipment into Korea, 3 October 1956. 
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advantages. It took the position that the introduction of these weapons would produce 
serious adverse reactions against the U. S. throughout the world, and that the 
Communists would have an opportunity to abrogate the armistice. 87 In response, the 
JCS pointed out that the charge of causing a breach with Communists should not deter 
the United States from moving because such a charge was probable if they modernized 
at all, regardless of dual capacity weapons. There was no compromise between the two 
powers in the Eisenhower administration. 88 
Following the Korean War, the Defense Department was very anxious to reduce 
the volume of expenditure of one and a quarter billion dollars per year in Korea. That is 
the reason why Defense longed to place the most modem weapons in Korea. Defense 
doubted the willingness of the ROK to reduce the number of active divisions unless 280 
mm guns and the Honest John missile, which are capable of delivering tactical nuclear 
weapons, were included in the U. S. modernisation programme . 
89At last, the Defense 
view predominated. The United States devoted itself to gaining the support of the 
British Commonwealth and other members of the UNC for a public announcement of 
the suspension of paragraph 13d. They agreed to the suspension on the condition that 
the UNC should continue to support the armistice as a whole and to observe the cease- 
fire. 90 Accordingly, at a press conference on 14 May, Dulles announced the introduction 
of 'more modem and effective' weapons, and Defense Secretary Charles 
E. Wilson 
boosted these statements, indicating that dual capability weapons were included. 
87FRUS, vol. 23, p. 359, Sebald to Murphy, 5 December 
1956. 
88 Ibid., pp. 360-363, Gray to Wilson, 6 December 
1956. 
89 DDE Library, Ann Whitynan File, NSC Series, 318th NSC 
Meeting, 4 April 1957. 
90 NA, RG 59,795-00/6-557, Modernisation of 
United States Forces in Korea, 5 June 1957. 
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President Rhee praised the U. S. decision to modernize its arsenal in South Korea as a 
bold stroke against the Communists. 91 
Following the paragraph's cancellation the U. S. had a free hand to send modem 
hardware to the U. S. army and to ROK forces, whereupon both North and South 
Korea began to reinforce their supplies of armaments. The senior UNC members made 
a statement in a MAC meeting on 21 June 1957 that the UNC considered itself relieved 
from the obligation under paragraph 13d. 92 This irritated the Communists. Although 
truce violations by both sides were no longer secret, the overt action taken by the U. S. 
must have increased North Korea's misgivings about the military balance in Korea. The 
UNC unilaterally abrogated sub-paragraph 13d of the Korean armistice agreement 
which prohibited reinforcing troops and combat materiel in Korea. 93 The declaration 
touched the central part of the armistice agreement. North Korea's reaction to the 
decision was violent, and North Korea even expressed its fear that the American 
decision could lead to total abrogation of the armistice provisions. North Korea was 
particularly alarmed by the subsequent American decision to equip their units in Korea 
with sophisticated modem weapons, and denounced it as a preparatory step for atomic 
war and for continued occupation of South Korea. The representatives of the Korean 
People's Army and the Chinese Pqople's Volunteers responded by denouncing the 
statement as an attempt "to wreck the armistice agreement and turn South Korea into an 
91 Department of State, Bulletin, 3 June 1957, pp. 894-901; FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 432-433, Editorial Note. 
92 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Administrative Subseries, United Nations Command Statement of 21 June 1957 to the Military 
Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, 21 June 1957. 
93 New York Times, 21 June 1957. 
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American base of atomic warfare. 1594 Although the abrogation was an American 
response to the Communist military build-up and was aimed at re-establishing the arms 
balance of 1953, North Korea's reaction was extreme. To North Korea, obsessed as it 
was by the military superiority of the U. S., as displayed during the Korean War, even a 
defensive measure taken by the United States was perceived as an offensive act. The 
moving of the United Nations Command from Tokyo to Seoul on I July 1957, 
which took place almost simultaneously with the abrogation of subparagraph 13d of the 
an-nistice agreement, must have further intensified North Korea's suspicion and 
misgivings. In particular, frequent references to 'massive retaliation' by officials in the 
Eisenhower administration deepened North Korea's fear. 
On 29 June, General Lemnitzer notified the NNSC that there would be no UNC 
reports on replacement of weapons although reporting of personnel continued. The 
Communist side continued to report, but the NNSC ceased to submit monthly 
evaluations to the MAC. Prior to this announcement, many high-level officials in the 
State Department reiterated their opposition to the introduction of atomic weapons. 
Despite these objections, there was no indication of Dulles's reaction. He had never 
been satisfied with the Defense plan since under his judgment the U. S. capability in 
Okinawa and Japan was adequate for the deterrent power of the U. S. against the 
Communist forces in North Korea. The only reason he favoured introducing the 
94 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 11, Statement by the Department of Defense issued in conjunction 
with UNC Statement, 21 June 1957; Nodong 
Sinmun, Pyongyang, 27 June 1957; FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 460- 
46 1, Editorial Note. 
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weapons would be to bring about a reduction in the expense of U. S. military assistance 
in Korea. 95 
Immediately after the UNC declaration of the suspension of paragraph 13d on 21 
June 1957, The UNC informed the NNSC that there were no reports of the introduction 
of new weapons. 96 Although the function of the NNSC had been regarded as 
ineffective, the United States considered that Swiss and Swedish participation in the 
NNSC was useful because the presence of the NNSC in the DMZ was in itself a 
deterrent to renewed hostilities. 
The Role of U. S. Forces in Korea 
Shortly before the Korean War ended, the Eisenhower administration 
contemplated the possibility of a neutralised Korea in an effort to settle the Korean 
question. A neutralised Korea would require a total withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from the Korean peninsula. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of a military 
vacuum in Korea that would be caused by the entire withdrawal of the Chinese forces 
and the U. S. -UN forces from Korea. They believed that U. S. military prestige in East 
Asia would suffer irrecoverably: with Chinese forces withdrawn beyond the Yalu River, 
to achieve no more than the establishment of a neutralised Korea, the withdrawal of 
U. S. -UN forces would be regarded as a concession to the Communists throughout the 
world, particularly in South Korea and elsewhere in East Asia, as evidence that the U. S. 
95 NA, RG 59, Lot 62 D 1, US Policy toward Korea, 10 June 1957. 
96 FRUsý vol. 23, pp. 460-46 1, Editorial Note. 
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was unwilling to continue to oppose Communist aggression with military force. 
Moreover, the JCS worried about a precedent case of a unified and neutralised Korea, 
which would constitute a serious hazard if applied to Germany, Austria, and Indochina. 
Reflecting the fact that there was no change in Communist military objectives, 
redeployment of UN forces would be undesirable from a military point of view. 97 
In view of there being no hope for the unification of Korea in the near future, the 
JCS argued that a strong military posture should be maintained in Korea including 
adequate South Korean forces. Their assumptions were that a neutralised Korea could 
bring about an increase in United States military commitments in Asia vis-a-vis 
Communist China if a neutralised Korea were susceptible to Communist infiltration and 
subversion; that the achievement of a unified Korea under South Korea, tied into the 
U. S. security system and developed as a military ally, was not a practical possibility 
under current circumstances; and that, in the event of U. S. military operations in the 
area, the possession of bases in Korea would, from a strategic point of view, offer 
particular advantage to the U. S. for the defence of the Japanese islands. 
In the meantime, European allies were strongly in favour of the neutralisation of 
Korea both because such a settlement would appear to remove an area of dangerous 
friction between the U. S. and the Communists and thus reduce the danger of general 
war and because the creation of a strong U. S. position in South Korea would result in a 
drain of U. S. resources which otherwise would be available for investment elsewhere. 
98 
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Pending the Korean Political Conference in Geneva in April 1954, the State 
Department had presented the U. S. position with regard to the withdrawal of foreign 
forces from the Korean peninsula as an alternative to a Korean settlement. 99 The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had agreed to this as part of an agreement on the reunification of Korea 
but, from a military point of view, maintained that mutual withdrawal would increase 
the freedom of Communist action. Agreement to a neutralised Korea would provide the 
Communists with an ideal situation in which to infiltrate and gain control, much as they 
had done in Czechoslovakia, because although Chinese forces might withdraw, its 
forces could be committed again to intervention in Korea. More than anything else, 
there would be a possibility that mutual withdrawal might encourage the ROK to take 
provocative action. ' 00 
Despite these discussions, the U. S. policy makers were confident that there was 
no possibility of agreement in Geneva over the reunification of Korea between the 
Communists and the allies, especially South Korea and the U. S. 101 Eventually, with the 
aim of curbing Rhee's hostility against North Korea, the United States maintained that 
the presence of UN forces in Korea could be regarded as collective security against 
Communism in East Asia. Despite this strategic advantage, however, the presence of 
U. S. troops on the front line left no doubt that if North Korea were to attack the South, 
the U. S. would view this as equivalent to an attack on itself and would become 
involved in another war. 
99 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 36,6 September 1953. 
100 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 171" NSC Meeting, 'U. S. Objectives and Courses of 
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(i) Force Levels and Redenloyment 
In contrast to the Truman administration, which in the aftermath of North Korea's 
attack on South Korea in June 1950 had made an effort to strengthen the western 
world's capacity for non-nuclear military responses to communist aggression, 
Eisenhower and Dulles moved quickly to reverse this emergent non-nuclear emphasis 
in western strategy and defence. 102 They announced, upon the inception of the new 
administration, that U. S. efforts to contain the expansion of 'global monolithic 
communism' would be grounded in the de facto strategy of the early years of Truman's 
presidency: communist aggression, whether nuclear or not, would be deterred by the 
threat to employ nuclear weapons against the power centres-Moscow and Peking-of 
the communist world. One principal difference between the nuclear retaliatory postures 
of the Eisenhower and early Truman administration, of course, was the presumption of 
the former that there were now essentially two power centres to be deterred. The range 
of possible aggressive acts that nuclear weapons would be called upon to deter was 
expanded under Eisenhower as well, both geographically and in terms of the intensity 
of possible provocations. Under Truman, U. S. threats to introduce nuclear weapons into 
a conflict were reserved primarily for the possibility of overt Soviet aggression against 
102 David N. Schwartz, 'A Historical Perspective', in John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, Alliance 
Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 6. 
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decision to intervene on behalf of the South Koreans. In 1952, NATO adopted the so-called Lisbon force 
goals, which called for a conventional rearming of Western Europe that would make ninety-six active and 
reserve divisions available 
in the event of Soviet aggression against NATO. 
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Western Europe, as underscored by Truman's decision to fly a squadron of atomic- 
capable B-29 bombers to England at the height of the 1948 Berlin Crisis. 
During Eisenhower's presidency, however, nuclear deterrence was viewed as a 
cost-effective, credible deterrent to a wide variety of possible communist challenges, 
ranging from communist or communist-supported insurgencies in developing regions of 
the world, to low-intensity probing actions by either Moscow or Peking around the 
periphery of communist Eurasia, to a major non-nuclear attack upon the Atlantic 
Alliance. 103 Eisenhower's growing reliance on nuclear bombs also grew out of his 
determination to cut back government spending. He feared that military spending on 
the level of Truman's $50 billion annually would set off a terrible inflation and ruin the 
economy. 104 In two years Eisenhower reduced Truman's military budget by nearly one- 
third to about $34 billion. His reliance on nuclear armaments to accomplish this 
reduction soon became evident as he allowed the development of the B41 bomb of over 
20 megatons, or the equivalent of 400 Hiroshima-type bombs. The size of the nation's 
nuclear stockpile doubled between 1953 and 1955, while new, huge B-52 bombers 
rolled off assembly lines to deliver the weapons. Eisenhower was prepared to consider 
starting a nuclear war if necessary. 
105 
During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower promised to terminate the 
Korean War, cut the budget, and reduce taxes. When he took office, he inherited a large 
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budget deficit from Truman. The federal budget was estimated to be $4 billion in the 
red in the fiscal year (FY) 1953, with a larger deficit of $9.9 billion in 1954.106 The 
Eisenhower administration formulated a new basic national policy-the 'New Look'. 
Eisenhower asserted in his meeting with Congressional leaders on 29 April 1953 that 
the dual perils facing his administration were the external threat of world communism 
and the internal danger of a weakened American economy. 107 To meet these two 
concerns became the essential objectives of the Eisenhower administration's national 
security policy. Eisenhower thought that U. S. national security policy had aimed too 
much toward building up the military strength of the free world ready for the Soviet 
Union's global aggression. The military security policy, in his view, evoked 
unnecessary military expenditures and overshadowed everything else. 108 He believed 
that it was impossible for America and its allies to build up massive military strength 
around the Communist countries. 
This emphasis on economic stability, for instance by budget cutting, necessitated 
the development of a new form of military strategy at the lowest cost. To this end, 
Secretary Dulles provided a critical theoretical concept for the strategy. In his speech 
before the National Farm Institute, he insisted that the Soviet Union "had a choice of 
weapons, a choice of places, and a choice of timing. "109 The massive power of atomic 
106 Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. tisenhower, 1954 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1960), P. 788. 
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weapons did not cost any extra money, and could protect other free nations. Massive 
atomic capability thus became a major feature of the strategy. The main rationale for 
reliance on atomic weapons was to save expensive manpower in war. On 29 April 
1953, Eisenhower ordered cuts in the manpower of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. 
The Army would be reduced by 87,000 to 1 . 423,000. The Navy and Marine Corps were 
to be reduced by 58,000 to 981,870. An overall reduction of 145,000 was to be cut from 
the active divisions at the beginning of 1953.110 
NSC 162/2 reflected the New Look precisely by stating that in the face of the 
Soviet threat, United States security "with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory 
strength and defensive strength ... must be based on massive atomic capability. "' 11 Saki 
Dockrill briefly summarises the concepts of the New Look as follows: (a) the U. S. 
military should adopt the concept of the long haul in its strategic planning, thereby 
n, k abandoning NSC-68's forecast that the U. S. faced a specific year of maximum danger 
from Communist aggression; (b) American forces worldwide must be substantially 
reduced, and a local nation's defence secured without jeopardising its economic 
stability or undermining its fundamental values and institutions; (c) the United States 
should be prepared, if necessary, to threaten to use or actually use its nuclear arsenal 
either to deter or, failing this, to counter Communist aggression; and (d) the United 
States should rely more on collective security in the future. 112 In coping with local 
aggressions, indigenous forces were a critical defensive power with U. S. military 
1 10 Snyder, 'The New Look of 1953' p. 416. 
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assistance, economic defence support and logistic support, and aided by mobile U. S. 
forces. To satisfy this policy, alliances were given high priority in the Eisenhower 
administration's New Look policy. For this reason, Washington endeavored to expand 
beyond the NATO and Japanese base and look for broader alliances in the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia and East Asia. ' 13 The reduction in manpower included redeploying 
more U. S. forces from overseas towards the U. S., reducing overseas indigenous forces 
supported by U. S. military assistance, and persuading U. S. allies to place more reliance 
on American retaliatory capability to protect them from attack. In local wars, the United 
States should not play a major military role and U. S. support to its allies should come 
from U. S. naval and air forces. 
Following the signing of the Korean armistice agreement, the Eisenhower 
administration made a decision to redeploy the greater volume of its forces outside of 
Korea, while strengthening South Korean forces and attempting to persuade other allies 
to leave their forces in the UNC. Later it was not practical to maintain a vigorous 
campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in 
Korea in view of the armistice and the redeployment of U. S. divisions. However, the 
withdrawal of most of the U. S. forces from Korea clearly reduced its potential ability to 
use forceful measures within Korea to Prevent the ROK from taking unilateral action, if 
such orders were issued. Concurrently, ROK potential for unilateral action would 
increase, since it was no longer practical to restrict supplies to the ROK of material and 
ammunition so drastically as in the past. Nevertheless, the agreed Minute in July 1954 
created a situation in which it was less probable that South Korea would take unilateral 
113 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 209 th NSC Meeting, 5 August 1954. 
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action because South Korea promised to accept 'Operational Control' by the UNC in 
return for U. S. responsibility for defending South Korea. ' 14 
The United States maintained a basic policy that the presence of the UN forces in 
Korea had to be regarded as a collective security measure against the Communists in 
Asia. Contrary to this, most of the Commonwealth countries wished to terminate their 
military involvement as quickly as possible. By November 1953, the Eisenhower 
administration was seeking to reduce its defence budget. Consequently, the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons was favoured by the military as an alternative to the massive 
and expensive military involvement required if hostilities resumed. The State 
Department, however, was concerned that the use of atomic weapons would provoke an 
adverse response from the allies, especially from Great Britain and France. 115 At the 
Bermuda Conference in December 1953, Churchill opposed the use of atomic weapons, 
and expressed his concern about the possibility of a counterattack by the Soviet Union 
in Europe if the U. S. employed nuclear weapons against China in the event of 
hostilities. 11 6 
In the middle of 1954, The Eisenhower administration had to confront two basic 
problems. The first of these arose from the fact that the U. S. did not have an adequate 
defence against Communist expansion by means other than war. Coping with the 
Soviets' preference for using the methods of civil war and subversion, the United States 
had no adequate answer in purely military terms. The second problem derived from the 
114 DDE Library, Wbite House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 50,2 December 1954. 
115 NA, RG 218, JCS 1776/408, The current situation in Korea, 17 November 1953. 
116 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 174th NSC Meeting, 10 December 1953 and 
179h NSC 
Meeting, 8 January 1954. 
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growing danger of atomic war. In light of this, whereas the British 'soft policy' was 
gaining prestige and acceptance, the U. S. 'tough policy' was unpopular throughout the 
free world. President Eisenhower admitted this but claimed that "South Korea, Taiwan, 
Turkey, and Greece would go along with the U. S. PoliCy. i5117 
In 1954, the Eisenhower administration confirmed that a further withdrawal of 
U. S. forces should proceed because half of the Chinese Communist armies had been 
pulled out of North Korea and because of the further build-up of South Korean forces. 
Moreover, Japan had finally agreed to build up its own military strength, and the U. S. 
were developing indigenous forces in Formosa and Indochina. Instead of redeployment 
of U. S. ground forces, Eisenhower directed that the U. S. should keep naval and air 
power up to full strength around the periphery of South Korea. 1 "However, the Western 
allies' reaction to a further redeployment of U. S. forces became a delicate and 
complicated problem. Secretary Dulles and his own advisors in the Department of State 
shared a feeling that a reduction would have bad political consequences even though it 
represented an increase in U. S. strength on an overall basis. " 9 
As anticipated by Dulles, the announcement of the proposed withdrawal of two 
U. S. divisions from South Korea provoked the British Commonwealth countries' 
decision to seek to withdraw their forces. 120 The British Foreign Office took a slightly 
different view on force reduction. They maintained that although military and financial 
117 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 204flNSC Meeting, Tentative Guidelines under NSC 
162/2 for FY 1956,24 June 1954. 
118 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Legislative Meeting Series, I May 1954. 
119 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 208th NSC Meeting, 'Redeployment of Forces from the 
Far East-Westem Pacific Area', 29 July 1954. 
120 PRO, F0371 110599 FK 1192/4, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 2 January 1954. 
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considerations were important, political factors had an even greater priority, arguing 
that by stationing their forces in Korea they would be in a stronger position to influence 
and restrain the United States. 121 Washington resisted any attempt by other UN forces 
for a similar reduction which could damage the preservation of the LNC and the UN 
collective defence measure against Communism in Korea after the armistice. In reality, 
keeping the Commonwealth forces in Korea was basically political and based upon 
giving political cover to U. S. military action. The U. S. maintained that the Communists 
thought that the determination of the allies to resist them had weakened when all UN 
nations reduced their forces. 
The British government had long been considering scaling back its 
Commonwealth forces, but believed that this had to be dealt with cautiously, and 
wanted to avoid making any premature moves. The U. S. gave its approval to the 
withdrawal of a French battalion to fight in Indochina. 122 By the summer of 1954, 
however, the deteriorating situation in Indochina intensified the talks on reduction. As 
soon as it became clear that France was never going to reestablish its authority over the 
north of Indochina, the security of Malaya and Singapore, which could have been the 
next target countries for Communist expansion, became vitally important. 
Almost 
immediately, the concerns of the British goverrunent shifted from Korea to Malaya. 
Eden argued that action should be taken for the transfer of forces 
from Korea to 
121 PRO, F0371 110599 FKI 192/4, Minute By Allen, 5 January 1954; F0371 110599 FKI 
192/6, Minute 
by Crowe, 12 January 1954. 
122 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, 
OCB Central File Series, 
Box 121, OCB 387.4 Korea[Annistice] (File #1) 5, 'Achieving a 
Position of Strength in Korea', 25 
March 1954. 
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Malaya. 123 In July, half of the Turkish forces in Korea went home. Washington was 
concerned by this action, but assumed that some reduction in other UN forces was 
unavoidable. The NSC action on 29 July indicated the desirability of retaining other UN 
forces to preserve the justification of UN participation in Korea. In the end, the U. S. 
and the Commonwealth countries made a decision to reduce their forces by two-thirds 
respectively. 
124 
From the beginning of 1955 the Commonwealth countries made a request to the 
British govermnent for further reduction of their forces in Korea to a token force 
comprising a battalion group. From the military point of view, the reduction could be 
used to contribute to strengthening the position in Southeast Asia. The Foreign Office 
accepted the view of the Chiefs of Staff that the reduction from a brigade to a battalion 
group would not make much difference militarily, and decided to press the U. S. more 
firmly, although the danger of the U. S. plan to use nuclear weapons in the event of 
renewed aggression from the Communists was a troublesome thought. At that time, 
from a military point of view, the British did not believe that further UN forces' 
reductions would have a serious adverse impact on the interests of Asia as the U. S. had 
argue . 
125 
Anthony Eden pressed Dulles at a meeting in Bangkok, later termed the SEATO 
Council, to get the remaining British forces transferred from Korea to Malaya to meet 
pressing problems in that area. Aware of their own increased commitments to the 
123 PRO, FO 371 110600 FK 1192/48, Reduction of Commonwealth Forces in Korea, 15 April 1954; 
FO 371 110601 FK 1192/59, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 10 June 1954. 
124 NA, RG 273 NSC Action 1189,29 July 1954; PRO, FO 371 110603 FK 1192/105,14 September 
1954. 
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defence of Southeast Asia, the Australians and New Zealanders took the same position. 
Dulles was far from optimistic about the probable success of maintaining the UN 
forces. 126 The Commonwealth countries made a formal request to Admiral Arthur W. 
Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to reduce their forces to one battalion 
group. As U. S. ground forces had been reduced from three Corps with approximately 
300,000 personnel, to one Corps of 90,000, and other UN forces had been reduced from 
33,000 to 14,500 personnel, the Eisenhower administration did not agree to this 
proposal of reducing the UN forces. 
127 
The Eisenhower administration was concerned about this situation because if 
such reductions continued, the international composition of the United Nations 
Command would be jeopardised. It was the view of the United States that the continued 
existence of the United Nations Command was important to the maintenance of the 
armistice and to stability in Korea on account of its deterrent effect on the Communists 
and the assurance it afforded of united policies on the part of the free world nations 
towards the Korean problem. 128 The British, however, did not want to become involved 
again in Korean battlefields. The Commonwealth made it clear that their position was 
firm. Washington would have to come to a decision with them so discussions between 
the U. S. and Commonwealth Military Representatives were proposed. The U. S. 
accepted under the condition that it would not be implemented before the spring of 
125 PRO, FO 3 71 115 3 54 FK 1196/3 0,5 May 195 5. 
126 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 240thNSC Meeting, 10 March 1955; ibid., J. F. Dulles 
Papers, Telephone Conversation Series, Conversation with Robertson, 23 March 1955. 
127 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 59-61, Wilson to Dulles, 30 March 1955; NA, RG 59,795B. 5/4-2955, Reply to the 
Commonwealth Proposal for Further Reduction of Their Forces in Korea, 29 April 1955. 
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1956. In early 1956 the reduction of Commonwealth forces to a battalion group was 
conducted. During the autumn of 1956 the British government proposed a reduction in 
the Commonwealth forces to a nominal size, or a complete withdrawal. The U. S. were 
strongly against this, to them, extreme proposal. 129 
The Suez crisis in October 1956 had a great impact on the issue of a complete 
withdrawal. 130 Most of the high officers and diplomats of the Foreign Office were 
greatly concerned that adverse U. S. reactions to a withdrawal of the Commonwealth 
forces would be stronger than expected. The U. S. wanted the Commonwealth forces, 
not because of military cooperation in Korea, but because of the invaluable policy of 
UN pafticipation. 
131 
The debate on reducing the British military commitment continued throughout 
1956 and by the beginning of 1957 they were getting wider support in favour of a 
complete withdrawal. The Ministry of Defence recommended a complete withdrawal 
and proposed the appointment of a liaison officer to maintain contact with the UNC. 132 
Eventually, by way of negotiations with the British goverment, Secretary Dulles 
129DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 50, OCB 091. Korea (File #1)8,17 November 1955; PRO, FO 371 115357 FK 1196/92, Minute by 
Crowe, 18 November 1955; FO 371 121130 FK 1193/57, Minute by Crowe, 9 October 1956. 
The Israeli attack on Egypt on 29 October escalated the Suez crisis to its peak. Great Britain and 
France immediately intervened on the pretext of maintaining the Canal for international control. The 
United States was angry about the British and French attitudes which were in opposition to the U. S. 
demand for unconditional withdrawal from Suez. Instead the two countries wanted the U. S. to assist with 
the 'UN' peacekeeping forces. 
131 PRO, FO 371 121130 FK 1193/65, Minute by Crowe, 3 December 1956; FO 371 121130 FK 
11 93/74ý A. J. de la Mare to Crowe, 4 December 1956. 
132 PRO, FO 371 127621 FK 1192/6, Ministry of Defence to Foreign Office, 25 January 1957. 
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agreed to the proposal, acknowledging British financial difficulties in keeping its 
force in Korea. 133 The govermnents of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand 
agreed to the establishment of a small liaison mission at the UNC. The mission was to 
operate from I September 1957.134 The Liaison Mission finally left Korea in 1961. 
The reduction of U. S. forces was a troublesome issue between Washington and 
Seoul. On 26 December 1953, Eisenhower released a statement that U. S. ground forces 
in Korea were to be "progressively reduced as circumstances warranted. " 135 As there 
had been no consultation on this matter with Rhee, Eisenhower instructed Admiral 
Radford to inform Rhee before Eisenhower's announcement in order to dissipate 
Rhee's likely furious reaction. The decision on the returning of two U. S. divisions to 
America as an initial step was delivered to Rhee on 24 December. 136 More than 
anything else, the withdrawal of three Chinese Communist divisions from North Korea 
influenced Washington's plan. 137 At a meeting with Congressional leaders, Eisenhower 
revealed that U. S. forces in Korea remained at a minimum strength. 138 The Defense 
133 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, The White House Staff notes 
No. 92,3 April 1957. 
134 NA, RG 59,795.00/3-2957, Memorandum of a Conversation about United Kingdom forces in Korea, 
29 March 1957; PRO, FO 371 127624 FK 1192/117, Directive to the Senior Liaison Officer, 
Commonwealth Liaison Mission Korea, 14 August 1-957. 
135 Public Pgpers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 860-861. 
136 NAý RG 59,795B. 551/12-1753, Memorandum by Cutler to Smith, 17 December 1953; 
FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, p. 1746, Rhee to Eisenhower, 4 February 1954. 
137 DDE Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversation Series, Box 1, Conversation with 
Arthur Dean, 29 December 1953. 
138 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Legislative Meeting Series, I May 1954. 
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Department considered unit withdrawals in 1954 which would lead to redeployment of 
most of its forces within a year or two. The rapid and substantial reduction of U. S. 
forces might adversely affect relations between the U. S. and South Korea and could 
lessen American influence on the ROK. 
139 
However, the redeployment was deferred until after the Korean political 
conference, based on the premise that U. S. forces in Korea constituted one of their most 
useful trading assets at the Conference. As paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement 
recommended a political conference to settle through negotiation the question of the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the United States were well aware that the 
Communists' objective at Geneva would also be to obtain the withdrawal of foreign 
forces. Policy makers in Washington were apprehensive that making the planned U. S. 
force withdrawal known publicly in advance of, or during, the conference could give 
the Communists a substantial tactical advantage at the conference table. 140 Following 
the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Eisenhower administration was convinced that the 
Communists regarded Korea as a stable stalemate. Accordingly, decision-makers in 
Washington proceeded with the redeployment as planned. However, Dulles and his 
advisors felt that a reduction would have detrimental political consequences, even 
though it represented an increase in U. S. strength overall. 
141 In South Korea, the more 
American forces that were withdrawn, the greater impact Rhee's Government would 
139NA, RG 59,795.00/3-154, Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea and the Korean Political 
Conference, I March 1954. 
140 NA, RG 59,795.00/2-2854, Telegram 84 1, Briggs to the Department of State, 28 February 1954; 
DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 192 nd NSC Meeting, 16 April 1954; FRUS, vol. 
15, p. 
1770, Progressive Report by the OCB to the NSC, 26 March 1954. 
141 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 208th NSC Meeting, 29 July 
1954. 
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have. President Rhee was furious about the announcement of the withdrawal of U. S. 
forces because he regarded it as a sign of the abandonment of his country. 142 
In August 1954, during Rhee's visit to the United States, the Eisenhower 
administration notified its embassy in Seoul of the policy of redeploying its forces in 
East Asia. The Eisenhower administration planned to withdraw two divisions out of 
Korea even though two divisions had already been withdrawn. The U. S. decision 
provoked anger and despair in South Korea. At a rally on 28 September, South Koreans 
protested against the U. S. troop withdrawal through Rhee's organised nation-wide 
campaign. Simultaneous expressions of concern were voiced from Asia over the issue 
of redeployment. The American Embassy in Saigon reasoned that "it would be difficult 
to convince the French Mendes Government not to remove its force from Indochina. " In 
Taipei, further reduction was interpreted as a sign of weakness in U. S. military policy 
against the Communists. 
143 
Some Generals, who had influenced the redeployment, had different views on 
which country should be first for redeployment. General Hull, Commander in Chief, Far 
East, expressed his view that U. S. forces in Japan should be retained, and, instead, its 
forces in Korea ought to be redeployed to Hawaii and Okinawa, since from the 
spring of 1954 8 out of 19 Chinese Communist armies had been removed from North 
Korea. However, General Van Fleet argued that redeployment in Japan and Korea 
should be continued and expedited, with combat elements being withdrawn 
from Japan 
first and Korea last, accompanied by the immediate action of creating two 
full strength 
142 NA, RG 59,795-00/6-2854, Briggs to Dulles, 28 June 1954. 
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ROKA divisions. 144 With the discussion at the National Security Council in March and 
the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, the redeployment of U. S. 
forces could be perfectly justified by the continued build-up of indigenous land 
forces. 145 
Having calmed down and realised that the redeployment of U. S. forces weakened 
Washington's bargaining power, Rhee, whose principal desire was for aid programmes, 
especially military programmes, expressed his concern that renewed Communist 
aggression might be instigated by US troop withdrawal. 146 
In June 1955, UN commander Maxwell D. Taylor favoured either total removal 
of U. S. forces or the retention of a token force. He believed that the withdrawal of 
U. S. ILJN forces from Korea and their concentration elsewhere in the Far East Command 
would free them from the restrictions of the armistice on their modemisation as well as 
providing a sounder strategic distribution of forces to meet U. S. commitments in the Far 
East. 147 The implications of this had to be reconsidered in the light of the possible 
reaction of President Rhee who, Washington's policy makers thought, could try to 
move to North Korea to obstruct the American forces' withdrawal. In addition, the JCS 
disagreed with the desirability of total withdrawal and decided that the only major 
developments needed in U. S. forces were the reorganizing and reequipping of two 
144 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 36, Chief MAAG (Formosa), Van Fleet to 
Secretary Wilson, 3 July 1954; ibid., from Tokyo, CINCFE, Hull to Ridgway, 5 July 1954. 
145 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 187hNSC Meeting, 4 March 1954. 
146 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 36, Letter from Rhee to Eisenhower, 
31 january 1955. 
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divisions into pentomic units 148 with emphasis on the Honest John as the basic weapon. 
The rotation of U. S. Air Force units, based in Japan, into Korea was carried out for 
familiarization. 149 
In Washington, a major question was raised as to how many troops the U. S. 
should retain in order to justify its continued command over approximately twenty 
ROK divisions. At a meeting in September 1957, Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, disclosed the Pentagon's view that their plans called for no U. S. divisions 
to remain in Korea and no divisions in the Far East after July 1961. In response, 
Secretary Dulles expressed his concern that the U. S. was duty bound to keep two 
divisions in Korea until the South Korean force reduction was complete. The JCS 
objected to this plan and supported the maintaining of two U. S. divisions as a 
stabilising force against the possibility of a march by Rhee against North Korea. The 
Eisenhower administration acknowledged the likelihood of Rhee's withdrawal of the 
Operational Control of ROK forces if he was not satisfied with U. S. military policy 
towards Korea. After a lengthy and serious discussion, a consensus was reached that 
the two U. S. divisions and supporting forces (comprising about 80,000 men) in Korea 
were about the minimum required. 150 
148 Each division, smaller than the size of army personnel of current division, consisted of five combat 
groups, supported by five batteries of light artillery and by one battery equipped with Honest John nuclear 
missiles capable of firing both conventional and tactical nuclear warheads. The typical pentomic 
division 
had eighteen nuclear systems--twelve 155-mm Howitzers, four 8-inch howitzers, and two 
Honest John 
missile launchers. 
149NA, RG 59, Lot 61 D 417, State-JCS Meetings, 9 August 1957. 
150 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 320'hNSC Meeting, 17 April 1957; White House 
Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records, Special Assistant 
Series, 
Chronological Subseries, Box 5, State-Defence Meeting, 5 September 1957. 
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As the U. S. were confident that there was an adequate deterrent of nuclear 
capability based on Okinawa to defend South Korea from the Communists' attack, the 
fact that two U. S. divisions were stationed in Korea was primarily for political and 
psychological reasons. 151 The U. S. military presence in Korea was a political necessity, 
bolstered South Korean morale, and helped to gain their cooperation in supporting 
U. S. foreign policY objectives. U. S. forces in Korea, which had reached 360,000 during 
the Korean War, dropped to 60,000 by 1957 and consisted primarily of two infantry 
divisions. Although Chinese forces withdrew from North Korea in 1958, they were still 
a threat from beyond the Yalu River, hostilities had been halted only by an armistice, 
not by a peace treaty, and intense antagonism persisted between Washington and 
Peking. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration also regarded the deterrence of 
China as an important reason for the continued presence of U. S. forces in South Korea. 
At the beginning of 1958, the Communist side proposed a peace initiative to the 
UNC. On 5 February 1958 North Korea issued a statement on the issue of peaceful 
unification of Korea, proposing that "all foreign forces be withdrawn from North and 
South Korea simultaneously, that following the withdrawal of all foreign forces nation- 
wide free elections be held under the supervision of a neutral nations organisation, " 
which had already been proposed during the Korean Political Conference in 1954, and 
66 an-ned forces of North and South be reduced to the minimum within a short period of 
time. , 152 The PRC communicated their support of this proposal to the British 
representatives in Peking on 7 February. Secretary Dulles repudiated the Chinese 
statement, and stressed that the United States did not plan any reduction of foreign 
15 1 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 364h NSC Meeting, I May 1958. 
152 KPR, 729.54 1958/152, Korean Embassy, London, to Foreign Minister, 7 February 1958. 
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forces in South Korea. The Chinese call for a simultaneous withdrawal was followed 
by the Joint Communique of Chou En-lai and Kim Il Sung with regard to the unilateral 
withdrawal of Chinese forces from North Korea and its completion by the end of 1958. 
The U. S. believed that this decision was primarily for propaganda purposes, albeit 
influenced by the economic burden imposed by the maintenance of the huge Chinese 
forces in North Korea. 
The withdrawal of Chinese troops was apparently designed to force withdrawal of 
U. S. forces from South Korea and to gain acceptance under the terms of the North 
Korean and Communist Chinese regimes by the United Nations. Nevertheless, the U. S. 
believed that this action could give the PRC international credit as a pursuer of peace. 
The dispatching of nuclear weapons to South Korea led the Chinese to determine the 
withdrawal plan to bring pressure on the U. S. to decrease or dislodge them. 153 
The U. S. and South Korea were very much concerned that the other countries on 
the United Nations Command side would welcome the Chinese action overtly and 
covertly. European countries prudently drew attention to the Chinese decision which 
they thought might pave the way for the settlement of the Korean issue. Great Britain 
and France, in particular, tried to pressure the U. S. into withdrawing from South 
Korea. 154 Rhee's Government was extremely cautious about U. S. attitudes in 
153 KPR, 729.54 1958/152, Korean Embassy, London, to Foreign Minister, The Joint Statement of the 
DPRK and the PRC, 19 February 1958. The two parties unanimously condemned the U. S. for its 
continued arms expansion and war preparations in an attempt to turn South Korea into a United States 
atomic base. 
154 KPR, 729.54 1958/152, Ambassador Yang to President Rhee, 20 February 1958; 773.1 US/414, 
Confidential no. 241, Han to Rhee, 20 February 1958; 773.1 US 1958 V-1/408, Information no. 101, 
Ambassador Yang to Rhee, 6 March 1958. 
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connection with the Communists' proposals and the reduction of U. S. forces in Korea 
because Dulles had instructed the American Embassy in Seoul to play a passive role in 
Korean unification until the State Department had consulted with the British and 
Japanese governments on the Korean question in an effort to make a concerted 
campaign to counter the Communist peace offensive. 155 
The withdrawal of Chinese forces was carried out in stages. The first stage was 
the withdrawal of 80,000 Chinese forces carried out during the period from 15 March to 
30 April 1958, and the last was completed in November. When the Chinese communist 
forces withdrew from Korea, apparently carried out in the hope of promoting the 
withdrawal of U. S. forces from South Korea, the Japanese government disclosed their 
concerns over the U. S. response by withdrawing its forces from Korea. Washington 
interpreted the troop withdrawal and accompanying gestures as part of a coordinated 
propaganda manoeuvre by the PRC, DPRK, and the USSR. The Eisenhower 
administration did not consider the Communist peace offensive as an attempt to achieve 
a reduction in tensions or of the military threat in the Korean peninsula. The Western 
allies revealed their reluctance to join the U. S. position but were eventually persuaded 
to follow American policy, and support the U. S. line that withdrawing all LTN forces 
before genuinely free elections under UN supervision took place throughout Korea 
would be unsafe. 
156 
In mid-1958, the Eisenhower administration raised the question of basic national 
security policy in this period of relative nuclear parity between the U. S. and the USSR. 
155 KPR, 729.54 1958/152, Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Washington, 13 March 1958. 
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Until then, the U. S. had relied upon the massive retaliation principle by applying 
nuclear weapons based upon the New Look strategy. Thereafter, whenever a limited 
military aggression was to take place, the U. S. would need flexible capability so that it 
could detennine the application of force that would best serve U. S. interests under the 
circumstances. The U. S. government paid attention to the development of its Western 
European allies' position on nuclear war strategy to defend them against the Soviets. 
The Eisenhower administration anticipated that these European countries would not go 
along with U. S. policy. Accordingly, the U. S. developed the tactical defensive 
capabilities inherent in small nuclear weapons, so that the U. S. could deal with limited 
war not directly involving itself and the USSR, but still maintain its allies and its 
security position in Western Europe. ' 57 In this connection, the Administration set out to 
deploy tactical nuclear weapons into Korea from 1958 after the denunciation of the 
armistice agreement clauses 13c and 13d. 
The reorganisation of the U. S. forces was carried out during the 1958-59 period in 
policy modifications in NSC 5817 of 1958 and NSC 5907 of 1959, with a reduction of 
over 80 % since the date of the Armistice. 
158 Table I below indicates total U. S. military 
strength in Korea following the cease-fire. 
On the problem of forces and weapons, modernisation of weapons 
for U. S. forces 
continued, and deployment of a U. S. Air Force missile unit was to 
be completed. In 
1960, the U. S. forces in Korea consisted of 2 Infantry divisions, I U. S. Army missile 
command (Honest John), I Field Artillery(FA) 
Battalion(BN) 280 mm Gun, I FA BN 8 
157 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 
364th NSC Meeting, I May 1958. 
158 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC 
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inch Howitzer, I U. S. Air Force tactical missile unit, and 9 Tactical Air Force units on a 
continually rotational basis, together with the necessary support forces. 159 
TABLE I American Troops Stationed in Korea 
July 1953 3025483 
December 1954 1025865 
December 1955 59,910 
December 1956 545288 
December 1957 565898 
December 1958 45,747 
June 1959 49,420 
June 1960 56,438 
Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
While the U. S. would neither confirm nor deny this, it was widely accepted that 
there were American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. In order to 
maintain a superior position vis-a-vis the enemy, the U. S. continued to replace their 
forces' equipment with improved models. In this regard, Washington policymakers 
determined that the advantages of taking action would outweigh the political 
disadvantages, including the possible non-agreement of the UNC allies to such a 
course. 
160 
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(ii) Status of US forces 
The term 'status of forces' refers here to the legal and administrative 
arrangements. Korean legal jurisdiction over the civil and criminal acts of U. S. military 
personnel was the critical issue. For the United States, a problem of inevitable delicacy 
involved the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen abroad -a 
relatively new problem resulting from the stationing of large numbers of troops in 
friendly countries in time of peace. The U. S., of course, desired to maintain its own 
discipline over its troops, and to assure to each serviceman the standards of American 
military justice which Congress had established. To the local country, on the other 
hand, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction was basic to its sovereignty and an obligation 
to its citizens. 
During the U. S. Military Government period from 1945 to 1948 after the 
liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule, all Americans and other official 
foreigners were exempted from Korean jurisdiction and subject to U. S. military 
jurisdiction. All Korean claims arising from the occupation were settled by the Initial 
Financial and Property Settlement of 12 September 1948, which transferred sovereignty 
from the United States to South Korea. 161 However, by an exchange of notes between 
the U. S. and South Korea during the first weeks of the Korean War in 1950, the United 
States was given exclusive jurisdiction over its own forces. 
162 
The United States was committed, by Secretary Dulles and President Rhee on 8 
August 1953, to negotiate administrative agreements to cover the status of such forces 
161 KPR, 741.24/240-1958, Supplement to the Initial Financial and Property Settlement, 12 September 
1948. 
162 KPR, 741.14/232, Working Understanding, 29 June 1950. 
196 
as the United States might elect to maintain in Korea after the Mutual Defence Treaty 
came into force and to effect the availability to them of South Korean facilities and 
services needed for the discharge of their common task. The administrative agreements 
covered a number of other subjects: the use of Korean facilities and areas by the U. S.; 
the entry and exit of military personnel; etc.. Rhee's Government had increased 
pressure on the United States to negotiate a full scale of forces agreement including, in 
all probability, a revised jurisdiction formula. South Korea strongly desired to have 
criminal jurisdiction over U. S. military personnel in Korea. Once the ratification of the 
Mutual Defence Treaty between South Korea and the United States had taken place on 
29 January and 5 February 1954, the South Korean press brought up the issue of the 
conclusion of an Administrative Agreement on the status of U. S. forces in Korea. South 
Korea wished to have similar jurisdiction with respect to other countries. Rhee's 
Government followed the example of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, in effect 
in the United States, in almost all NATO jurisdictions, and in Japan. In simplification, it 
provides that the primary right to exercise jurisdiction rests with U. S. military 
authorities where an offence arises out of an act done in the performance of duty, or 
where none other than U. S. personnel or property are involved. In the case of other 
offences, the local courts have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. In such cases 
the country exercising jurisdiction guarantees the accused adequate basic safeguards of 
fairness by American standards. There is also a provision that signatories should give 
163 
sympathetic consideration to requests for waivers in cases of particular 
importance. 
The formal negotiations had begun by the end of February 1954. The Korean 
Foreign Minister Pyun insisted on jurisdictional arrangements of the type applicable 
in 
163 KPR, 741.14/232, Administrative Agreement between the U. 
S. and the allies. 
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Japan and NATO countries which meant recognition of their primary right to try U. S. 
and other UN forces for off-duty offences. 164 South Korea's requests were buttressed by 
a series of publicised incidents involving UNC personnel and ROK civilians. Although 
action by the United Nations Commander had reduced the frequency of these incidents, 
pressure on the United States to enter into negotiations for an agreement continued. 
Rhee's Government proposed that negotiations be initiated to cover the various 
components of such an agreement separately, with discussion of the jurisdiction over 
United States forces to be reserved for last. The U. S. sought an agreement in principle 
from South Korea that, although the NATO formula was written into the agreement, 
they would waive their right to exercise jurisdiction until some time in the future. The 
Defense Department was not anxious to negotiate the issue because they believed that 
the present arrangements with respect to criminal jurisdiction were better than they 
were likely to get. ' 
65 
The U. S. continued to oppose entering into discussions with the ROK for a status 
of forces agreement, or negotiating separate deals on elements of such an agreement, 
because they were reluctant to relinquish the exclusive court-martial rights they then 
enjoyed. The Eisenhower administration determined that for political reasons, and in 
view of its commitment of August 1953 to negotiate such an agreement covering U. S. 
forces, it could do so only on the specific understanding that the agreement would not 
include criminal jurisdictional provisions. ' 66 Accordingly, the State Department 
164 PROý FO 371 110604 FK 1193/24, Request by the ROK for an Administrative Agreement, 23 March 
1954; KPR, 741.14/232 1955-59, The Administrative Agreement between Korea and U. S. 
165NA, RG 59 795.00/7-1954, Subjects on which we may have something to give the ROK, 19 July 1954. 
166 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 27, Report to the President by Frank C. 
Nash, Country Studies-Korea, November 1957. 
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proposed to negotiate this and the base rights issues as well as any claims, but the 
United States wanted South Korea to waive its right to exercise criminal jurisdiction for 
three reasons: (a) the strain on ROK courts; (b) the fact that it was still technically an 
area of hostility; and (c) the fact that the United States already undertook to see that 
justice was done and reported to South Korea in all cases in which they were interested. 
In addition, some members of Congress and groups in the United States expressed 
opposition to any exercise of foreign jurisdiction over U. S. troops abroad. This 
opposition invoked the so-called constitutional right of the soldiers to be tried by a U. S. 
court rather than by the foreign country where they are stationed, and appealed to 
isolationist attitudes in some areas of the United States. 
The executive branch, who had recognised the need for, and the basic soundness 
of, most existing jurisdiction arrangements, had difficulty in countering the emotional 
appeal of such groups. For this reason Washington instructed U. S. representatives to 
open all status discussions with a request for maximum U. S. jurisdiction. However, 
quite apart from the subject of jurisdiction, the U. S. proposed to discuss problems 
raised by stationing U. S. forces in Korea and to take whatever corrective action as 
might be appropriate. South Korea did not accept this U. S. counter-proposal and in an 
Aide-Memoire of 20 December 1958 requested that the U. S. reconsider its position. 
The U. S. continued to delay their response and ignored the Korean position. 
167 As a 
result, this issue was not concluded in President Rhee's time because South Korea did 
not have enough power over the United States in the one-sided relationship created by 
the considerable amounts of assistance they received from the U. S. 
167 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Operations Coordinating Board Report on Korea, 29 
April 1959; KPR, 741.14/232,1955-59. 
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Force Reduction and Modernisation of South Korean Forces 
In 1953 a commitment for strengthening South Korean forces was made as part of 
the bargaining process for Rhee's acquiescence in the armistice negotiations. The 
Eisenhower administration accepted Rhee's prerequisite for an armistice, and agreed 
that the administration would undertake to conclude a mutual defence treaty, and aid 
South Korea in strengthening ROK armed forces, including ground forces of 
approximately 20 divisions. 168 In his aide-memoire of 7 July, Rhee put an emphasis on 
the flexibility of the strengthening of the ROK Army in order to make further 
expansion of ROK forces possible. 169 Rhee thought that because U. S. foreign policy 
would change in conjunction with their national interests, South Korea had to maintain 
a maximum strength which could be supplied and assisted by the U. S., and the degree 
of cooperation between the two countries should be conditional on continued U. S. 
support. In general, U. S. -ROK relations were driven by: U. S. policies towards the 
struggle with communism; U. S. efforts to reduce world tensions; and U. S. attempts to 
achieve the peaceful unification of Korea. South Korea had vigorously protested against 
any U. S. actions which they interpreted as attempting to accommodate the Communists. 
In the early weeks of 1954, the French operations at Dien Bien Phu met with 
difficulty and the Eisenhower administration considered both direct intervention and 
securing the support of other nations to help the French 
forces. Improving his 
bargaining power with the Eisenhower administration in connection with the 
Indochina 
crisis, and attempting to demonstrate the positive role of 
South Korea in international 
168 F obertson to Department of State, 3 
July 1953. 
_FRUS, 
Vol. 15, p. 1312, R 
169NA, RG 59,795-00/7-853, Rhee's Aide-Memoire, 8 July 1953. 
200 
relations, Rhee made an unsolicited offer to the U. S. to send a ROK division to assist 
the French forces which were in need of military support from the United States. In 
return for this offer, Rhee requested that the U. S. strengthen ROK forces to his 
satisfaction. His motives in proposing the troop offer were: to increase Communist-Free 
World tension in the Far East and thereby increase the chances that the U. S. would be 
drawn into active military operations against Communist forces which might lead to the 
conquest of North Korea and overthrow of Communist China; to create additional 
pressures on the Communists in the hope that they might either make concessions in 
Korea or be provoked to new aggression in Korea; and to create publicity which would 
raise ROK prestige among the free nations of Asia. 170 
The highest levels of the Eisenhower administration considered the advantages 
and disadvantages of this proposal. Under political considerations, ROK participation 
would be a concrete step in advancing collective security measures against Communist 
hostilities and would accelerate the formation of a regional security pact in Asia. 
Meanwhile, ROK participation could lead the tN nations with troops in Korea to 
conclude that their contingents were not needed for the security of South Korea and 
increase the withdrawal of their units from Korea, thus lessening the character of UN 
efforts to protect the security of South Korea. This proposed action would be considered 
undesirable in view of the forthcoming Korean political conference at Geneva at which 
170 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 185th NSC Meeting, Contemplated Offer by President 
Rhee of an ROK Division for Service 
in Indochina, 17 February 1954; DDE Library, White House 
Office, office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records, NSC Series, Policy Papers 
Subseries, Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to Laos, 2 March 1954. 
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the Communists would be given an opportunity to create propaganda advantages over 
the free world. 
171 
From the military point of view, although it would enhance the capability of the 
French to implement the Navarre Plan for offensive operations designed eventually to 
achieve a military victory, there were some disadvantages for the United States. Firstly, 
the burden of the arrangements for furnishing logistic support to the ROK division 
would most certainly, directly or indirectly, fall on the United States. Secondly, the 
situation would be widely exploited by Soviet bloc propaganda as a case of United 
States employment of ROK forces for the benefit of U. S. imperialism. 172 Considering 
all the pros and cons of the proposal, the policy makers at the National Security 
Council reached a firm consensus that it was not desirable, partly because U. S. public 
opinion would not support the maintenance of U. S. forces in Korea while ROK forces 
were withdrawn from Korea for action elsewhere, and partly because the free world 
would react adversely to ROK participation in the Indochina war. 173 However, one of 
the most important reasons for rejecting the ROK proposal was that it might invite overt 
participation by Communist China or North Korea in hostilities in Indochina, thereby 
widening hostilities in the region. However, a decade later the United States begged 
"' Ibid., Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to Laos, Attachment A: Political Aspects of Proposed ROK 
Offer of Troops to Laos (Prepared by the Department of State). 
172 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, I March 1954. 
173 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 187h NSC Meeting, Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to 
Laos, 4 March 1954. 
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South Korea to send ROK forces to Vietnam when they were involved in another civil 
war as they had been in Korea. 
By recognising the deteriorating situation in Indochina, the Eisenhower 
administration discussed U. S. participation in Indochina with or without U. S. tactical 
use of nuclear weapons. Although there was a possibility of Chinese Communist 
offensive action in Korea concurrently with or subsequent to a Chinese Communist 
intervention in Indochina, Washington policy makers reflected upon the redeployment 
of U. S. and UN forces from Korea. Some of the NSC participants suggested the 
movement of U. S. forces out of Korea for dispatching into Indochina, but Eisenhower 
opposed this because of Rhee's strong demonstration against the previous withdrawal 
of two U. S. divisions from Korea. 
174 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had three alternatives for Korean forces considered to be 
required for U. S. military policy against the Communists. Condition A was the 
improvement of the present position: together with the growing potency of U. S. Air 
Force and Naval Air elements deployed in the Western Pacific, action would present a 
constant, serious threat to the communist orbit. Condition B was the military 
embodiment of a policy to initiate offensive action, at the earliest practicable date, and 
in concert with other anticommunist nations: the U. S. Eighth Army Comprehensive 
Staff Study calculated the mobilisable potential of the ROK Army to be 1,071,000 
physically qualified males between the ages of 19 and 36. The Eighth Army concluded 
that the most effective utilisation of such manpower, in combat operations, would be as 
a 30 division balaneed army of 800,000, and at the same time, additional marginal 
personnel would be available for functions equivalent to the Korean 
Service Corps and 
174 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 194 
th NSC Meeting, 29 April 1954. 
203 
for the performance of other military support activities. Properly supported by the 
nuclear capability of the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy, this Army was judged to be 
capable of defeating Communist forces deployed in North Korea, and whatever 
additional Chinese Communist forces that could be used to augment them. Condition C 
was a defensive position, and assumed the restoration of stability to the Far East, on the 
basis of quasi-legal recognition of the present geographical status quo. Concurrently, 
the ROK standing Army could be reduced to 250,000.175 
As part of a visit to the Far East to examine U. S. security policy towards the 
indigenous forces of the Far East, General Van Fleet went to Korea to carry out an 
obligation from Eisenhower's letter to Rhee of 16 April 1954 in which the United 
States would consider programmes "for the continued improvement of ROK forces, 
including modernisation of air force by supplying jet aircraft, and reorganisation of 
marine corps from a brigade of scattered small marine units. "176 The South Korean 
President interpreted the term 'continued improvement' as a commitment on the part of 
the United States to expand ROK armed forces, so Rhee asked for increased military 
assistance in line with the build up of North Korean forces. Ambassador Briggs made a 
similar interpretation of the letter. In contrast, the Pentagon did not consider it to mean 
175 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Box 2, Report of Ambassador James A. 
VanFleet, April-August 1954. 
176 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, Report of Ambassador Van Fleet, Box 2, Expansion of the Repýblic of Korea Armed Forces. 
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an expansion of the present forces. 177 These contrasting views would bring about the 
conflict between the two governments over the issue of Korean force reduction. 
In his report to President Eisenhower, Van Fleet encouraged a build-up to 35-40 
army divisions, based on five ROK divisions for each U. S. division in expenditure. 178 
Admiral Radford supported the idea of the increase of ROK forces due to the fact that 
it was much cheaper to maintain Korean rather than U. S. divisions. 179At this time, an 
estimate of the relative operating costs of a U. S. soldier to a ROK soldier was a ratio of 
15 to 1. The comparative costs of each division of the U. S. and the ROK are given in 
Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2 
Initial Equipment 
Annual Operating Cost 
under Combat Conditions 
U. S. Almy ROK AM 
$87.7 million $19.3 million 
$205.8 million $119.6 million 
Total $293.5 million $119.6 million 
Source: DDE Library, Reference Collection of Miscellaneous Declassified Documents, 
Tasca's Report to the President, Costs of ROK Forces and the ROK Defence 
Budget 
177 KPR, 773.1 US/402, The Transactions of Political Affairs from the Embassy in America, 15 April 
1954. 
178 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 37, 'Survey of the Military forces of 
Korea, Fonnosa, Japan, and the Philippines, and of the United States Military Assistance Program related 
thereto', no date. 
179 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 193 rd NSC Meeting, Expansion of ROK Forces, 13 
April 1954. 
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Even though Rhee had already requested a build-up of the ROK army to a 
strength of 35 to 40 divisions with a simultaneous increase in the ROK navy and air 
force, this was of course out of the question for Washington decision makers. The 
Eisenhower administration felt that it was beyond the capabilities of Korean manpower 
and the economy and, if achieved, might encourage Rhee to undertake offensive action 
against North Korea. 180 Furthermore, the Commander of the U. S. Eighth Army and the 
American Economic Coordinator in Korea voiced concern over the inflationary impact 
of force expansion in South Korea and about costs to the United States. At the same 
time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of a 20 division-force 
goal as a maximum. Coping with divided opinions among decision makers, Defense 
Secretary Charles E. Wilson thought that any further expansion of ROK forces should 
be justified on the basis of "political rather than military considerations. " 181 His 
argument stemmed from the fact that at least $1 billion per year was required to operate 
the ROK forces under peacetime conditions and the ROK economy could not carry this 
burden. Consequently, the U. S. had to be prepared to meet an annual bill of roughly 
one billion dollars for maintenance of the presently approved ROK forces, partly 
through direct military assistance and partly through economic or defence support 
aid. 182 Eventually, the U. S. decided upon Condition A, that of improving the quality of 
the ROK forces within current force levels. Rhee had accepted the idea of having the 
eventual 20 division force and the political power which would go with it, but, as 
180 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 15, pp. 1765-1766, CINCFE to JCS, 17 March 1954. 
181 Ibid., pp. 1779-178 1, JCS to Wilson, 31 March 1954; DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 
192nd NSC Meeting, 6 April 1954. 
182 NA, RG 59,79513.5/4-1354, Rough Costs Involved in Expansion of ROK Armed Forces Cost of 
Initial Equipment, 13 April 1954. 
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previously, he enjoyed standing his ground with the United States over their Korean 
policy., 83 Despite South Korea's total dependence upon the U. S. during this period, the 
Eisenhower administration was never able to look forward to President Rhee's total 
cooperation on most issues. 
From the end of 1954 Rhee continued with his reluctance to cooperate with the 
U. S. because of his complaint about U. S. Korean military and economic policy, as 
demonstrated by his delay in signing the Agreed Minute and his obstructionism in the 
dollar-hwan controversy, 184 but his bargaining power could not help but diminish 
compared to the situation of the time of the Korean armistice. ' 85 The Eisenhower 
administration could control Rhee through aid programmes, the allotment of which was 
crucial to South Korea's military and economic policies. In the end, an amendment of 
the Agreed Minute of Understanding was signed on 12 August 1955 after a long 
bargaining process. The minute fixed the ROK force levels at 720,000 men with 20 
active army divisions, and committed the United States to supply and equip them, albeit 
to a lesser extent than their own forces. At this time, the armistice agreement prevented 
the introduction of new types or additional numbers of weapons into Korea, so that 
183 NA, RG 59, Lot 53 D 413, Taylor, The Commander of the Eighth Army, to Clark, CINCFE, 9 June 
1953. 
184 The U. S. had a significant stake in South Korean foreign exchange rate adjustments since they had a 
direct impact on the pricing of aid imports in South Korean currency. This affected the magnitude of the 
government's budget support from the sale proceeds of the aid imports, and the size of the 
dollar 
reimbursement of the UN local currency advances to the ROK government. The 
U. S. proposed to devalue 
the Korean currency, the hwan, to a more desirable level, but Rhee's Government did not agree 
because 
South Korea benefited from the foreign exchange reserves made available by American aid and the U. S. 
forces' advances, to fmance its imports. 
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ROK requirements could be largely met from the inventories of U. S. divisions being 
withdrawn. 
Difficulties were encountered very soon in fulfilling the programme. Although the 
minute contained an understanding with respect to the timing of retirement of active 
ROK army divisions to reserve status, Rhee's Government could violently object to 
such a shift. At the same time, the U. S. planned to reduce their security effort overseas 
in an attempt to cut their budget deficit. US budgetary pressures were increasingly 
limiting the amount of military assistance available worldwide. As a result, South 
Korea had no choice but to be a target country for a test case. As illustrated in Table 3, 
South Korea was the largest aid recipient from the United States. By the mid-1950s, the 
military drag on Korean economic progress was clear. It was most evident in the 
defence budget and in the counterpart fund. As military pay and operating costs 
mounted, they soaked up more and more of the counterpart funds, leaving less available 
for investment in civilian economic expansion. 
TABLE 3 U. S. Military Assistance to South Korea 
Total Military Assistance ($ million) 
Fiscal Year to Korea to Asia to Eurove Worldwide 
1958 331.1 688.7 768.8 2,333.7 
1959 190.5 690.6 547.8 2137.1 
1960 190.2 689.7 658.3 1798.1 
Source: DDE Library, Draper Committee Reports, Committee Meetings-#50 
through #59: Comparison of Deliveries and Programs by Region 
185 FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 23, part 2, pp. 9-10, Radford to Wilson, 
18 January 1955. 
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At this time, the most serious dilemma for the United States was that while North 
Korean forces were strengthening their war potential, the United States was 
encountering severe budgetary restraints on its aid programmes, while South Korea was 
suffering economic recession as a result of the huge ROK forces. When the Korean 
armistice had been established, there had been art Rhee- 
onA. Palle-s that the U. S. would provide a two-yeW programme of assistance. Part of' 
this U. S. programme involved the return of many U. S. divisions to the United States. 
As a result, South Korea maintained a huge number of its own forces, which became a 
great burden on the South Korean economy, to fill the military vacuum following the 
return of US forces. During the fiscal year 1954, South Korea's expenditure on national 
defence constituted approximately 80% of its revenues in the general account budget, or 
approximately 21% of Korean gross national product. For a nation with a gross national 
product of less than $ 100 per capita, this was a staggering burden. 186 
In addition to budgetary constraints, major political problems should also be 
considered. In May 1955, Ambassador William S. B. Lacy 187 in Korea voiced 
Washington's concern over ROK force reduction with regard to the forthcoming U. S. - 
186 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Report of Van Fleet, Defence Expenditures of 
South Korea, 26 April-7 August 1954. 
187 The length of his service as Ambassador in Korea was for five months. Lacy was recalled at Rhee's 
request. Rhee had obtained a report that Lacy might disturb his re-election as President and a rumour that 
Lacy had played a similar role when he was ambassador in the Philippines. He was known to plan to 
replace Elpidio Quirino with Ramon Magsaysay. The Eisenhower administration expressed its discontent 
by leaving the position vacant for six months. Quoted from Seung Joo Han, 'The Domestic Politics 
between Korea and the United States', in Young Rok Koo (ed. ), Han Kook kya Mi Kook [Korea and the 
United States] (Seoul: Pak Young Sa, 1984), pp. 138-142. 
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ROK economic discussions in Washington that would make U. S. relations with Rhee's 
Government exceedingly difficult. 
As the ROK military establishment was the single strongest stabilising force in 
Korea and a significant factor in the general Far East situation, the issue was a 
complicated controversy within the Eisenhower administration. Furthermore, within 
Korea itself, if ROK force reductions were mandated before tensions in the area eased5 
particularly before the promised force goals were reached, ROK morale would be 
shaken, and ROK forces might be withdrawn from UNC operational control. At the 
same time, Rhee's political influence, built in large part on his success in getting 
military aid from the United States, would be diminished. Ambassador Lacy indicated 
the unsettling economic effects of the plan on Korean society, which was accomplished 
by the Economic Coordinator to Korea, in the shape of problems that would arise 
when those released from the army were integrated back into the civilian economy. 188 
The US military circle also maintained their objection against a full-scale 
reduction programme. With General Lemnitzer's recommendation as Commander in 
Chiefs of Far East (CINCFE), who advocated a stage-by-stage cutback, 189 the JCS held 
the line throughout the post Korean War period that the 20 division ROK army, plus 
two U. S. divisions, were crucial for a defending action against the Communists. 
However, the withdrawal of the Chinese forces from North Korea in 1958 would make 
188 NA, RG 59,795B. 5/5-3055, the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, 30 May 1955. 
189 NA, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea(3-19-45) (2), Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE)'s 
Recommendations for Future Force Levels of the ROK Army, 6 September 1955. 
General Lemnitzer recommended: the tentative force levels were July 1957,20 active divisions, ten 
reserve divisions; January 1958,17 active, 
13 reserve; July 1958,13 active, 17 reserve; January 1959,9 
active, 21 reserve. 
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the JCS change their position a little. 190 In spite of the political and military concerns, 
economic problems obviously required a reduction of the level of South Korean forces. 
On 8 December 1955 the National Security Council discussed the problem posed for 
the economy of South Korea by the inflationary pressure created by a large military 
establishment supported by United States aid. The participants concluded that, for the 
long-term solution to the problem, South Korean forces should be reduced to a level 
supportable by the South Korean economy. President Eisenhower was seriously 
concerned about having to convince Rhee of this in the near future. He recalled the hard 
bargaining with Rhee in the armistice and post-armistice period. 191 
A full-dress debate about reducing South Korea's 20 division anny began in the 
middle of 1956. Decision-makers of the Eisenhower administration were anxious to 
forward the reduction of the ROK army. As illustrated in Table 4, compared with other 
allied forces, the ROK army's strength was weaker. Ignoring the complaint from Rhee's 
Government that they needed to modernise their air force, to acquire additional naval 
vessels and even to modemise their army, the U. S. emphasised the reversal in the 
direction of their spending in Korea downward. In particular, Defense Secretary Charles 
E. Wilson, who was discouraged by the cut in the defence budget, was keen to 
encourage the force reduction programme, believing that there was no real way to cut 
US expenses except by reducing the size of ROK forces. 192 
190 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 262 nd NSC Meeting, 20 October 1955; FRUS, vol. 23, 
p. 178, no-4. 
191 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 269h NSC Meeting, 8 December 1955. 
192 lbid. ý 297 
th NSC Meeting, U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, 20 September 1956. 
211 
TABLE 4 Comparison of Strength, Allowances of Selected Weapons and 
Items of Equipment of Infantry Division 
U. S. (1955) Japan 













BAR 493 489 252 677 258 249 326 486 
Launcher 550 556 255 453 293 205 384 
Rocket 3.5" 
Howitzer 54 54 54 54 12 36 12 54 
105mm 
Mortar 81mm 54 40 36 36 30 60 
Mortar 4.2" 36 36 12 36 27 24 36 
Truck 1/4T 1,103 781 195 792 274 394 202 1,080 
Source: DDE Library, President's Committee to Study the U. S. Military Assistance 
Program (Draper Committee) Reports, 1958-59 
The Eisenhower administration considered that such a reduction would show 
U. S. peace aspirations to the free world which had been bombarded with Communist 
peace propaganda. Furthermore, and more importantly, they were convinced that a 
renewed attack from North Korea was unlikely. 
193 Until then, the ROK forces 
consisted of 20 active plus 10 reserve divisions, 2 jet fighter bomber wings plus I 
tactical control squadron and 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron, and a navy of 79 
ships. Costs were projected at $580.6 millions for FY 1957 and 
$672.8 millions for 
1958 plus substantial increases in the ROK military budget. The latter could 
be met 
193 DDE Library, office of the Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs Records, OCB Series, 
Subject Subseries, Report on Korea, 25 October 1956. 
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only by a further drain on the Department of State counterpart funds, to the serious 
detriment of the South Korean economic development programme. "' 
The JCS presented their view that the Communist situation permitted a phased 
reduction in ROK active forces and recommended 16 Infantry Divisions, 14 Reserve 
Divisions, Marine Division, with the Navy and Air Force at minimum strength levels 
under the condition of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the U. S. forces. The 
JCS confirmed at the NSC Planning Board meeting on 22 October that if nuclear 
weapons were not to be introduced, there would be no change in present force levels of 
either the U. S. or the ROK. In response, Defense Secretary Wilson believed that a mere 
transfer of four divisions to reserve status was not worth all the difficulties inherent in 
the introduction of nuclear weapons. 195 Asked by the Department of State for an 
ap raisal, Walter C. Dowling, Ambassador to Korea from May 1956, opposed the X-P 
maintenance of the present force levels and supported a reduction of army forces to 10 
active and 10 reserve divisions, followed by the introduction of nuclear weapons, the 
replacement of wom-out transport and communications equipment, and the addition of 
sophisticated aircraft. Dowling also mentioned the same political problems as his 
predecessor Lacy, and believed that the problem of unemployment of discharged 
soldiers was serious but manageable. He was concerned that nuclear weapons for the 
194 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 50, Major Program Commitments, 14 March 1956. 
195 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 322-325) JCS to the Secretary of Defence, II October 
1956; ibid., p. 333, Parsons 
to Robertson, 24 October 1956; ibid., pp. 342-344, Parsons to 
Dowling, 7 November 1956. 
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U. S. forces could compensate for ROK force reductions but would bring about clamor 
for the same weapons requirement for South Korea. 196 
The application of 'New Look' policies in Korea was critical for the Eisenhower 
administration. The precedent of the Korean case was followed in Formosa, Vietnam, 
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, all of which, together with South Korea, were given nearly 
two-thirds of total U. S. mutual security assistance. This commitment was inspired by a 
growing concern that Congress would attempt to reduce its various foreign 
commitments in the interest of the domestic defence budget which had steadily 
increased as a result of new weapons developments. 197 The Eisenhower administration 
lost a series of battles over the mutual security program in its struggle to secure more 
funds from Congress. Dealing with Eisenhower's request for $ 4.67 billion for the 
mutual security programme for FY 1957, Congress reduced it to $3.8 billion. 198 
At the beginning of 1957, the Eisenhower administration tried to evaluate 
alternative military programmes for South Korea in the draft NSC 5702: 
Alternative A was the existing military programme, consisting of (a) 20 active and 10 reserve army 
divisions, (b) 6 jet fighter squadrons, (c) I marine division and coastal navy. 
Alternative B involved following changes in converting 4 of the 20 active divisions into reserve 
divisions over a three-year period, Providing U. S. forces in Korea with dual conventional nuclear 
weapons. 
Alternative C involved converting 10 of the 20 active divisions into reserve divisions, providing 
the remaining active forces with additional limited dual conventional nuclear weapons like the 
U. S. forces. 
196 NA, RG 59,795B. 5/10-1256, Dowling to the Department of State, 12 October 1956. 
197 ERUS, vol. 23, p. 343, Parsons to Dowling, 7 November 1956. 
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Alternative D was the same in terms of the army divisions, and also provided 12 squadrons of 
fighters and fighter bombers sufficient to offset North Korean air strength; and providing the ROK 
Army with equipment comparable to that of the North Korean Army, but not the provision of dual 
conventional-nuclear weapons. 
Considering these alternatives came to be more controversial in inter- 
departmental relations. Alternative B reflected the views that the JCS had previously 
expressed as their minimum requirement. In the Department of State itself, Assistant 
Secretary Robertson advocated alternative A, feeling that the reduction of the ROK 
forces might induce Communist hostilities similar to the Korean war. On the contrary, 
A 
Robert R. Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Plarfing, supported alternative 
C as the goal of U. S. policy since it would save $165 million annually in aid to Korea, 
would ease the military burden on the Korean economy, and would facilitate Korean 
economic development. 199 These contrasts were more evident at the NSC meeting a few 
days later. Secretary Dulles stated his objection to drastic reductions in ROK forces. 
Defense Secretary Wilson was opposed to increasing economic assistance to South 
Korea by way of any savings resulting from a reduction. He thought that this would not 
have any effect on the Korean force reduction that Washington had desired. Treasury 
Secretary George M. Humphrey was not satisfied with a reduction of four divisions 
because of America's serious financial situation. On the whole, policy makers opted for 
alternative B which could be achieved by additional deployment of 
U. S. nuclear 
forces. 200 
199 FRUS , vol. 
23, Pp. 390-391, Robertson to Dulles, 29 January 1957; ftid., p. 391, no. 
5. 
200 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 311 
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Admiral Radford, who had been one of those staunchly pro-New Look and 
sympathetic to South Korea in a military perspective, obviously spoke for the Defense- 
JCS outlook for the reduction of South Korean forces when he outlined that: (a) the 
introduction of nuclear weapons was necessary to deal with Rhee over the reduction 
programme because South Korea felt much safer if the invasion routes into the ROK 
were covered by nuclear weapons; and (b) the U. S. military would not continue military 
planning without including the use of nuclear weapons, on which the security of U. S. 
forces in Korea was highly dependent. He emphasised that the notification to Rhee 
about the introduction of atomic weapons was indispensable for his concurrence on the 
Korean force reduction. 201 
Meanwhile, the United States pressed for a reduction of Korean strength on the 
grounds that the North. Korean army of 383,000 faced South Korean forces of nearly 
twice that strength plus two U. S. infantry divisions. However, Rhee's Government 
maintained vigorously that maintenance of the army was an unalterable must. For the 
South Korean government, whatever happened to the economy was a secondary 
consideration. Rhee believed that a military build-up was crucial for defending his 
country from further North Korean hostilities and possibly for making a raid on the 
North to reunify Korea, although this would have been implausible without full U. S. 
support. 
Discussion in the National Security Council on 13 June 1957, concerning U. S. 
policy towards Korea, indicated an urgent need for U. S. action to reduce the mounting 
costs of the total U. S. defence effort. In order to keep a proper balance between 
201 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 326 th NSC Meeting, U. S. policy toward Korea, 13 June 
1957. 
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domestic and foreign programmes, the Council discussion on Korea focused attention 
on reductions in the U. S. defence effort overseas. Participants believed such reductions 
would be made possible by the greatly increased power of sophisticated modem 
weapons. In accordance with Eisenhower's decision, Dowling and Lemnitzer were 
instructed to propose a reduction of ROK forces to Rhee, in return for a modernisation 
of the ROK Air Force and the modernisation of the U. S. forces in Korea. The proposal 
was timed to coincide with the U. S. announcement of the suspension of the Armistice 
limitation on force improvement. Eisenhower predicted that they would again encounter 
delicate and difficult negotiations with Rhee, and did not want an ultimatum to be 
presented to Rhee even though Dowling and Lem-nitzer were entitled to exercise some 
flexibility in reaching an agreement with Rhee. They were directed to notify Rhee, if 
questioned, of the probability of the introduction of atomic bombs onto South Korean 
territory. 
202 
Rhee welcomed modernisation but raised objections to force reduction, 
remarking that "the ROK forces could only be reduced after unification of the country. " 
Additionally, he notified Eisenhower of his objection to this plan until the 
modernisation programme for the ROK had been completed to a satisfactory extent. 
203 
He pressed the U. S. for more modem equipment for ROK forces, including atomic 
weapons. In this way Rhee took the risk of attempting to drive another 
hard bargain 
202 NA, RG 59,795.00/6-1857, Joint State-Defence Message for Dowling and Lemnitzer, 18 June 1957; 
DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records, 
Special Assistant Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 5, Memorandum for the President: 
Further 
Application of New Look to U. S. Defence Effort Overseas, 19 June 
1957. 
203 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Letter from Rhee to 
Eisenhower, 24 June 1957; 
FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 461-462, Dowling to 
Parsons, 24 June 1957. 
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with the Eisenhower administration as he had done in the past. He incited Senator 
Knowland and Henry Styles Bridge, who had been on good tenns with Rhee, to press 
the Pentagon. At the same time, the JCS argued their position concerning the 
introduction of nuclear weapons to US forces in South Korea in order to persuade Rhee 
and his Govermuent to believe that the security of South Korea could be guaranteed by 
the weapons. 204 Eisenhower took a finn stance that the reduction of ROK forces was 
imperative for the sake of the American budget, and that the modernisation of U. S. 
forces, the addition of improved weapons to ROK forces, and the mutual defence treaty 
should be sufficient to defend South Korea. 205 From the U. S. point of view, the 
question of the reduction of ROK forces was not negotiable insofar as U. S. support was 
concerned. However, Rhee's Government urged the U. S. to refrain from discussing the 
question of force reduction until the completion of a study into the matter, then being 
undertaken by the South Korean Government. 206 
Washington's position was that, with a cut in defence support, a continuation of 
the present level of ROK forces could have disastrous economic effects in South Korea. 
It was believed that the American desire to withdraw its support of twenty ROK 
divisions was probably closely related to President Eisenhower's quest for savings to be 
used in countering the Soviet missile-age offensive. 
207 Rhee maintained that South 
Korean forces should be modernised in a manner similar to the level of U. S. 
forces. In 
those days, the U. S. did not endorse such policies as equipping their allies' forces with 
204 Ibid., pp. 467-468, Radford to Wilson, 17 July 1957. 
205 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Letter from Eisenhower to 
Rhee, 19 July 1957. 
206 NA, RG 59,795.00/6-2157, Joint State-Defense Message, 22 July 1957; 
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the same weapons. Ultimately, Rhee's requirement was a means for achieving his goals 
in his dealings with the United States. He followed the principle in this diplomatic 
seesaw that one should insist on much more than one wants to eventually receive it 
through negotiation. In this connection, Secretary Dulles regarded Rhee as a 
quintessential Oriental bargainer. He argued that it was going to be hard to get Rhee to 
agree to a reduction of the ROK forces, and "to achieve this we may have to give him a 
heavy jolt because he is a master of evasion. , 
208 
Although the Eisenhower administration was annoyed at Rhee's attempt to 
negotiate a force reduction, Rhee insisted that he would not accept discrimination in 
armaments between U. S. and ROK forces, and complained that he had not had any 
information on the type of weapons and the date of their introduction . 
209 Rhee basically 
welcomed modernisation but raised objections to the procedure of force reductions. 210 
Rhee then resorted to his now familiar demonstrations as he had always done in 
bargaining with the U. S. for the destiny of his nation. Rhee was mostly concerned with 
modernisation to compensate for the reductions. There was considerable popular 
sympathy for reducing the burdensome force levels in South Korea but the fundamental 
concern was that U. S. interest in and support for the ROK was decreasing. 
In the following months, laborious negotiations lingered on with Rhee's 
Government manipulating every possible argument to maximise ROK force 
207 Washington Evening Star, 18 January 1958. 
208 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 334"' NSC Meeting, U. S. Policy toward Korea, 8 
August 1957. 
209 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Letter from Rhee to Eisenhower, 2 August 
1957. 
210 Ibid., Letter from Eisenhower to Rhee, 23 August 1957. 
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modernisation while avoiding force reductions. Ultimately, on 5 November 1957, 
Rhee's Government determined force reductions of 60,000 men from the authorised 
720,000 level, to consist of the deactivation of two army divisions and other units, 
including a Marine battalion, rather than four, as proposed by the U. S. 
211 This decision 
was partly affected by the inforination that a cut in total U. S. foreign aid appropriations 
for FY 1958 necessitated a decrease in economic aid to Korea. If ROK forces were not 
reduced, deficit financing and consequent economic decline could undermine ROK 
forces and South Korea itself . 
212 This was considered unacceptable by the United States 
since the actual level of ROK forces of 676,995 had always been below the authorised 
213 level, established in the Minute of Understanding of November 1954 for FY 1955. 
Aceeptance of the ROK proposal, therefore, would not have resulted in any 
budgetary savings, which was the objective of the Eisenhower administration's decision 
to reduce the ROK forces, because the actual reduction was only by 17,000. A series of 
meetings between the Departments of State and Defense reached the following mutually 
agreed views : (a) the minimum acceptable plan was a reduction by 30 June 1958 of 
61,500 men; and (b) Rhee would be informed that the Honest John and 280 rnm guns 
would soon be introduced into South Korea. In reality, decision makers and officials in 
Washington were awfully concerned about Rhee's unpredictable reactions, as he was 
frequently inclined to change his decisions. Predictably, Rhee reacted negatively that 
"no force reductions were possible until unification was achieved, " so General Decker, 
CINCUNC, informed Rhee of American plans regarding the introduction of the nuclear 
21 1 NA, RG 59,795-00/11-657, Joint Ambassador-CINCUNC Message, 6 November 1957. 
212 FRUS, vol. 23, p. 526, Sprague to Decker, II December 1957. 
213 As the authorised level was considered important for the Korean 
forces' capacity, Rhee did not care 
for an actual level of ROK 
forces that would be expanded as necessary. 
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weapons battalions. Despite U. S. confinnation of dispatching nuclear weapons, Rhee 
opposed any reduction without the visible modemisation of ROK forces. 
Accompanying Rhee's ardent objection, there were a lot of other objections over 
the Korean force reduction programme. From the beginning of 1958, in order to hamper 
the programme, Rhee tried to work by contacting various newspaper feature writers and 
Congressional leaders such as Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, Speaker of 
the House Sam Rayburn, and Senator Knowland. 214 He emphasised to them the 
importance of South Korea in defending Japan, which had come to be regarded as a 
country of considerable importance to the U. S. economy. This kind of tactics was quite 
successful and they accordingly used their influence to oppose the ROK reduction 
programme that the Eisenhower administration had planned. The Eisenhower 
administration acknowledged that the originally planned reduction would cause a 
negative effect in not only South Korea but also in such neighbouring countries as 
Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. As an initial step that was a compromising position 
temporarily between Korea and the U. S., and between interdepartmental conflicting 
interests in the Eisenhower administration, a revised military aid agreement reducing 
the maximum number of ROK military personnel that would be supported by MAP 
(Military Assistance Program) through the calendar year 1959 from 720,000 to a new 
force ceiling of 630,000 was signed on 29 November 1958. This involved a reduction 
in the total number of active ROK army divisions from 20 to 18.215 
214 KPR, 773.1 US 1958 V. 1/408, Information no. 14, Ambassador Yang to Rhee, 8 January 1958; 
Infon-nation no. 42, Yang to Rhee, 30 January 1958. 
215 KPR, 729-11 1955-58/760, Memo for the Minister of Defense, 'Reorganisation of the ROK Armed 
Forces', 12 February 1958; DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for 
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By 1959, the problems of force levels and equipment had sharpened: the financial 
constraints on U. S. aid were growing tighter, yet the equipment of ROK forces was 
increasingly obsolescent, while their burden on the ROK economy was even more 
evident. Treasury pushed for a drastic cut of ROK forces, but State and Defense 
opposed them. From the State Department's point of view, ROK forces played a larger 
role in East Asian security than simply the defence of its country. The Defense 
Department considered that even the most drastic reduction proposal would not save 
enough Mutual Assistance Programme resources to make possible the desired degree of 
modernisation of ROK forces. 
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In May 1959, the U. S. Country Team in South Korea, which consisted of the 
Ambassador, the United States Operations Mission (USOM), and the Military Assistant 
Advisory Group (MAAG), completed a study of five-year cost projections for various 
ROK force levels at the request of the State Department. The survey disclosed that 
these savings brought about by Korean force reduction could not be realised as such 
because of the large modernisation requirement, estimated to total about $325-400 
million for the period. 217 Ultimately, the force reduction programme that the 
Eisenhower administration had pursued was not successful in its overall objectives. 
National Security Affairs Records, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Operations Coordinating Board 
Report on Korea, 29 April 1959. 
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Information no-95, Yang to Rhee, 6 March 1958. 
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222 
At the NSC meeting in June 1959, there was much controversy among decision- 
makers concerning the settlement of this issue. Secretary Dulles, affected by these 
opponents, raised the political and psychological impact both in South Korea and in the 
Far East. Contrary to this, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget called for an effort 
to reduce the ROK to 16 active divisions and proposed that this could be reduced to 12 
with greater modemisation of the ROK forces. The President himself also agreed not to 
reduce Korean forces considerably because he did not want to face the new problem of 
another 100,000 unemployed men in South Korea. 218 In this period, ROK forces were 
an important mechanism in maintaining the balance of employment. For the United 
States, they would have to consider the impact of such a reduction not only on South 
Korea but also on the rest of Free Asia. 
As far as military assistance was concerned, by 1960 the United States had 
provided approximately $1.4 billion to South Korea since the Korean armistice. 
American military assistance and the presence of U. S. military forces gave the United 
States great leverage with which to influence South Korean military policy, as well as 
government policy in general. However, in the last quarter of the 1950s the U. S. 
government could not continue to afford assistance programmes for foreign countries 
and still maintain a strong and healthy U. S. economy. This reduction of military 
assistance brought about the weakening of Rhee's political power in South Korea 
because U. S. military assistance had significant economic implications, combined with 
huge amount of economic aid. For this reason, jhe downfall of Rhee's administration 
in 
April 1960 was implicitly caused by this shortage of aid from the United States even 
218 DDE Libraryý Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 41 
Ph NSC Meeting, US Policy toward Korea, 25 June 
1959. 
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though the explicit reason was attributed to his government's corruption, malfunctions, 
and undemocratic rule. 
By 1960 the ROK armed forces were capable of defending South Korea against 
North Korean attack with conventional weapons for a sufficient period of time to permit 
outside reinforcement. However, although ROK ground forces were numerically 
superior to North Korean forces, lack of logistical build-up and limited quantities of 
modem equipment precluded a sustained defence by the ROK Army without prompt 
materiel assistance. 
219 
In conclusion, during the Cold War, the rationale of U. S. -South Korean military 
relations had been to contain the North Korean military threat as part of the global 
struggle between the U. S. and the USSR. Japan's importance in U. S. strategy since 
World War 11 made the United States regard South Korea as a front-line base for 
defending Japan and the Pacific region. On account of this, the U. S. commitment to 
South Korea was regarded as a crucial sign of American credibility with regard to its 
other allies in Asia. The loss of South Korea would have negative repercussions for the 
free world. This strategic view justified massive U. S. military assistance to South 
Korea. In reality, the United States committed itself to a military assistance programme 
for psychological reasons to build foreign confidence and determination to resist 
Communist expansionism and subversion. 
2 19 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
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The principal elements of U. S. -South Korean military relations included a mutual 
defence treaty, a U. S. military presence in Korea, and U. S. military assistance to the 
ROK forces. This relationship has been characterised as one-directional, in that the 
relationship was dominated by U. S. political and national interests. Under these 
conditions, the objectives of Rhee's Government were to keep a significant number of 
U. S. troops stationed in its territory, and to strengthen the ROK forces, albeit with 
necessary assistance from the United States. 
The only reliable political arrangement for the defence of South Korea was the 
U. S. -ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The formula of this treaty is fundamentally different 
from that of the NATO Treaty which presuppose an automatic response in the conflicts 
of allied countries. In other words, it means that the United States neither supports any 
military action initiated by South Korea nor provides for immediate action by the 
participating parties in the event of armed attack. Thus, from South Korea's point of 
view, this treaty did not guarantee sufficient commitment to South Korean security. As 
a result, President Rhee attempted to look to the excuse of reinforcing South Korean 
forces to a level at which they would have enough capacity to overthrow North Korean 
forces. His unsolicited proposal of the dispatch of an ROK army to Indochina was 
linked to this scheme. 
In this period, the two countries' military relationship was not coordinated in all 
cases. Given the asymmetry of capability between the two sides, while the U. S. notified 
unilateral decisions to South Korea, Rhee ardently opposed these and took a bargaining 
position with Eisenhower who became tired of these laborious and painful deals. On 
the specific problem of force reductions, the Eisenhower administration determined that 
the redeployment of U. S. forces in Korea and the reduction of ROK forces to the 
minimum necessary to defend itself from the North Korean forces were inevitable. This 
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action was regarded as being necessary because of the burden that the current level 
of ROK forces imposed on the Korean economy, as well as the burden on the U. S. 
budget of being required to assist in supporting these armed forces. Rhee took the 
position that he could not accept the plan unless ROK forces were to be equipped with 
modem weapons comparable to those being provided to U. S. forces in Korea, including 
atomic weapons. Although Rhee was sure that the U. S. would not provide South Korea 
with atomic weapons, he knew he had to ask for the maximum possible from his 
counterpart and, then, withdraw his position to one which the U. S. would tolerate. To 
achieve this, he manipulated conservative congressmen and the American newspaper 
feature writers, who were either vigorously anti-Communist or sympathetic to Rhee. 
The Eisenhower administration had to modify its positions in light of these internal 
political processes. In the case of a redeployment of US forces, the U. S. government 
was much worried about the likelihood of the South Korean forces' withdrawal from 
UNC operational control if the redeployment of all its forces from Korea, which had 
been determined in the original plan, was carried out. Considering Rhee's decision on 
the release of POWs prior to the Korean armistice, American policy makers were 
compelled to be worried about a recurrence of a similar incident. In the end, the U. S. 
decided to leave two infantry divisions and have continued to leave the same level of 
forces in Korea. 
As for the negotiation of a status of forces agreement, the United States opposed 
relinquishing the exclusive court-martial rights it then enjoyed. They argued that such 
an agreement should be delayed until the settlement of the military situation in Korea, 
where American forces had been on a virtual war footing. South Korea's desire to 
conclude this issue, linked as it was to the question of sovereignty, was not fulfilled, 
partly because nobody in Washington could agree with Rhee's position, and partly 
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because South Korea had used up its leverage over the United States in the course of 
securing the substantial levels of assistance from them. 
One of the major problems complicating U. S. -ROK relations was South Korea's 
desire to abrogate the Armistice Agreement and have the freedom to take unilateral 
action to unify Korea. The United States supported the maintenance of the Armistice 
agreement and the achievement of unification through peaceftil means. Even though 
this difference of policies on the principal objective of Rhee's Goverment had an 
important influence on relations between the two countries, as stability in the Korean 
peninsula was critically important to the U. S. and remained a main objective of U. S. 
Korean policy, in the end, Rhee's Goverment recognised that the extent of their 
dependence on U. S. assistance and support was such that they had no alternative but to 
continue their close association with the United States. 
Since the cease-fire, the armistice in Korea continued as the basis for maintaining 
peace in the area. Continued United States efforts to impress upon the ROK the futility 
of unilaterally reopening hostilities proved successful, although Rhee on a number of 
occasions had publicly advocated marching north. There was no question, however, that 
he and his senior military leaders were fully aware of the futility of unilateral action on 
the part of the ROK under the prevailing international circumstances. Rhee was a 
brilliant leader in extracting assistance from the U. S. to the extent that he did. 
Guaranteeing operational control to the U. S., which would often raise the problem of 
the sovereignty of South Korea, South Korea was awarded large amounts of military 
and economic aid from the U. S., which were essential resources for sustaining South 
Korea itself following the Korean War. 
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In spite of enormous U. S. military assistance to South Korea's security, how 
could Rhee as a leader of a small state exert his continued influence over the 
Eisenhower administration? Notwithstanding South Korea's nearly total dependence 
on the U. S., there was never total cooperation by President Rhee. There were several 
reasons for this. The American reevaluation of South Korea's value for U. S. global 
strategy, as a typical case of the patron-client relationship, convinced Rhee to take it 
for granted that he could make special claims on the U. S. for its role in the U. S. -led free 
world security system. Given Robert Keohane's argument that U. S. global policy was to 
contain Communist expansionism at any price and burden, 220 Rhee was presented with 
an opportunity to use a certain amount of bargaining power. Under the conditions of 
global competition which marks superpower interaction, a small state assumes a value 
to the great power states, as they compete for ascendancy over each other, based not 
only upon the small state's intrinsic worth but also upon its ability to put other powers 
at a disadvantage. A small state can then become a scarce resource which is sometimes 
able to extract a considerable price for its particular contribution to its patron state. 
Additionally, as Rhee's anti-Communist posture reflected the mood of the right-wing 
Republicans in the 1950s, Rhee not only raised his prestige in the world of anti- 
communism but also reinforced his bargaining power with the U. 
S. 
Keohane considers the nature of the American political system to 
be another 
important factor in understanding the bargaining power of small allies. Certainly, 
Rhee 
managed to exploit the interaction of the American power system, 
in which American 
policy is largely the outcome of clash and compromise among separate 
interest groups 
220 Robert KeOhane, The Big Influence of Small 
Allies', Foreigm Policy, 2 (Spring 197 1), pp. 161-163. 
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and bureaucratic units. 221 He often attempted to boost the value of South Korea's geo- 
political advantage to U. S. military strategy, knowing that U. S. policy makers put a 
great emphasis upon the importance of protecting its small allies regardless of the costs. 
As time went by, however, Rhee's bargaining power was bound to diminish compared 
to the background of the periods of the Korean armistice and the Korean phase of the 
Geneva Conference. The Eisenhower administration was able to increase its control 
over the South Korean government through the mechanism of aid programmes, the 
allotment of which was crucial to Rhee's military and economic policies. 
During the Rhee regime, South Korea was continually seeking means to 
strengthen and consolidate U. S. commitment by enhancing its value as an ally, by 
itself playing in the larger context of the cold war in East Asia. The reason for Rhee's 
offer to the U. S. to dispatch the ROK forces to Indochina was his personal ardent desire 
to lead an anti-Communist front in Asia and to attract favourable U. S. public opinion. 
Thus the rationale could be seen as an attempt to gain a central position for Korea in the 
global war against communism alongside an ambition for regional political power. 
Patron-client state relationships can be better understood as fundamentally bargaining 
interactions in which each state tries to extract from the other valuable concessions at a 
minimum cost. 
221 Ibid., p. 164; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 'Alliance Strategy: 
U. S. -Small Allies Relationships', Journal of 
Stratggjýý_Stý-_u ýies, 3 (1980), p. 205. 
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4. Rhee's Conflict with the United States 
Downfall of His Regime 
and the 
With the Korean cease-fire, U. S. influence was concentrated primarily on 
military and economic areas. Even though the Eisenhower administration sought to 
restrain Rhee from obvious political errors and excessive measures against Koreans, 
they did not go as far as the point of confrontation. In the eyes of the South Koreans, the 
United States played a critical role in the progress of democracy. Unlike Rhee, the U. S. 
paid attention to fair elections, civil liberties, adherence to constitutional process, and 
maintenance of a capable opposition party. However, in most cases, American influence 
on Korean political affairs resulted in problems for the bilateral relations between the 
two countries. While President Rhee personally managed South Korean foreign and 
domestic policies from the Korean armistice until 1960, the United States frequently 
met his bluffs and uncooperative stance over U. S. regional strategy towards the Far East 
and the Korean economic plan. 
Until 1960, the United States, for its part, accepted Rhee as South Korea's 
inevitable leader during his life time, despite the difficulties of dealing with him, and 
regardless of his undemocratic political regime. In 1960, however, the Eisenhower 
administration was constrained to give more support to his overthrow. It is therefore 
important to assess the extent to which the U. S. and South Korean governments clashed 
over Korean internal political and economic affairs, thereby resulting in Rhee's 
resignation. 
The ultimate objective of U. S. policy towards South Korea in the 1950s was to 
assist the ROK to make a substantial contribution to the 
Free World's strength in the 
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Pacific area. This was achieved by encouraging the conditions necessary to forni, and 
then to participate in, a Westem Pacific collective defence affangement, including the 
Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and South Korea, eventually to be linked 
with ANIUS and SEATO. The United States sought to influence the ROK goverment 
and political leadership to support U. S. views on major strategic policy towards East 
Asia. However, President Rhee was not an ideal client from the viewpoint of American 
strategic objectives. His resistance resulted in many problems with American policy 
makers during the Eisenhower administration. ROK-Japanese relations are a good 
example of this. When meeting with Rhee in 1953, Secretary Dulles emphasised the 
strategic importance of the anti-Communist bloc in the Western Pacific sector. ' For this 
security interest, a close cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan was 
seen as a prerequisite. However, Rhee's response was entirely negative; he asked 
Washington to stop Japan's military and economic build-up. U. S. sponsorship of the 
Tokyo-Seoul negotiations did not diminish Rhee's stubbornly held anti-Japanese 
posture. Such negative attitudes to American East Asian strategy made U. S. policy 
makers consider his removal and the support of a new flexible leadership who would be 
responsive to U. S. policy. 2 
With the deterioration of Korean politics in 1960, the United States decided to 
withdraw support from Rhee, thereby paving the way for the new policy of Korean- 
Japanese nortnalisation, and created a triangular security relationships between the U. S., 
1 FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 15, p. 1473, First Meeting between Rhee and Dulles, 5 August 1953. 
2 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 15, Operations Coordinating Board Report, 'U. S. Policy toward 
Japan', 8 April 1959. Washington policy makers believed that the resignation of President Rhee provided 
improved prospects for achievement of an over-all settlement 
between South Korea and Japan. 
231 
Japan, and South Korea. This was one of the most important U. S. security objectives in 
East Asia after the Korean War. This chapter therefore assesses the extent and in which 
circumstances Rhee did not go along with U. S. policy, and how his negative attitude 
induced withdrawal of American support when Rhee encountered great domestic 
resistance to his regime. 
The Normalisation of South Korea-Japan Relations vis-a-vis U. S. 
Security Interests in East Asia 
The Cold War atmosphere in East Asia and eventually the Korean War greatly 
changed the role and interests of the United States in ROK-Japanese relations. The 
Eisenhower administration tried to reintegrate East Asia into a strong anti-Communist 
bloc from the strategic point of view, and to create a triangular security system between 
the U. S., Japan, and South Korea. A normalised relationship between the two Asian 
countries was indispensable to this policy. However, the postwar relations between 
South Korea and Japan were not normalised, not only because Japan was still regarded 
as the enemy, but also because Koreans were annoyed at the U. S. policy of giving 
economic priority to Japan. 
During the Korean War, the economic benefits accruing to Japan from the U. S. 
made a great contribution to the economic revival of Japan. The U. S. regarded Japan as 
the heart and soul of the situation in the Far East. If Japan was not on the U. S. side, 
America's East Asian position would become untenable. The U. S. from the beginning 
of its economic aid to South Korea attempted to encourage and expedite trade with 
Japan as a natural market and source of supply. Korean agricultural and marine 
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products were needed by Japan and in turn Japan provided the main source of 
equipment for South Korea, which was compatible with Korean industrial factories 
built in the thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule. President Rhee suspected Japan's 
economic intentions, even though he knew that non-nalisation was indispensable. 3 The 
United States managed to maintain pressure on both countries to work for a settlement 
until the final exchange of ratifications of the Agreement of Normalisation of Relations 
came in December 1965. The State Department, led by Secretary Dulles, believed that 
the revival of trade with Japan and the creation of a favourable climate for foreign 
investment--e specially Japanese investment-could bring South Korea steady progress 
towards self-sustaining growth. 
In September 195 1, President Rhee publicly declared his discomfort about the 
signing of the U. S. -Japanese Peace Treaty. He regarded it as a great threat to Korea and 
a stepping-stone for Japan towards economic and military domination of the East Asia 
area. Despite this mistrust, the treaty led to Korean recognition of the need to consider 
future relations with Japan. Until late 195 1, the U. S. authorities in Japan had made 
numerous efforts to mediate the disputes between South Korea and Japan before U. S. 
influence over Japan diminished because Japan would be restored to full sovereignty 
along with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty which would be effective in April 1952.4 
Preliminary talks which were the first official contacts between Korea and Japan started 
KPF, 726.23 1954/137, Rhee to President Eisenhower, 4 February 1954. Rhee conveyed his complaint 
about U. S. economic policy by saying: American aid funds given 
for the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of the Korean economy have been spent more 
for the Japanese than for the Korean economy. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Korean View of Korea-Jppan Relations and Jgpan's 
Asian Polic , 
Reference No. 13 (1957), p. 7. 
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on 13 October 1951.5 The U. S. maintained the position that South Korea and Japan 
should be responsible for all negotiations but, if required, it would be ready to act as a 
mediator. This passive American position continued until Rhee's Government 
collapsed. American policy makers believed that Rhee's rigid anti-Japanese position 
was the main obstacle to normalised relations. Formal talks between South Korea and 
Japan began in Tokyo on 15 February 1952, but reached a deadlock. The main 
substantive issues in the normalisation of Korean-Japanese relations were fisheries and 
the 'Rhee Line', property claims, and Korean residents in Japan. 
The East Sea (Sea of Japan) located between Korea and Japan was an important 
fishing area. During the U. S. occupation of Japan, General MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, allocated outer limits for Japanese fishermen, 
referred to as the MacArthur Line. On obtaining its independence in 1948, South Korea 
started policing the Korean side of the MacArthur Line. As the restoration of Japanese 
sovereignty was imminent, President Rhee unilaterally declared the 'Rhee Line' in 
January 1952, which superceded the MacArthur Line which was to be eradicated with 
the end of the American occupation of Japan. 6 This action in the arena of the Korean 
War surprised Washington and Tokyo. The U. S. objected to this unilateral action and 
emphasised the desirability of untangling the problem through a fishing agreement. 
Irritated by South Korea's continued seizing of Japanese fishing vessels, on 27 
September 1952 General Clark, UN Commander, constituted a 'Sea Defence Zone' 
NA, RG 59,695.95/9-115 1, Telegram 245, Embassy in Korea to the State Department, II September 
195 1; RG 59,795B. 00/9-265 1, Dispatches 98, Embassy in Korea to the State Department, 28 September 
1951. 
Don 7A Ilbo, Seoul, p. 
1,18 February 1952; Korean Office of Public Information, Korea and Jqpan 
(Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1954), pp. 17-18. 
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(often referred to as the Clark Line) for security against Communist intrusions during 
the pending war, but principally planned to prevent further aggravation of the fishery 
disputes between South Korea and Japan. Clark's move displeased Japan. After the 
Korean armistice, the Japanese government requested the Zone's abrogation and it was 
suspended in August 1953.7 In spite of this action, South Korea maintained the Rhee 
Line, reaching at some points sixty miles off the coast. Inside this line Rhee forbade any 
Japanese fishing. Numerous Japanese fishing boats had been seized for violating the 
line which Japan did not recognise. 
Rhee's Government argued for reparations from Japan for damages and 
indignities to persons, real properties and assets during Japanese colonial rule of Korea. 
The Japanese did not accede to this claim and asserted their property claims towards 
Korea. They indicated that 85% of the property in Korea had been owned by them. The 
U. S. was involved in this issue because it had seized all Japanese assets in the southern 
part of Korea. The U. S. had transferred all seized Japanese property to South Korea in 
the 'Initial Financial and Property Settlement' on 9 September 1948. However, the 
Japanese contended that Japan still had valid property rights in Korea, since 
international law did not permit the American military government to transfer full 
rights. 8 The U. S. position over this problem was that negotiations concerning property 
claims were a bilateral matter between South Korea and Japan. Such an ambiguous 
American attitude made this problem much more difficult afterwards. 
Donp, -A Ilbo, Seoul, p. 1,5 
September 1953; William Vatcher, Panmumjom (New York: Praeger, 
1958), p. 147. 
NA, RG 59,694.95/3-2552, Yang to Acheson, 25 March 1952; 694.951/4-852, Memorandum of 
Conversation, Han and McClurkin ,8 April 1952. 
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After World War II, approximately 700,000 Korean nationals remained in Japan 
and some dissatisfied South Koreans illegally infiltrated Japan. At that time, Rhee's 
Government disregarded their welfare except to the extent that its national prestige and 
security were involved. South Korea insisted on full rights for Korean nationals in 
Japan, but South Korea refused to accept the repatriation of Koreans whom the 
Japanese wished to deport because the Korean resident was, partly because of racial 
prejudice, thought to be mainly a problem of Japanese social instability, and South 
Korea would not seriously consider a repatriation plan unless Japan paid the costs. 9 
With the end of the Korean War in July 1953, Japan re-examined its foreign 
policy in the Cold War. Furthermore, commercial interests exerted pressures on the 
Japanese Government to seek trade with Communist China. The Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) exploited the situation and initiated steps towards a 
possible rapprochement with Japan. 10 Given the Japanese sentiments against 
rearmament, the Japanese government, led by Premier Ichiro Hatoyarna, wished to 
NA, RG 59,694.95/12-2950, Telegram 1281 from Tokyo, 29 December 1950, Korean Public 
Information Office, op. cit., p. 16. 
DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 7, NSC 166/1: U. S. Policy toward Communist China, 'Chinese 
Communist Intentions towards Non-Communist Asia and the West', 6 November 1953. 
In Northeast Asia, China's interest was to insure the safety and potential future expansion of the North 
Korean regime and to attempt to neutralise the threat of Japan. Short-term policy emphasised Korea but in 
the long term the Peking regime was most deeply concerned over Japan, which alone could be a military 
threat to the PRC in the Asian countries. In the field of economy, Peking was anxious to extend its 
commercial contacts throughout Asia, particularly with Japan, not only 
because of the need for trade in 
China's industrial isation programme, but also because trade offers were considered by the PRC to be 
powerful weapons in neutralising the anti-Communist posture of many 
Asian governments. 
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make Japan a neutral nation. This would definitely undermine U. S. influence over 
Japan's rearmament programme. 
Since 1953, despite the U. S. effort to contain the Chinese Communists, China had 
made significant encroachment into American influence in Japan. During 1953-1954, 
pro-Chinese attitudes predominated in Japan. " Given these circumstances, the 
Hatoyarna cabinet favoured negotiations for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and-fýe 
fUi. 12 
. týe assuml normal trade relations with the PRC, ý'Which were very success 
Meanwhile President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had plans for promoting a 
security pact which would draw together Japan, South Korea, Formosa, the United 
States and perhaps the Philippines. However, this plan met an impasse because of the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan. ' 3 In the last quarter of 
" Hugh Borton, et al., Jqpan between East and West (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 208. 
The PRC offered to repatriate some 30,000 Japanese nationals in China to fin-ther enhance favourable 
Japanese attitude towards its regime. Over the next two years, approximately 29,000 Japanese were 
repatriated during the first arrival of repatriates in Japan on 20 March 1953. 
12 The Japanese knew that compared to trade with the U. S., trade with the PRC would not amount to 
much but in order to persuade the Americans to allow Japanese goods into America, the Japanese 
purposely made an agreement with China. 
13 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 7, NSC 5416, Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Defense, 'United States Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (NSC 
Action No. 1029-b)', 9 April 1954; ibid., Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Summqry of Meeting on 
Southeast Asia, 24 July 1954; White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, 
JFD 
Chronological Series, Dulles to Embassy Tokyo, 5 August 1954. Basic to the establishment of a non- 
Communist position of strength in the Far East was the rehabilitation of the 
Japanese military forces. The 
United States, although realising certain risks of Japanese military revival, 
fostered Japanese rearmament 
in the light of the security interests of the 
U. S. in the Far East. 
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1954 the Eisenhower administration seriously urged Rhee to repair relations with Japan, 
and highlighted the possibility of reducing aid to Korea if he refused. In this respect, 
the U. S. thought that once they had committed themselves to the aid programmes Rhee 
desired, especially the military programme, without having required him to settle issues 
with Japan, the possibility of doing so later would be correspondingly reduced. 14 
Acceding to U. S. 's firm stand on Korean-Japanese relations, in January 1955 
South Korea made overtures to Japan for the reopening of ROK-Japanese 
negotiations. 15 However, subsequent approaches by North Korea to Japan, in which 
North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung proposed a normalisation of diplomatic relations, 
and the favourable response of some private Japanese groups, brought these efforts to 
naught. Japanese foreign policy towards the pro-Communist attitude irritated President 
16beCc,, 
t4Se ýýftc Rhee. who was well known as the toughest anti-Communist in the world, 
t WO'Ak4 A0_YA(XV_ W%S FOý'ýtt4h. 
The Japanese government from mid-1955 wished for an independent-oriented 
policy in its relations with the United States vis-a-vis its relations with the PRC. It also 
tried to revise the U. S. -Japanese Security Treaty in order to reduce Japan's dependence 
on the United States. To discuss the issue, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and 
Secretary General Nobusuke Kishi visited Washington in August 1955 and the Dulles- 
Shigemitsu Joint Communique on 31 August unveiled the responsibility of Japan to 
defend the Western Pacific and a subsequent increase in the Japanese self-defence 
14 NA, RG 59,795B. 5/9-2054, Ambassador Briggs to the State Department, 29 September 1954. 
15 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 36, Memorandum for the President, 
'Suggested Reply to Rhee's Letter of 29 December 1954', 28 January 1955. 
16 New york Times, I June 1955, p. 5. 
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forces. 17 Under the new security system, Japan was to undertake a lot of the burden in 
the economic development of Asia and the security of East Asia. These decisions made 
other Asian countries feel insecure. South Korea was exceptionally concerned by the 
Eisenhower administration's effort to make Japan the main power base for the 
implementation of its containment policy in Asia. 
In the face of continued Japanese trade with Communist countries, Rhee directed 
a total suspension of trade with Japan. This action brought about greater problems for 
South Korea than for Japan. The economic embargo against Japan was not effective in 
controlling Japanese policy because South Korea, at that time, was not so powerful in 
the economic sphere. 18 As a counter measure against continued Japanese relations with 
North Korea, Rhee's Government tried to capture increasing numbers of Japanese 
fishing vessels which were violating the 'Rhee Line'. As the relations between South 
Korea and Japan deteriorated, the Eisenhower administration had serious concern for 
the persistent conflict over the 'Rhee Line' following active U. S. mediation for early 
Korean-Japanese cooperation. At that time, Rhee quite often disclosed his objection to 
the U. S. -Japanese policy of encouraging the rearmament of Japan, whereby Japan could 
be given a stronger position in East Asian affairs. Assuring Rhee of continued U. S. 
concern, the Eisenhower administration had to indicate that it had no intention of 
enriching Japan at the sacrifice of South Korea. Nevertheless, when Washington 
proposed the creation of a so-called Asian Collective Security Organisation, Rhee 
17 FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 23, part I (Japan), pp. 90-120,29 and 31 August, I and 2 September 1955. 
18 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 49, Japanese-ROK Relations, I June 1955; OCB Central File Series, Box 50, Detailed Development 
of Ma . or Actions Relating to 
U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, 17 November 1955. J 
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rejected any possibility of Japanese membership of the organisation. 19 At this juncture, 
the U. S. and Japanese leaders realised that an early rapprochement between South 
Korea and Japan was a prerequisite to any successful anti-Communist regional defence 
system in Asia. Furthermore, without South Korea's cooperation, Japan would 
experience great obstacles in carrying out its new role in Asia. 
Following U. S. mediation efforts, South Korea and Japan, realising the necessity 
for an early reconciliation, resumed infonnal and formal talks in 1956. For the Japanese 
government, the increasing numbers of fishing vessels and fishermen captured by 
Korean patrol boats and detained by Korea constituted a serious social and political 
problem. For this reason, Japan desired reconciliation with South Korea. President Rhee 
also realised that rapprochement with Japan was inevitable because, as the leader of a 
client state, he had to recognise the U. S. strategy towards East Asia-the new phase of 
American containment policy based on the 'New Look'-but he was not willing to 
enter negotiations until Japan withdrew the Kubota assertions of 1953 and Japanese 
property claims against South Korea. 20 In spite of the different opinions within the 
19 Korea Times, Seoul, 23 July 1956, p. 1. 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Korean View of Korea-Jgpan Relations, p. 15. 
At a meeting of the claims sub-committee of the Japan-Korea Conference on 15 October 1953, Chief 
Japanese Delegate Kenichiro Kubota stated that the repatriation of Japanese from Korea, the disposition 
of Japanese property in Korea by the American military government, and the establishment of an 
independent Korean state before the peace treaty with Japan were all violations of international law; that 
the description in the Cairo Declaration of Korean 'enslavement' was wartime hysteria; and that 
"Japanese colonial rule of Korea for 36 years was beneficial to the Korean people. " This last statement 
would become a serious obstacles in proceeding with formal negotiations 
between South Korea and 
Japan. The Japanese governments were reluctant to make a formal withdrawal because of the effect on 
South Korean property claims, as well as for considerations of face value. 
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Japanese government, it was about to withdraw the Kubota statement if this would 
facilitate the normalisation of relations between the two countries, but refused to retract 
Japanese property claims. In this regard, the Japanese stand was to minimise the South 
Korean property claims against Japan, or to obtain mutual cancellation of the both 
countries' property claims. 21 
By the end of 1956, most foreign policy problems between Japan and its 
neighbouring countries were satisfactorily completed. In October Japan signed a 
fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union and a similar agreement with the PRC. The 
only remaining tasks to be resolved were the renegotiation of the U. S. -Japan Security 
Treaty and the normalisation of diplomatic relations with South Korea. The Hatoyama 
cabinet were willing to reopen the talks in order to lay the ground for better relations 
with other Asian neighbouring countries. This plan was once again rebuffed by the 
initial repatriation activities of the Japanese government. Ever since the Japanese 
attempts to repatriate a large number of Korean residents in Japan to South Korea as 
undesirable aliens had failed, since Rhee's government refused to accept them, the 
Japanese government started to manoeuvre to send the Korean nationals in Japan to 
North Korea. For South Korea, this was viewed as a great boost to the North Korean 
regime in terms of much-needed manpower and international prestige. 
Tanzan Ishibashi gave an optimistic sign to South Korea. while taking over the 
new premiership. On 27 December 1956, Foreign Minister Nobutsuke Kishi argued for 
non-recognition of the PRC because it was not a United Nations member, and 
further 
stated his wish for normalisation of Japanese-South Korean relations, including the 
1 Korea Times, Seoul, 28 August 1956, p. 2. 
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release of Japanese fishermen detained in Korea. 22 Keeping a delicate political balance 
towards the Communist countries, Japan's key economic policy was to maximise 
foreign trade with Southeast Asia and the PRC. For this reason, Japan had to develop 
all of its trade relations with Southeast Asian countries. This trade would provide access 
to abundant supplies of raw materials and enhance Japanese prestige as well as 
providing a substantial market for Japanese goods. 
However, many Asian countries suspected Japanese intentions, reacting with 
bitterness because of the Japanese invasion during World War 11. Nobutsuke Kishi, who 
became the new Prime Minister on 25 February 1957, believed that an early 
rapprochement with South Korea would enhance Japan's image in Southeast Asia. 
Accordingly, he expressed his willingness to meet President Rhee personally to 
expedite an early rapprochement. Subsequently, Kishi proposed a simultaneous release 
of the detainees. However, Rhee's Government persistently insisted on the withdrawal 
of Japanese property claims as a prerequisite for the resumption of formal 
negotiations. 23 Despite pressures for an early reconciliation with South Korea, the 
Japanese government felt that it could no longer make any concessions because of the 
possibility of political instability being caused by socialists who were endangering the 
more important foreign policy-the re-negotiation of the American-Japanese Mutual 
Security Treaty. Consequently, the South Korean-Japanese talks met another stalemate. 
As negotiations for the Mutual Security Treaty proceeded, Washington policy 
makers were convinced that a rapprochement between South Korea and Japan was 
indispensable to the creation of an effective anti-Communist system in Asia. They 
jMes, Tokyo, 27 December 1956, p. 1; Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul, 5 January 1957, p. 1. 22 j1pan T 
23 Asahi Shinbun, Tokyo, 13 July 1957, p. I- 
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believed that a regional system based upon a unified military strategy for Japan, South 
V- 
Korea and Taiwan was a prerequisite for security in the region. To fill the vacuum 
created by any withdrawal of American ground forces from Japan and South Korea, 
strong conventional military forces against the Communists in East Asia were needed. 
However, an effective security system in the region as the cornerstone of the U. S. 
containment policy was inconceivable in the absence of cooperation between South 
Korea and Japan, in both defensive and economic matters. 
Despite the need for a collective security system and the advantages of 
normalised relations, there remained little expectation of them as long as Rhee retained 
his presidential power. For this reason, Japan would have to make considerable 
concessions to South Korea in order to normalise relations. Premier Kishi endeavoured 
to settle all pending issues in a series of talks. This willingness stemmed from his 
economic policy in Southeast Asia. The Japanese acknowledged that if they expanded 
their economic aid to other Asian countries before normalising relations with South 
Korea, South Korea's demands would become even higher. 24 As a result, the Kishi 
cabinet demonstrated its willingness to withdraw the Japanese property claims against 
South Korea if Rhee's Goverment came to tenns with Japan regarding the detainees 
issue. The Japanese government had to settle this issue because of domestic political 
pressure for bringing the detained Japanese fishermen back home. Following a month 
of negotiations in the preliminary session, the two governments finally reached an 
agreement on 31 December 1957 with regard to the detainees. At the same time the 
24 Theodore mcNelly, 'Japan's Role in Southeast Asia', Current HiqM, 49(November, 1965), p. 
291. 
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Japanese government withdrew the polemical Kubota statement and retracted its claim 
to properties in Korea. 25 
For the Japanese, there were problems including the detainees, the need to secure 
the settlement of the 'Rhee Line' and South Korea's property claims against Japan. 
However, President Rhee did not make any concessions to Japan until both countries 
reached satisfactory settlements for all other pending issues. The most crucial matter 
amongst them was the status of Korean residents in Japan. The Eisenhower 
administration was deeply concerned with this issue since it was one of the stumbling 
blocks in Korean-Japanese relations. More significantly, it became a Cold War issue 
because the Japanese, who were frustrated in their attempts to cope with the 
troublesome Korean community, allowed the Japanese Red Cross to negotiate with the 
North Korean Red Cross, who initiated a large-scale voluntary repatriation programme 
to North Korea. In December 1957, the Japanese Red Cross asked the International Red 
Cross to intervene on their behalf The International Red Cross accepted its role as 
mediator on the principle of reuniting the separated families. While the rigid stand by 
the two governments impaired the political compromise, Premier Kishi sent a personal 
envoy to Rhee for the purpose of solving the impasse. Despite this positive step, South 
Korea, at that period, did not have the capability to absorb the Koreans residents in 
Japan, at least not the necessary financial support. 
During the summer of 1958, the early rapprochement between Japan and South 
Korea was greatly strengthened by the incidents of the Quemoy and Matsu crisis 
26 along 
25 Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minisia Bulletin, No. 13 (1958), pp. 102-103. 
26 The largest of several 'offshore islands' included in the territory of Taiwan since 1949, despite the 
proximity of the Chinese mainland. The islands were used by the Nationalist annies of Chiang Kai-shek 
as a base for amphibious guerrilla raids, especially 
in the period 1953-58. Peking renewed intensive daily 
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the Formosan straits. The Eisenhower administration considered that the Communist 
threat against the security of their allies in the Pacific surpassed national hostility. The 
Eisenhower administration tried to persuade both countries to make a concession but 
these efforts failed not only because of Rhee's suspicion of American willingness to 
rearm Japan, but also because of the rigid stand by both the ROK and the Japanese 
govemments. 
27 
The year of 1959 was regarded as an intolerable period for both countries. When 
the Japanese government realised that there would be no Possibility of compromising 
on the impending issues-the 'Rhee Line' and the detainee issue-it decided to resume 
its efforts to repatriate pro-North Korean residents. The Japanese-North Korean talks 
over the repatriation issue were timely, taking place immediately before the U. S. and 
Japan signed their mutual security treaty. The Japanese pro-Communist rallies against 
the security treaty effectively nullified any possible U. S. opposition to the repatriation 
shelling of the islands in August and September 1958, threatening an invasion or a blockade. As in 1954, 
tension mounted rapidly and the United States was poised for massive intervention. Peking demanded the 
surrender of the islands, which was met by a declaration by Dulles to the effect that the U. S. would fight 
to protect Formosa and another by Eisenhower defining the islands as necessary for its defence. The 
Formosan government was assisted by supply vessels escorted by U. S. warships. U. S. allies, American 
public opinion, and the Democrats opposed a showdown over the islands. This opposition to military 
action persuaded Eisenhower to adopt a more conciliatory policy. The crisis was deflated by the 
resumption of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. With the unilateral declaration by 
Peking of its alternate-day cease-fire, the shelling was directed away from harbour and supply areas. 
Chiang committed himself not to attack the mainland again without first consulting the United States by 
Dulles' successful persuasion. The Taiwan Straits crisis had actually subsided. The Eisenhower 
administration achieved during this period the object of showing that the American 
decision not to 
intervene in Indo-China in 1954 did not betoken a general American failure of will. 
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28 programme. The repatriation negotiations with North Korea were devoted to 
counteracting the current anti-security movement in Japan by presenting an image of 
independence from the U. S. to the Japanese people. Under these circumstances, Rhee's 
Government was considerably ineffective in persuading Washington to directly 
intervene in the repatriation issue. Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration were 
sympathetic to the Japanese stance in this issue. The State Department helped restrain 
the Korean government from any reckless action against the transporting of vessels 
across the East Sea (the Sea of Japan). 29 
The issue of the Korean nationals in Japan was being used by the current Japanese 
regime for domestic political purposes for recovering the Japanese people's support. 
Accordingly, the issue was a convenient vehicle by which they could stir up emotions 
for their political gains. 30 The Japanese government planned the Repatriation issue 
partly to use as a bargaining point to win concessions from South Korea on the question 
of the 'Rhee Line'. 31 If the Japanese govenunent were to settle the question of the 
27 KPR, 773.1 US/407, Letter no. 1045, Rhee to Ambassador Yang, 4 November 1958. 
28 There was a strong suspicion in the South Korean government that the Japanese government threatened 
the United States not to sign the revision of the Security Pact unless it could successfully carry out the 
deportation scheme. For this reason, Rhee was confident that the Eisenhower administration pressured his 
govenunent into giving in as much as it could so that the U. S. could get the pact signed. 
29 KPR, 773.1 US/427, Yang to Rhee, 17 February 1959; Douglas Mendel, The Jqpanese People and 
Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 190. 
30 KPR, 773.1 US/428, Mass Expulsion of Korean Residents in Japan to North Korea, 10 March 1959; 
773.1 US/432, Letter no. 71, Han to President Rhee, 16 April 1959. The Japanese government intended 
to deport Korean residents as an excuse to get rid of Korean communists in Japan because it had its own 
problem of communist subversive activities. 
1 KPR, 773.1 US/432, Letter no. 74, Han to Rhee, 20 April 1959. 
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'Rhee Line', it would expect to get a greater advantage in domestic political affairs. 
Rhee's Government denounced these negotiations, and proposed an unconditional 
resumption o talks with Japan in an effort to prevent the Japanese from signing the 
Japanese-North Korean repatriation agreement. 32 In spite of the effort of Rhee's 
Govermnent, Japan and North Korea continued their negotiations and agreed the 
repatriation on 16 August 1959. In this case, the Kishi government effectively 
manipulated the two Koreas so as to settle an annoying issue of the unwanted Korean 
minority in Japan. 
When the Japanese government planned to repatriate the Korean minority to 
North Korea in the summer of 1959, the Eisenhower administration did not support 
Rhee's rigid anti-Japanese policy which did not leave any room for the Japanese to 
compromise with South Korea. Rhee's emotional hatred against Japan, a rigid trade 
barrier against Japanese goods, and frequent trade suspensions had brought South 
Korea's economy to a standstill. In spite of inexpensive Japanese goods and geographic 
advantage, Rhee was often prepared to buy expensive commodities from other 
countries. 33 Washington's policymakers quite often indicated that early normalised 
relations between South Korea and Japan would be advantageous to both Korean 
economic development and Korean interests themselves. Unable to prevent the 
repatriation programme, the United States tried to persuade Rhee to acquiesce in it, 
32 KPR, 773.1 US/432, Letter no. 90, Han to Rhee, 23 April 1959. 
33 KPR, 773.1 US/427, Cable no. WM-0653, Korean Embassy in Washington to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 27 June 1959; 773.1 US/43 1, Letter no. 88, Rhee to Minister Han, 16 July 1959; Pyong Choon 
Hahm, 'Koreaýs Mendicant Mentality', Foreign Affairs, 43 (1964), pp. 165-174. 
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while seeking to ensure that the programme was on a voluntary basis. 34 The South 
Korean government argued against the Eisenhower administration's strong inclination 
towards the Japanese deportation scheme and did not resume negotiations with the 
Japanese because it was regarded as a sign of giving in to the Japanese repatriation 
scheme. 35 At last the first ship with repatriates for North Korea departed Japan in mid- 
December and it seemed inevitable that Japan-ROK talks would end. Foreign Minister 
Jung-hwan Cho submitted his resignation to Rhee on 19 December owing to his failure 
to block repatriation. 36 
The U. S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty was signed on 19 January 1960 and gave 
the Japanese further responsibility for its own foreign relations and defence. This treaty 
satisfied the Japanese government's desire for a larger measure of military power and a 
greater regional role, and the American desire for a joint strategic system in East Asia. 
Under these circumstances, Rhee's Government's effort to prevent the repatriation to 
34 NA5 RG 595 795B. 00/7-2459, Embassy Seoul to State Department, 24 July 1959; 795B. 00/12-3159,31 
December 195 9; KPR, 773.1 US/43 0, Yang to Rhee, 'Comments on the Korean Repatriation Problem by 
Mr. Lincoln White, State Department Spokesman, at his Press Conference', 29 October 1959; ibid., 
Information no. 469,5 November 1959; Information no. 483,12 November 1959. 
The State Department unveiled its displeasure to You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador to America, 
while he was provoking anti-repatriation campaigns by American churches who 
favoured stopping the 
deportation scheme of Japan, and public opinion groups. The New York Times carried an article stating 
that the Department of State had reprimanded him. The State Department frequently tried to stop Yang 
from making speeches criticising Japan's actions. State warned Yang that a 
foreign diplomat should not 
use American platforms to criticise and condemn the actions of another 
friendly ally of the United States. 
35 KPR, 773.1 US/43 1, Letter no. 118, Rhee to Han, 3 September 195 9. 
36 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Progress 
Report: 
Korea, Week of 14-18 December 1959 and Week of 21-25 December 
1959. 
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North Korea was insignificant to American policymakers in Washington in comparison 
with the purpose of effecting a successful implementation of a major U. S. -Japan 
alliance. As the repatriation was the first massive defection from the Free World to a 
Communist country, the prestige of South Korea was bound to be damaged. 
The deteriorating relations between South Korea and Japan became a serious 
concern for the Eisenhower administration. It thought that Rhee's Government should 
37 reconsider its Japanese policy and take a more realistic viewpoint. As a result of the 
combined efforts of American political and economic pressures, and opposition attacks 
on Rhee's Japanese policy, the restrictions on Korean-Japanese trade by the Korean 
government were gradually relaxed. 38 Once the American-Japanese Security Treaty was 
signed, the Japanese government attempted to undertake its next major foreign policy 
task-normalising relations with South Korea. Despite agreement on resuming 
negotiations on 15 April through a series of talks between the two govemments, 
normal relations were not achieved because the Rhee regime fell quickly because of the 
37 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 4360'NSC Meeting, 'Significant World Developments 
Affecting U. S. Security', 10 March 1960; KPR, 773.1 US 1960/1359, Ambassador Yang to Rhee, 16 
March 1960. Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, reported that the dispute between Korea and Japan over 
fishing rights and the seizure of Japanese fishermen on the high seas was reaching a climax; the Japanese 
government considered various means of retaliation, including armed protection for Japanese fishing 
boats. The United States had infonned Rhee in the past that it did not accept the 'Rhee line', but never 
made this decision public, not wanting to exacerbate the dispute. However, having been impatient with 
Rhee's strong hatred towards Japan and acknowledging Kishl's domestic dilemma with the 
fishery issue, 
Washington urged upon Rhee the immediate release of the Japanese detainees. 
38DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Progress Report: 
Korea, Week of 22-26 February 1960. 
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'Student Uprising' on 19 April 1960 . 
39After the fall of the Rhee regime, the new 
Korean government, led by Prime Minister Myon Chang, was less hostile towards 
Japan, and recognised the political and economic necessity of friendly ROK-Japanese 
relations. However, Chang's government, given the parliamentary system of the Second 
Republic, could not control party competition and political opposition to its Japanese 
policy. Ultimately, the long-craved U. S. hope of ROK-Japanese relations was not 
normalised until General Chung-hee Park's military coup in 1961 succeeded and 
established the Third Republic. 
U. S. Economic Policy towards Korea and Its Negative Effects on 
Rhee's Government 
Economic relations between the two countries during the period of 1953-1960 
were one-sided. The United States was the donor and South Korea the recipient. 
Emphasising the politics of aid giving, the central function of foreign aid was intended 
to serve the donor's foreign policy interests. As an instrument of foreign policy, foreign 
aid served American interests by countering communism and developing stable 
democratic regimes. This assumed that economic development would lead to political 
democracy in a recipient country capable of defending itself against the spread of 
40 
communism. 
39Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul, 22 April 1960, p. 1; Jqpan Times, Tokyo, 27 April 1960, p. 2. 
40 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 2350'NSC Meeting, 'Future United States Economic 
Assistance for Asia', 3 February 1955; Fairless Committee Records, Box 10, 'U. S. Foreign Economic 
Assistance Views of Chiefs of Mission', 10 October 1956. 
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Foreign aid is an important source for financing security and economic growth in 
the client state. To a dependent country survival and prosperity depends on the heavy 
flow of foreign aid and security assistance from a big power state. A policy change 
persistently requested by the latter is a significant pressure on the former. As an aid 
package constitutes an important part of the small state's fiscal and administrative 
operations, the small state's external autonomy becomes increasingly limited in 
domestic and foreign policy spheres where the big power retains an interest and tries to 
exercise its leverage. This also makes the client state quite vulnerable, thereby forcing it 
into a subordinate role, allowing only one-sided concessions to the patron. The client 
relieves psychological and material insecurities by associating with a patron. In such a 
patron-client relationship, the patron supports the client's economy for ideological and 
military reasons, partly to demonstrate the superiority of its system to that of its rival. 41 
4e 
American foreign aid to South Korea during'1950s was primarily intended to 
serve the economic and foreign policy interests of the U. S. This also provided 
additional economic resources to South Korea which were to be utilised for economic 
programmes consented to by the United States. In addition to the foreign policy quid 
pro quo at the initial stage of the commitment of aid, regulations together with the 
subsequently established decision-making procedures provided the U. S. with legal and 
structural leverage to intervene in South Korean economic policy making. 
42 
The first official commitment to an American aid programme for South Korea, 
after its independence, was conceived in the context of fulfilling the American foreign 
policy interests of containing Soviet influence in the southern part of Korea. At the core 
41 John A. White, i Aid (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 78-90. 
42 KPF, 761.42 US/332, Agricultural Commodities Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Goveniment of the Republic of 
Korea, 13 March 1956. 
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of the U. S. interests in the zone and its commitments was not the survival of South 
Korea as such, but the potentially negative psychological and political impact of the 
area9s Sovietisation on other countries. This included the Far East and Southeast Asia to 
which the U. S. promised political and economic support. 
The foreign aid programmes in the Cold War period included large amounts of 
direct military and military-related aid designed to serve strategic rather than economic 
purposes. The question of American commitment to economic and military assistance 
to Korea during 1945-1953 was essentially a political one that was to serve U. S. 
prestige and credibility. The economic price of a comprehensive long-term aid for a 
self-sustaining South Korea was not justifiable since the territory of South Korea was 
not regarded as of any particular value to the overall American strategic position in the 
Far East and the aid was largely limited to relief activities. 
A major change in official American aid policies in Korea to a systematic relief 
and rehabilitation programme evolved from the armistice deals that the United States 
negotiated with South Korea. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the final American 
proposal for the truce terms, Eisenhower officially promised to offer a comprehensive 
aid programme to South Korea in definite terms as a way to win Rhee's cooperation in 
reaching an armistice. 43 Economic and military assistance to South Korea from the 
United States was decisive for Korea's survival after the Korean annistice. The United 
States had various motives for providing assistance to South Korea. Firstly, the 
American government feared that without foreign assistance the South Korean economy 
would collapse. As American prestige, credibility, and international image became even 
43 P* details for Korean armistice negotiations and its bargaining process between U. S. and South Korea, 
see Chapter I- 
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more closely connected to the development of South Korea, after the Korean War 
which had claimed a great number of the American lives and billions of dollars, 
American economic assistance could help establish a sound economic base enabling 
South Korea to become a showcase of democracy in Asia. Secondly, American 
assistance gave the United States leverage by which it could restrain Rhee's aggressive 
unification policy. Lastly, American economic and military assistance were seen as 
giving the United States an important apparatus by which it could influence South 
Korea's domestic policy. Aid was the most significant leverage the U. S. had in dealing 
with South Korea, and the U. S. used it as an instrument to force specific policy 
changes. 
American economic assistance to South Korea was institutionalised in a manner 
which assured American participation in many areas of South Korean goverm-nental 
decision making. A Combined Economic Board 44 was established by the U. S. -Korean 
Economic Coordination Agreement of 1952-namely, the Meyer Agreement which 
allowed direct U. S. involvement in South Korea's economic policies. Rhee and his 
government only reluctantly agreed to this arrangement since it disclosed the 
infringement of South Korea's sovereignty. 45 Following the Korean annistice, 
economic and militarY aid deepened South Korean dependence upon the United States. 
Consumer products and primary goods made up large portions of the aid. Imports in 
44The Board, with its American and South Korean representatives as joint chairmen, took responsibility 
for directing and coordinating existing relief and reconstruction agencies and organisation in Korea. 
45 KPR, 741.94, Treaty-624 1952/280, Agreement on Economic Coordination between the ROK and the 
U. S., signed and entered into 24 May 1952; 741.94, Treaty-624 1953/281, 
Combined Economic Board 
Agreement for A Programme of Economic Reconstruction and Financial Rehabilitation, 14 December 
1953. 
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this period were financed largely by aid programmes. Consumer goods predominated in 
imports and investment goods made up less than 14% of all imports during the 1953- 
1960 period. 
46 
The two major agreements that defined American aid to South Korea through the 
1950s were the Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) of 1948 and the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act). The outright prohibition of 
resale of aid under the ECA agreement had a major effect on South Korean economic 
development and decision-making during the Rhee regime. To protect American 
economic interests, South Korea could not export any of its major industrial products 
while receiving the U. S. grant-type economic and military aid. If the U. S. recommended 
certain changes necessary from the American view point, the South Korean government 
was obliged to make specific changes in overall economic policy. It also provided the 
U. S. with the legal power to influence not only the distribution of the counterpart funds 
and commodities imported under the aid programme, but also decisions about the use of 
South Korea's own funds in connection with the counterpart funds. 47 The Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act affected South Korea's economic strategy. Since the 
Act controlled exports of strategic materials that posed a threat to the U. S., a recipient 
country could not transfer any possession of material without the consent of the U. S. 
46 D. Chin, et al., 1950 Nyondaeui Insik [The Knowledge of the 1950s] (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1982), 
pp. 208-219. 
47 6 Agreement on Economic Cooperation', in U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, no. 1908 
(Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office., 1948), pp. 492-99; Section 101(d), Title 1,46. PL 480, 
Unite , Vol. 68, Part 
I (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), 
p. 455. 
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President. 48 Under this prohibition, export of the kind of items imported under 
American aid programmes was prohibited, even though they had been produced partly 
with the recipient's own resources. 49 
After the Korean War, the United States systematised its anti-China containment 
policy centr(iiia. upon military-economic ties with Japan. The regional security complex 
in East Asia played an important intermediary role between the global pattern of U. S. - 
Soviet rivalry and the security interests of local states. The recognition of the Cold War 
provided the United States with the need to reassess their Japanese policy, and to 
initiate a reindustrialisation programme for Japan. Japan, therefore, became a major 
economic beneficiary of the Offshore Procurement Programme during the Korean War. 
The programme enabled Japan to subcontract a portion of domestic military spending to 
foreign corporations. 50 Multibillion dollar spending paid for the Japanese trade deficit, 
temporarily solved the Japanese dollar gap, and brought Japan its first postwar taste of 
prosperity. The long-term aims of U. S. policy towards Japan after the Korean War were 
48 The Mutual Defense assistance Act of 1949, Title IV: General Provisions; U. S. Congress, House, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mutual Security Act of 1956,84thCong., 2 nd session, 1956, House of 
Representative 2213, p. 3 1. 
49 Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 66. 
50 The value of U. S. procurement programmes during the three-year Korean War was well above the 
value of total U. S. aid from 1945 to 195 1. This created an industrial boom above 
its prewar level and set 
the country on the road to economic recovery. As a price for the restoration of 
Japan's independence in 
1952, the Japanese government agreed to the continued stationing of U. S. troops on its territory. As the 
result, Japan continued to receive substantial amounts of 
financial support from the U. S. military 
procurement programme even after the Korean armistice. 
Quoted from C. J. Lee and Hideo Sato, U. S. 
poiicx- TowaErd JxpM anLd-Korea (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 17. 
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to foster reconstruction of Japanese industry, to ensure its economic ties with the United 
States, and to achieve limited rearmament in order to secure a strategic partner in East 
Asia .51 Even though the Korean War reduced some of the urgency of that conviction, 
the Korean cease-fire restored America's great anxiety. The sharp reduction of the 
Special Offshore Procurement Programme, the rapid reappearance of a Japanese dollar 
gap, and the apparent incompleteness and unevenness of Japanese recovery all pointed 
to Japan's pressing need for economic opportunities in non-dollar areas. In order to 
reduce its trade deficit Japan had to buy more of its raw materials and food from places 
other than the U. S., and had to find overseas markets to earn foreign exchange with 
which to make up the remaining shortage in its dollar account. Japanese 
reindustrialisation was accorded profitable markets and cheap raw materials in the 
Asian rimlands, including the PRC as well as South Korea and Southeast Asia. 52 The 
American policy that the aid given for the Korean economy should be used to buy 
Japanese products generated Rhee's suspicion and criticism about the Eisenhower 
administration's aid policy, which was intended to secure two dollars of benefit (one for 
Japan and one for South Korea) from every dollar expended. 53 From the U. S. view 
51 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 216fl' NSC Meeting, 6 October 1954 and 226th NSC 
Meeting, I December 1954. 
52 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 226h NSC Meeting, I December 1954; Thomas J. 
McCormick, America's Half-CentM (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 114- 
115. Despite taking strict measures to prohibit the Free World from trading with the PRC, at the National 
Security Council meeting, the Eisenhower administration decided to permit the Japanese to trade with the 
PRC in much more generous terms than Great Britain. Eisenhower was afraid that Japan might well go 
Communist if it were deprived of the possibility of trading. 
53 NA, RG 59,795. B. 11/2-1554, Rhee's letter to Eisenhower, 4 February 1954; 795.00/5-954, 
Ambassador Briggs to the State Department, 19 May 1954; DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, Dulles- 
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point, Japan would turn to communist trade unless the U. S. helped Japanese industries. 
Furthermore, Rhee suspected that the United States and Japan might have reached a 
secret agreement on placing South Korea under Japanese control. 54 
The most common and explicit confrontation between Washington and Seoul 
occurred around the post-war economic recovery plan and foreign exchange rates. 
Rhee's Government was most unwilling to compromise in areas such as the allocation 
of aid between investment and salable commodities, the selection of projects, imports 
from Japan and exchange rates. These were also the areas in which the U. S. was not 
readily willing to compromise. Although the Koreans requested investment for 
economic growth, the United States provided consumer goods in order to stabilise the 
economic deterioration caused by severely jhckieýoý54 inflation, due to the huge ROK 
military budget deficit, resulting in currency expansion. 55 This conflict was mainly 
because U. S. aid was designed not in the context of a long-term economic growth of the 
ROK, but rather as a short-term check on economic instability. The main purpose of 
Herter Series, Box 3, Briggs to Secretary Dulles, II May 1954; Ann Whitman File, International Series, 
Box 37, Rhee to Eisenhower, 29 December 1954; KPR, 761.42 US/332, Memorandum on Current 
Problems in Korea, 25 January 1955. 
54 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 226h NSC Meeting, I December 1954; Ann Whitman 
File, International Series, Box 37, Rhee to Eisenhower, 29 December 1954; NA, RG 59,795.00/Korea, 
Embassy in Seoul to Secretary of State, 15 September 1955. 
55 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff , OCB Central File Series, U. S. 
Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, 25 March 1954; Insang Song, 'Reflections on the Economic 
World', 
- 
[Financial Newspapers], I May 1979. 
257 
U. S. aid was principally to maintain national security and stability, not to develop a 
self-sustaining Korean economy. " 
The U. S. had an important interest in South Korean foreign exchange rate 
adjustments since they were directly related to the pricing of aid imports in South 
Korean currency. This in turn affected the magnitude of the government's budget 
support from the sale proceeds of aid imports, the size of the dollar reimbursement of 
the U. S. forces' local currency advances to the South Korean government. 57 The U. S. 
proposed to devalue the exchange rate of the Korean currency to a desirable level. From 
the South Korean point of view, these American attempts would reduce the maximum 
benefits from the foreign exchange reserves made available by American aid and the 
U. S. forces. With regard to economic aid, Rhee considered that U. S. aid was inadequate 
to South Korea's needs. At the same time, he was dissatisfied with the arrangement 
under which the aid was administered directly by U. S. officials who concentrated too 
much on relief measures and consumer goods rather than on production and 
recons c ion. 
58 
During this period it was difficult to distinguish military from U. S. economic aid. 
In most cases, the two were so inter-related that the UNC had to control and advise 
n, k about aid programmes. Rhee and his government sincerely desired to use the aid for 
56 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central File Series, 
OCB 3 87.4 Korea [Armistice] (File #2) 3, OCB File No. 26,2 December 1954. 
57 KPRý 761.42 US/332, U. S. -ROK Economic Cooperation, Joseph J. Caputa, Acting Economic 
Coordinator of the UNC to Mr. Paik, ROK Economic Coordinator, 19 January 1955; 'Auction on 28 
February 1955 of UNC military aid dollars for Ministry of Defence requirements', Paik to President 
Rhee, 2 March 1955; Paik to Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator of the UNC, 2 March 1955. 
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exclusively economic development. In this instance, Rhee believed that counterpart 
funds, a large part of which had been used to support the South Korean forces, should 
be used only for economic reconstruction. 59 The Korean President was convinced that 
this conversion would build up a self-sustaining nation which was always his goal. 
However, in this period, as Washington had only considered the role of the ROK in the 
light of strategic policy for East Asia, the economic development of Korea was an 
indifferent matter. 
60 
Since the armistice, from one-half to two-thirds of the funds in the economic aid 
programmes, had been used for the importation of salable commodities, in order to 
arrest the violent inflationary movement which plagued Korea and to provide the local 
currency required for the support of all aid programmes. The emphasis in aid 
programmes was therefore upon price stability rather than capital investment and 
development. The U. S. policymakers realised that this anti-inflationary device might 
result in raising the consumption level of Korea to a point which could not be sustained, 
in future, by its own economy, particularly in the absence of an adequate economic 
development programme. 61 However, owing to the emphasis upon Korea's importance 
58 FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 23, part 2 (Korea), pp. 131-33, President Rhee to the Assistant Secretary 
Robertson, I August 1955. 
59 Together with other military and economic aid, the United States financed out of counterpart funds a 
deficit of $120-130 million in the Korean military budget. 
60 KPR, 729.54 1956/151, Rhee to UN Commander Lemnitzer, 30 March 1956; 761.52 US/337, 
Lenmitzer to Rhee, 25 April 1956. 
61 DDE Library, White House Office, National Security Council Staff, Council of Foreign Economic 
Policy (CFEF) Series, Box 12, Report on Foreign Economic Policy Discussions between United States 
Officials in the Far East and Clarence B. Randall and Associates, ' Some Observations on US foreign 
Economic Policy in East Asia with Particular Reference to Korea', December 1956. 
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from a military point and ignorance of economic development of Korea by Washington, 
Korea's capital and production investment would be postponed until the Third 
Republic, led by President Chung-hee Park, initiated long-term economic plans, which 
would be ignited by Japanese compensations and loans. 
During the 1953-1957 period, economic growth rose to about 5% per annum, 
which was considered a reasonable rate. During the 1958-1960 period, growth was 
substantially slower. These differences between the two periods stemmed from aid 
flows which peaked during 1957 and then started to decline. 62 A client state should 
expand its financial capacity via external resources such as foreign aid. The external 
channel of financing is an important link between patron and client states, and this aid 
increases the client state's internal autonomy through its domestic distribution 
process. 63 Te amount of U. S. aid was cut down from 1958, aggravating the financial 
problems of Rhee's Government. Even though it was clear that the reduction was part 
of a U. S. aid policy, the U. S. was likely to cut the amount of aid for the purpose of 
destabilising Rhee's Government, which had been seriously considered by Washington 
policy makers, and to replace it with one which would comply with U. S. policy. 
From the last quarter of Rhee's rule, South Korea encountered a drastic cut in 
economic and military aid from the U. S. even though the South Korean government 
delivered a fervent hope that no such reduction should be made. 64 When military and 
62 Anne 0. Krueger, The Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), pp. 41-42. 
63 C. Carney, 'International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework', Studies in 
CoMpaLrative Intemational Developmen, 24 (1989), p. 49. 
64 KPF, 773.1 US 1958 Han V. 1/414, Minister Pyo Wook Han, Washington, to President Rhee, 3 April 
1958. 
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economic assistance decreased in the late 1950s, a serious fiscal crisis took place and 
the economy went into a recession, whereby Rhee's political power was wrecked. 
Owing to his dependence upon American aid programmes, Rhee could not avoid 
U. S. control over Korean decision-making. The bulk of American grant-in-kind aid to 
South Korea was appropriated as Mutual Security Funds in the 1950s. The size and 
composition of the South Korean budget was calculated based upon certain goals 
mutually agreed to by the two governments and on advice and screening by the 
Military Assistance Advisory Group to Korea on an annual basis. The aid mission and 
South Korean government representatives in turn determined what was required to 
maintain an agreed economic growth and defence level, and then set a level for 
economic assistance. Special conferences on Korean budgets were held regularly in the 
United States Embassy in Seoul. It was a decisive factor to raise the question of 
sovereignty. No matter how much money Korea had been given from the U. S., that the 
conference was held in the American Embassy was a crucial matter. 65 
The only comprehensive and systematic state economic programme during 
Rhee's Government was made up of activities surrounding the allocation of annually 
appropriated American aid. Between 1954 and 1960, about 50% of South Korea's 
annual national budget derived from American foreign aid sources, equaling the annual 
budget for the South Korean military establishment. This foreign assistance enabled the 
ROK to maintain a huge number of military forces for the defence of its own and U. S. 
65 KPR, 761.52 US/337, Informal Minutes of IST Special Conference on Budgetary Problems, 20 August 
1958. In this meeting, major attendants were: Ambassador Walter C. Dowling and UN Commander 
General George H. Decker for American side, and Reconstruction Minister, Defence Minister, Commerce 
Minister, and Agriculture Minister for Korean side. In the course of meeting, they dealt with various 
national problems-financial stabilisation programme, balanced budget, anti-corruption bill, and so on. 
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interests in East Asia. At that time, the South Korean economy was still considerably 
dependent upon the United States. Korean exports were quite small, amounting from 
$22 million in 1957 to $20 million in 1959. For almost a decade South Korea imported 
approximately ten times more than it exported. The deficits were made up by American 
aid. 66 
A substantial reduction in U. S. economic assistance not only reduced the 
availability of counterpart funds for support for the ROK military budget, but also 
inevitably reduced the already low living standards and increased opposition to 
President Rhee and his administration. Accordingly, such an economic aid shortage 
caused Rhee's Government's domestic politics to become unstable because the 
discretionary allocation of aid and imports was a political instrument for Rhee, who 
faced a growing political challenge from the opposition in the late 1950s. 
Rhee's Authoritarian Rule and Dispute with the U. S. 
Democracy was considered an aspect of U. S. -South Korean political relations. 
After the Korean War, U. S. policymakers planned to make South Korea a showcase of 
democracy in Asia. Following the cease-fire, Rhee's position was undermined by his 
66 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 
Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 29, NSC 6018, U. S. Policy toward Korea, 28 November 1960; 
Korean Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1969 (Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 
1969), p. 275. South Korea's foreign trade balance was almost 
ludicrously unfavourable and the Korean 
economy was extremely 
dependent upon large-scale U. S. aid. Thus, over 90 percent of Korea's imports 
were financed by U. S. aid and 
U. S. defence expenditures in Korea. 
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dispute with the U. S. over the Agreed Minute in 1953 and 1954,67 and his attempt to 
amend the constitution in 1954 to maintain political power. Washington often 
considered the issue of the succession of Rhee's Presidency because of his advanced 
age and his intractable stance against the U. S. For the United States, however, the main 
deterrent to a change in Rhee's position was that there were no alternative leaders with 
Rhee's prestige and charisma. 68 The United States believed that Rhee's departure from 
office would usher in a period of increased political instability; regardless of who 
succeeded Rhee, a successor regime should have to be more cooperative with the 
United States and less intransigent in its dealings with Japan. 69 
At the outset of 1954, Rhee's Government disclosed its long-term primary 
domestic political objectives for keeping its power. The continued existence of the 
Communist regime in North Korea offered Rhee's Government an excuse to usurp the 
power of the legislature. In this sense, communism not only constituted a visible, 
67NA 
I RG 59, FE 
files, lot 55 D 480, UN Commander Hull to Ridgway, the Chief of Staff, US Army, 8 
November 1954. In order to cope with Rhee's continued unwillingness to cooperate with U. S. policy in 
Korea, U. S. decision makers arranged an integrated plan which contained four series of actions, designed 
to develop mounting pressures on Rhee's Government. Each of the actions contained economic, military 
and political measures which would be implemented to the extent and at the rate necessary to induce 
Rhee's cooperation with U. S. policy. The specific measures among those recommended were as follows: 
(a) in military relations, slow-down of military programme, announcement of the possibility of 
redeployment of the U. S. forces from Korea, withdrawal of all U. S. and UN forces; (b) 
in economic 
relations, reduction or suspension of all economic aid programmes; (c) in political relations, reducing 
U. S. relations with Rhee's Government to the minimum level, and increasing contacts with 
Rhee's 
political opponents and Korean military commanders, who would 




1952-54, vol. 15, pp. 1914-15, Briggs to Dulles, 9 November 1954. 
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external, physical threat to democracy in South Korea but also accelerated the 
formulation of an extreme rightist autocracy in a country that was supposedly 
democratic. At the National Assembly elections of 20 May, the government's 
interference in varying degrees was widespread and, combined with the police action 
prior to the election day, substantially affected the outcome. Censure of the election 
procedures for the one-party trend would be a sign of the beginning of unstable Korean 
politics. The United States did not voice its ill-favoured statement not only to avoid 
Rhee's criticism against American interference, but also to have the Korean political 
conference under consideration, which was currently in session. Washington appraised 
the developments in Indo-China which helped prevent the Korean elections from 
becoming an issue at Geneva. 70 
In November 1954, there was a crisis when a constitutional amendment was 
forced through the legislature to remove the prohibition on a third term for President 
Rhee. Rhee pushed again as in the 1952 constitutional crisis. 
71A 
constitutional 
69 FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 23, pp. 216-17, Editorial Note. 
70 NA, RG 59,795. B. 00/7-1457, Ambassador Briggs to the State Department, 14 July 1954. 
71 The confrontation between Rhee and his political enemies in 1951-1952 was a watershed in Korea-U. S. 
relations. The constitution provided for the election of the President by the National Assembly in 1952, 
but the Assembly was increasingly critical and hostile towards Rhee. The idea of a Constitutional 
amendment to establish a parliamentary government was again discussed, such as the proposal of 
amendment of 1950. Rhee wanted a constitutional amendment of his own for the direct popular election 
of the President and Vice President. In October 195 1, Rhee's Government put forward proposals for 
direct presidential elections and for a bicameral legislature, but the proposals failed when voted on in 
January 1952. On 7 May 1952 the Assembly announced a constitutional amendment to establish a quasi- 
parliamentary system. An Assembly election for President would not rettim Rhee to office. Rhee took an 
initiative for a new constitutional amendment on 14 May when the vote on the 7 May proposal 
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amendment was formally proposed by the Government which would remove the two- 
term limitation, and in order to simplify government, the abolition of the prime 
ministerial position. In the vote on 17 November, there was a strong opposition to the 
amendments and 135 members supported it out of the total membership of 203. Since 
the required two-thirds was 136, it was declared a failure. However, Rhee and his 
supporters forced a reinterpretation, known as "round to the nearest whole number. " 
Rhee signed the amendments and promulgated them on 30 November 1954. 
At the beginning of 1955, with Rhee's stubbornness against U. S. policy, 
Washington policy makers decided that the U. S. should assist a new leadership to 
approached. He inspired a goverm-nent-organised demonstration designed to intimidate opposition 
Assemblymen, and notified the U. S. Ambassador that he could not leave office in the midst of the 
Korean War. Rhee declared that there was a subversive plot to have Myon Chang elected President, who 
would then form a coalition government and one willing to deal with North Korea to end the hostilities 
and unify Korea. Rhee declared martial law without consulting the UNC. A campaign of intimidation and 
harassment against the National Assembly continued for a month and 12 Assemblymen were arrested for 
participation in a vague Communist plot without clear evidence. Rhee threatened to dissolve the 
Assembly even though he had no such power under the current constitution. At last, Rhee had his own 
objective with a few minor compromises. The presidential election was held on 6 August and Rhee won 
74.6 percent of the popular vote. There was considerable resentment among the opposition and 
Koreans 
against the U. S. for not intervening actively in the 1952 crisis. At the time, the 
decision was made at a 
high level within the Truman administration not to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
ROK. This 
decision was caused by a number of reasons: in particular, Rhee was engaged 
in an all-out campaign 
against an armistice, partly to improve chances for his re-election; with continued 
large-scale fighting on 
the battle fields, U. S. military commanders were reluctant to get involved 
in political controversy which 
might affect the security of their rear areas; and there was apprehension 
in Washington that opposition to 
Rhee might result in public and Congressional negative reaction who 
had admired his firm anti- 
communism. 
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assume power, by means of U. S. overt support when necessary, and should promise to 
be decisive in firmly establishing a new leadership. 72 This plan would be substantially 
carried out during the fall of the Rhee regime in 1960. 
The consequence of these developments in November 1954 was a strong trend 
towards a two-party system. A new, enlarged opposition party, the Democratic Party, 
emerged in September 1955, and managed to surmount its internal differences until it 
took power in 1960 after the fall of Rhee's regime. 73 The trend was demonstrated in the 
presidential election in 1956, and termed by the U. S. Embassy in Korea a turning point 
in Korean politics. At the outset of 1956, the U. S. was concerned about the 
development of Korean political stages. The minor opposition party mounted a vigorous 
campaign for its candidates, ex-Assembly Chairman Ik-hi Shin for President and ex- 
Prime Minister Myon Chang for Vice President, against Rhee and Ki-poong Lee 
respectively, for the Liberal Party. 74 There was a surprising degree of press freedom, 
and a relative reduction of the traditional official pressures on the electorate and 
candidates. This was a direct result of Rhee's recognition that his extreme anti-U. S. and 
anti-NNSC positions of 1953 and 1954 had lost American support. The atmosphere of 
W- 3 
Korea s first real political contest for the presidency was greatly heightened 
by the 
sudden death of Candidate Shin, ten days before the election. As the vote count catne in 
on 15 May, it was clear that President Rhee would be re-elected, but the vice- 
presidential vote was extremely close. There were rumors of opposition plans 
for 
violence, in conjunction with the impending funeral ceremony of Shin, if the election 
72 FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 23, p. 37, Gleason to Dulles, 18 February 1955. 
73 Tae Su Han, 'A Review of Political Party Activities in Korea, 1955-1960', Korean Affairs, 1 (1962), 
pp. 412-417. 
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results were found to be rigged. In these circumstances, the American Embassy officials 
IT ap roached the opposition leaders to avoid violence. 75 Rhee's Government was warned 
by the American Embassy that manipulation of the vote count would have serious 
domestic consequences. The Korean government also perceived the adverse domestic 
and international repercussions if it manipulated a vote count. As a result, Ki-poong Lee 
was defeated by the opposition candidate Myon Chang who, therefore, assumed his 
office. Notwithstanding his victory, the result outweighed the losing of Rhee's prestige 
in Korean politics. Whereas Rhee had received 74.6 percent of the total vote in 1952, 
the 1956 elections revealed stronger popular opposition to Rhee and the ruling Liberal 
Party because he received only 55.6 percent of the popular vote. In this connection, 
Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), estimated that serious 
consequences would occur if Rhee "resorted to force to gain his ends. , 76 
In spite of a rather startling decline in Rhee's influence, he and his associates 
moved against the growing threat to their power. Rhee did not show any change in his 
policies. He utilised his two main power bases-the police and the local bureaucracy, 
and the Liberal Party under Ki-poong Lee-as loyal instruments of his will. The U. S. 
Embassy was worried about Rhee's misunderstanding of the election's outcome and 
predicted that his inflexible Political patterns would create increasing danger of trouble 
ahead. 77 The U. S. policyrnakers recognised that the election in May was a major 
74 FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 23, p. 268, Editorial Note. 
75 Donald Stone Macdonald, U. S. -Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance (Boulder: 
Westview 
Press, 1992), pp. 166-168. 
76 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 287hNSC Meeting, 'Significant World Developments 
Affecting U. S. Security', 7 June 1956. 
77 NA, RG 59,611.95B/6-2956, American Embassy, Seoul, to the State Department, 29 June 1956. 
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political overturn which could lead to the opposition's inheriting power, combined with 
popular dissatisfaction. More importantly, they concluded that Rhee had failed to 
furnish South Korea the constructive leadership necessary for the achievement of 
American objectives in Korea. 78 
Following the 1956 elections, Rhee considered preventing Vice-president 
Chang's accession to the presidency in case of the incapacity of the president for any 
reason like a demise, and to establish greater parliamentary control . 
79Rhee reshuffled 
his cabinet and military leadership to install his firm supporters, and to have the 
National Police under the command of a heavy-handed officer who kept personal 
allegiance to him. The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps and the other major internal 
security force remained under Rhee's direct control. 80 
78 FRUS, vol. 23, p. 291, Nes to Parsons, 12 July 1956. 
79 Ibid., pp. 301-302, note 2,3 and 4. Chang's inauguration statement, which was critical of the South 
Korean democratic situation and indicated that his role was to act independently of President Rhee if 
necessary on domestic matters, prompted the fierce denunciation of Chang in the National Assembly and 
in pro-government newspapers. At the meeting with an officer of American Embassy on 28 August, 
Chang told him that the ruling Liberal Party leaders were planning to "eliminate him from the scene. " 
Chang asked whether he could count on sanctuary in U. S. installations if the threat to his life increased. 
At another meeting with Chang on I September, new American Ambassador Dowling, who presented his 
credentials on 14 July, forwarded his assumption to Chang by way of the officers that Chang's political 
career would be irreparably damaged by an attempt to seek refuge in an American installation, and that 
the position of the United States in Korea would also be damaged. The officer assured Chang that if a 
genuine threat to him developed, the U. S. would exert influence to try to prevent such development. 
80 FRUS, vol. 23, pp. 334-337, Editorial Note. In order to seize the Korean forces defmitely, Rhee 
shifted 11 Kwon Chung, former Army Chief of Staff, who had shown himself as more amenable to U. S. 
guidance, to the Chairmanship of the JCS, which was a position of less military influence. Another action 
tending to reduce the influence of General Chung was a major reshuffle of anny general officers initiated 
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In late 1957, the growing Liberal party division between the moderate and hard 
factions became evident in debates over revisions to the election law. Mounting 
opposition popularity posed the real danger of a Liberal Party defeat in the forthcoming 
1958 Assembly elections and in the 1960 presidential election as well. The first major 
move against the progress of Korean politics was the arrest of Bong-am Cho, leader of 
the Nationalistic and Progressive Party 81 before the 1958 Assembly elections. 
On 14 January 1958, shortly before the campaign for the National Assembly 
began, Cho was arrested on charges of violation of the National Security Act, which 
had a peaceful unification policy similar to the North Korean unification proposal, 82 
combined with the doubtful nature of Cho's disavowal of Communist connection. 
by the new successor General Hyong Kun Lee, and approved by Rhee. Rhee took these actions partly 
because of concern over the failure of certain elements of the army to give its full support to him and the 
Liberal Party in the May elections, and because of the potential challenge to his position by General 
Chung, who had been known to be pro-American. 
81 Cho had been an active communist but renounced his past action, and was elected as one of the small 
number of non-Rightists in the 1948 constituent assembly. A man of considerable charisma and ability, 
Cho remained politically active, and in 1955 he organised a socialistically-oriented Progressive Party. 
Cho won 2,164,000 votes in the 1956 presidential elections not only because of the Democratic candidate 
Shin's untimely death, but also because of the attractive party slogan, which proclaimed advocacy of 
steps towards peaceful unification, which directly encountered Rhee's forceful reunification policy. Until 
then, all South Koreans were forced to believe that the only method of reunification was 
based on a 
military way. To make matters worse, the opposition Democratic party too was suspicious of 
Cho's 
possible secret ties with North Korea. When Rhee's Government moved against 
Cho, the Democrats were 
of no concern to help. 
82 NA, RG 59,795.00/1-1358, Intelligence Note on the arrest of the Progressive Party leaders, 13 January 
1958. Dulles was informed by this intelligence note that Although Cho's political views were 
far to the 
left of Rhee's there was no evidence to support the allegation that 
he was engaged in subversive activities. 
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However, the actual indictment was based upon charges of espionage not only due to 
the weakness of the subversive case, but also due to the Korean government's 
sensitivity towards the international reaction that might have resulted from the use of 
the peaceful unification issue. The arrests indicated fear of Cho's personal popularity 
and apprehension about the increase in popular sentiment favouring a peaceful 
83 unification and towards the Progressive Party's socialist platform. On 13 June the 
prosecution demanded the death penalty for Cho and prison sentences for the other 22 
defendants. The United States was concerned about the death sentence against Cho. The 
Embassy in Seoul was instructed to "immediately unofficially bring Washington's 
serious concern" to influential Korean officials in seeking to avoid the death sentence 
on Cho. 84 Despite U. S. apprehension, on 25 October 1958 the appellate court imposed 
the death sentence under obvious political pressure whereas the district court had 
sentenced Cho to five years imprisonment. Ambassador Dowling, at Washington's 
instruction, called on powerful leading members of Rhee's government and party to ask 
for a withdrawal of Cho's execution. After the meeting with highly powerful 
governmental members, Dowling was confident that the Supreme Court would reverse 
the decision of the appellate court. However, the former upheld the latter's decision on 
27 February 1959. Dowling's endeavour was unfruitful. On 31 July 1959, Cho was 
executed abruptly. The execution resulted from a decision of the hard faction of the 
Liberal party to impress the opposition with their deten-nination to preserve political 
83 ERUS, 1958-60, vol. 18, pp. 433-434, Parsons to Jones, 3 February 1958. 
84 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/6-1958, Embassy in Seoul to State Department, 19 June 1958; 795B. 00/6-2058, 
State Department to Embassy in Seoul, 20 June 1958. 
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power. This execution made it clear that Rhee and his hard line supporters had 
abandoned any prospect of restoring their popularity by relying on liberal measures. 85 
As the 1960 presidential elections approached, Democratic Party leaders were 
confident of winning, if the elections were to be completely fair. Rhee's Government, 
however, was determined to retain power by every available meansý including 
repressive and illegal measures. In the face of growing opposition power, the moderates 
of the Liberal Party were unable to resist the growing power of a hard faction in the 
Liberal party. They were determined to prevent the transfer of political power to the 
Democrats through constitutional processes as the 1960 presidential election 
approached. The United States was worried by the situation that should the forthcoming 
presidential elections be dominated by governmental pressures and intimidation 
designed to deny the opposition party a fair opportunity, the opposition would then 
adopt a programme of extreme harassment and obstructionism or even turn to more 
desperate counsels advocating a radical change in the government. In terms of the U. S. 
objectives of encouraging the long-term growth of democracy and achievement of 
political stability, the character of the 1960 presidential elections in South Korea was 
more important than the outcome of the elections. 86 
The struggle focused on the struggle for a proposed amendment to the National 
Security Law from the autumn of 1958 to the spring of 1959. This struggle laid the 
groundwork for the demise of Rhee's Government in 1960. The original draft 
amendment to the law, introduced on 5 August 1958, was purportedly aimed at 
85 Ibid., 795B. 00/7-258, Telegram 915 from Embassy in Seoul, 2 July 1958; 79513-00/10-2758, Telegram 
189 from Embassy in Seoul, 27 October 1958; 795B. 00/1 1-458, Telegram 206 from Seoul, 4 November 
1958. 
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Communist subversion but permitted tightened restrictions on political activities and 
press freedom. The American Embassy was concerned that the loosely-drafted bill 
could be a threat to Korean civil liberties and it called into question the U. S. objective 
in terms of American-style democracy. The American Embassy contacted various 
government and Liberal party leaders to make them aware of the serious consequences 
from the international perspective. In accordance with Dowling's recommendation, the 
State Department conveyed the American Government's concern about Korea's 
international position regarding the current controversy over certain provisions of the 
87 Law affecting freedom of the press and political activities. This wholesome advice 
infuriated Rhee, who saw it as an intervention in Korean internal affairs and an example 
of the American Embassy's support for the opposition. 88 On 19 December, the Liberal 
89 
members passed the bill. Since the success or failure of the American attempt to curb 
the Korean government's repressive measures would decide the political future of 
South Korea, Ambassador Dowling urged Washington to stimulate critical reaction in 
the American press so as to influence Rhee and his government officials, who were 
86 NA 5 RG 595 795B. 00/12-158, Embassy 
in Korea to the State Department, I December 1958. 
87 KPR, 773.1 US/405, Information no. 448b, Yang to Rhee, 4 December 1958; NA, RG 59,795B. 00/12- 
558, Ambassador Dowling to Assistant Secretary Robertson, 5 December 1958; 795B. 34/12-658, 
Robertson to Dowling, 6 December 1958. 
88 FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 18, pp. 515-517, Korean Revised National Security Law, 12 December 1958. 
89The National Security bill was passed without change by the ruling party members of the Assembly 
Legislation-Justice Committee in a three-minute session. When all opposition Assembly members 
gathered into committee a few minutes later, the Liberals seized the opportunity to cut off further 
committee discussion. 
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particularly sensitive to such criticism, to eliminate the restrictive press provisions. 90 At 
the same time, Dowling was extremely concerned about the possibility of Rhee's 
attempt to gag the political opposition in advance of the 1960 elections unless there was 
a strong reaction from the United States. Unequivocally, if Rhee's Government 
succeeded in the enactment of the present version of the amendment, the United States 
would run a grave risk of a serious loss of its ability to influence South Korea. 
Unfortunately, events in Seoul moved too fast for Eisenhower's message to have 
any effect on Rhee. 91 On 24 December, while opposition Assemblymen were forcibly 
confined to the Assembly restaurant by Assembly guards reinforced by police, Liberal 
Party members passed the National Security Law 128-0 with only inconsequential 
amendments. The American Embassy viewed both the content of the law and the 
manner of its passing as a grave setback to the development of Korean democracy. 92 
Hearing this news, the State Department made a statement to the press on 24 December, 
hoping that the Law would not be used to hinder democratic development. However, 
this statement reflected U. S. cautious and passive views on ROK developments. 
90 FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 18, p. 518, Embassy in Seoul to State Department, 20 December 1958. 
In this period, Rhee's Government believed that Ambassador Dowling and his staffs' positive activities 
in Korean domestic affairs were caused by the orders from their superior officials in the State 
DeparUnent. 
91 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 37, Eisenhower to Rhee, 25 December 
1958. On 25 December, Eisenhower expressed his deep concerns about the manner in which the Law was 
adopted by the National Assembly. However, this letter did not include strong U. S. concern and 
objections against the Security Law. 
92 NA, RG 59,795B/21/12-2458, Dowling to Herter, 24 December 1958. The refusal to permit the senior 
U. S. Embassy officer to attend the National Assembly proceedings on the National Security Law made 
Washington disturbed about the manner in which the law was passed. 
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Washington policy makers did not want to involve the Eisenhower administration in 
93 acrimonious debate with the Korean government. At the meeting with Dowling, who 
delivered Eisenhower's message of 25 December, 94 Rhee commanded his well-known 
skill of evasion, and misled Dowling in understanding that he would correct this 
regretful incident vis-a-vis the Law. 95 A few days later, Rhee's response to 
Eisenhower's message vividly revealed his true position over the development of the 
Law. He emphasised the inevitability of excluding the opposition during the adoption of 
the Law because those Assemblymen excluded had attempted to disrupt normal 
procee ngs. 96 Combined with the Eisenhower administration's effort, Congressmen 
Walter Judd, a close friend of Rhee, showed deep concern about the deplorable 
situation of Korean politics in order to induce Rhee's reconsideration of the law. 97 
93 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/12-2458, Herter to Dowling, 24 December 1958. 
94 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, International Series, Message from Eisenhower to Rhee, 
25 December 1958; Washington Evening Star, 5 January 1959. President Eisenhower pointed out to Rhee 
the painful impression the curtailment of 'civil rights' in Korea had had on the people of the United 
States. Rhee in turn pointed out that South Korea, like the Taiwanese government, was in a state of war 
with the Communists in the north; while Formosa was separated from the PRC by 100 miles by water, 
South Korea was within gun range of North Korea; and hence severe laws against espionage and 
subversion were as essential as keeping the army at the ready. Washington Evening Star, 5 January 1959. 
95 NA, RG 5% 795B. 21/12-2758, Dowling to Herter, 27 December 1958. As the President controlling 
Korean affairs both domestically and internationally, it was believed that Rhee knew the whole process of 
the Law. However, he pretended not to be aware of the illegal process of the Law. Confirming passing the 
law, he then showed his disengagement of the incident, where it made allowances for Rhee to engage in 
bargaining with the United States. 
96 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Rhee to Eisenhower, 7 January 1959. 
97 FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 18, pp. 525-526, State Department to the Embassy in Korea, 27 December 1958. 
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In terms of U. S. -South Korean relations, 1959 was bound to be a difficult year 
because possible U. S. influence would be likely to have an important effect on the 
forthcoming course of Korean political events-the 1960 presidential election. To 
prepare a concrete and detailed assessment of the Korean situation, Ambassador 
Dowling was recalled to Washington, and the American Embassy was instructed to 
confine U. S. contacts with Rhee's Government to the most essential activities during 
his absence, in order to reveal the U. S. annoyance with regard to the National Security 
Law. 98 However, Rhee himself was not swayed by these developments. Rhee and the 
tough faction of his party believed that regardless of actions they took domestically, the 
United States would have no choice but to support them. While exploiting the 
conservative congressmen and American Military General's advocating of the Law, 
Rhee had nurtured the impression that if he took a strong position, the U. S. would back 
down. 99 
The Eisenhower administration was unable to change the situation with the 
limited resources it was willing to employ. However, Washington began to contemplate 
98 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/1-759, State Department to Embassy in Korea, 7 January 1959; 795B. 00/1-1459, 
State Department to Embassy in Korea, 14 January 1959. 
99 KPR, 773.1 US/432, Letter no. 7, Han to Rhee, 21 January 1959; 773.1 US/427, Ambassador Yang to 
Rhee, 22 January 1959. In the House of Representatives on 19 January 1959, Congressman Walter Judd 
advocated the National Security Law because of South Korea's hostile situation with North Korea, and 
stated that the Law was purely to punish the tremendous number of communist subversive agents coming 
into South Korea. Persons like General Lemnitzer were also quite angry at some of the 
American 
newspapers' hostile criticisms. In these circumstances, Rhee was very suspicious that some of the 
State 
Department officials were feeding infonnation to the correspondents to impair his regime. Minister Han, 
Korean Embassy in Washington, informed Rhee that his close press friends received a great deal of 
critical information from State officials. 
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serious consequences in terms of U. S. interests in Korea, and believed that when Rhee 
was no longer on the scene, the Liberal Party would probably be unable to maintain 
control by forceful measures. In this respect, the American Embassy in Seoul strongly 
urged Washington to adopt a positive course of action towards the Korean goverment. 
This was to prevent the eventual use of authoritarian actions to suppress the opposition 
and curb the free press, which could endanger the achievement of U. S. objectives in 
South Korea to encourage a politically stable and militarily strong nation which was 
pro-U. S. and anti-Communist in character. 100 In response, Rhee attempted to convince 
Washington of his assurance not to misuse the Law and emphasised that the incidents 
vis-a-vis the Law concerned Korean internal affairs only. 101 Regarding his worries 
about U. S. concerns over Korean affairs, Rhee was convinced that Secretary Dulles and 
his office was determined to get rid of him and this conviction would cause a great 
impact on U. S. -ROK relations with oncoming development of Korean domestic 
politics. 
1 02 
Meanwhile, the U. S. government informally encouraged compromise between the 
two Korean parties because the impasse between Liberals and Democrats continued till 
January 1959. The American Embassy continued to compromise between the two 
parties with respect to revising the law during February and March. The 
United States 
government was concerned deeply, during this period, about the possibility that 
the 
Korean people might react strongly or even violently if the continued operation of 
100 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/1-2459, Dowling to Robertson, 23 January 1959. 
"' KPR, 773.1 US/426, Rhee to Yang, 28 January 1959. 
102 KPR, 773.1 US/43 1, Rhee to Minister Han, 29 January 1959; 773.1 
US V. 1/428, Infonnation No. 79, 
yang to Rhee, II March 1959. 
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democratic machinery by the majority party and minority parties was prevented. 103 
Following the National Assembly recess on 20 March, a series of inter-party talks 
started, but nothing substantial was accomplished due to the rigid positions held by 
either side, and bipartisan efforts collapsed in May 1959.104 
To make it more serious, Rhee's Government cancelled the publishing license of 
Korea's second largest newspaper, Kyunghyang Sinmun, which was closely identified 
with the opposition party. The Korean government's determined action on I May to 
keep Kygnghyang Sinmun closed, and the manner in which Pong-am Cho's death 
sentence was executed, clearly revealed the iron fist with which the goverment was 
prepared to suppress the political opposition in anticipation of the 1960 Presidential 
elections. The U. S. voiced its concern with respect to the freedom of the press, 
particularly in view of the fact that the controversy over the National Security Law had 
still been fresh in Congress and the American press. 105Ambassador Dowling continued 
to criticise Rhee's Government's undemocratic activities. Rhee was furious about the 
American Ambassador's defiance. 106 At the same time, the death of Dulles and 
Assistant Secretary Robertson's leave from the State Department made Rhee much 
103 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, OCB 
Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, 'Coordinating of Planning and Implementation of United States 
Programs in Korea, 16 February 1959. 
104NA 
ý RG 59,795B. 
00/1-3059, State Department to Embassy in Seoul, 30 January; 795B. 00/2-259, 
Embassy in Korea to the State Department, 2 February 1959; 795B. 21/2-1159,11 February 1959; 
795.00/4-2959,29 April 1959; 795B. 5/5-1159,11 May 1959. 
105 KPR, 773.1 US/432, Letter no. 71, Han to Rhee, 16 April 1959; 773.1 US/427, Yang to Rhee, 3 May 
1959; New York Times, editorial, 4 May 1959. 
106 KPR, 773.1 US/43 1, Letter no. 53, Rhee to Han, 13 May 1959. 
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more gloomy about coping with pending problems with the U. S. 
107 
In defiance of Rhee's Governinent's concern, Dowling warned Washington that 
unless a positive measure was taken against Rhee's Government, the U. S. would be in a 
difficult position vis-a-vis South Korea in the near future. He urged the United States to 
take positive actions, which, he believed, would have a major impact on Rhee and his 
government. The actions he recommended were: (a) the widest U. S. and international 
news and editorial coverage before and during 1960 elections; (b) visits by 
Congressmen and other prominent figures to deliver the U. S. 's serious concern and to 
persuade Rhee into returning to democratic rules; (c) emphasis by the United States 
Information Service (USIS) on the dissemination of information on the basic 
requirement of free elections and democracy; and (d) economic pressure. 108 The State 
Department agreed that these recommendations would be carried out in due time. 
Consequently, as an initial step, the Eisenhower administration undertook a complete 
review of the ROK police programme, and wamed Rhee that any further use of the 
police in election campaigns could result in the cessation of U. S. aid for the Korean 
police; the next step was to cut U. S. assistance to the Korean Office of Public 
107 KPRý 773.1 US/43 1, Letter no. 70, Rhee to Han, 9 June 1959. Although Rhee did not accept Dulles's 
Asian policy, especially with regard to Japan, he realised Dulles' talented ability as a Secretary of State 
and owed Dulles a great deal in U. S. Korean policy. Robertson was one of few top officials in 
understanding and advocating the South Korean position in the State Department. His 
leave meant a great 
loss to Rhee's influence on the Department that, Rhee believed, consisted of full supporters of Japan. 
Confronting the difficult position domestically and internationally, Rhee was concerned about the new 
Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, who had been well known for expertise about Europe but little 
about Asia. 
101 FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 18, pp. 585-589, Dowling to the State Department, 28 September 1959. 
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Information, which had become identified with the government suppression of 
oppositions, from $474,000 in 1959 to $167,000 in 1960.109 
In January 1960, the United States began to take a further stand against Rhee's 
regime, based on experience with 1959 crises-the North Korean deportation problem 
and the problem of U. S. -financed imports from Japan. The U. S. objective was to 
change ROK attitudes which directly affected U. S. interests. Accordingly, the new 
policy was applied to Korean relations with Japan, and to the problems of the Korean 
presidential election. 
On 3 February 1960, Rhee's Government formally announced the presidential 
election date of 15 March, which was considerably earlier than usual, intended to 
capitalise on the Liberal Party's advance preparations and to take advantage of the 
disorganisation in the faction-ridden opposition party. To make the Korean tormented 
democrats even more miserable, the opposition presidential candidate, Pyong-ok Cho, 
110 
died of cancer in the Walter Reed Hospital in Washington on 15 February. 
Nevertheless, the Korean government continued with campaign abuses. 
Shortly before the 1960 Presidential elections Washington decided that further 
steps to prevent the abuse of democratic processes in Korea should be carried out with 
the intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign sovereign state. This was under the 
assumption that the presidential elections would stimulate Rhee's Government's serious 
attack on the operation of democratic institutions and processes 
in the ROK, and also 
boost Rhee's intransigent attitude towards the impending question of ROK-Japanese 
109 Ibid., pp. 589-594, Parsons to Herter, 22 October 1959. 
110 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/2-460, Embassy in Seoul to the State Department, 4 February 
1960; DDE 
Library, White House office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Intemational 
Series, Progress Report: Korea, 
Week of 1-5 February and Week of 15-19 February 1960. 
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relations. "' On the domestic scene in Korea, tension was heightened by increasing 
incidents and violence claiming some lives. To be more precise, there was the outbreak 
of student demonstrations, which was considered significant as this was the first act 
against the government since the establishment of the ROK. 1 12 The student 
demonstrations reflected substantial popular dissatisfaction with Rhee's regime and 
became a presage of the forthcoming student uprising which would result in Rhee's 
resignation. 
The election resulted in an overwhelming majority for Rhee and his running mate, 
Ki-poong Lee, who ran unopposed after the death of Democratic candidate, receiving 
approximately 90 percent of the votes. Rhee's running mate defeated the opposition 
candidate Myon Chang. The elections were marked by violence, intimidation and 
fraudulent counting. There was a tremendous outcry in the American press. The crude 
and violent manipulation of the election results meant that the people were denied the 
last legal channel for expressing their political views. The accumulated resentments of 
the Korean people exploded in the city of Masan, located in the southeastern part of 
Korea, with a major civil disorder. A number of people were killed and many more 
injured as demonstrations stepped up into hostilities between the police and the 
demonstrators. Other clashes between police and demonstrators took place in many 
other cities during 15-16 March. When the ROK Army requested permission to use its I 
troops to restore orderý the UNC decided to give its consent. 
113 
111 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/3-1060,1960 Presidential Elections in the Republic of Korea, 10 March 1960. 
112 EFRUS, 1958-60, vol. 18, Embassy in Seoul to the State Department, 12 March 1960. 
113 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 437th NSC Meeting, 'Significant World Developments 
Affecting U. S. Security', 17 March 1960; White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International 
Series, Box 9, Progress Report: Korea, Week of 14-18 March 1960. The State Department was concerned 
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Washington's initial reaction to the election was stronger action against the Rhee 
regime, led by the new Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, who called in 
Ambassador Yang and handed him a firmly-worded aide-memoire dealing both with 
election abuse and with the intransigent ROK attitude towards Japan. Herter delivered 
Congressional and American public reaction about the election, which might adversely 
affect the American aid programme to Korea. ' 14 Rhee's Government's reaction was not 
encouraging, even though Rhee changed the Home Secretary and some high ranking 
officers. Rhee once again called for "a march north for unification" slogan, which was 
no longer effective for strengthening Korean unity. The reaction to such undemocratic 
activities by the Korean goverranent caused greater anti-govemment feeling than at any 
time since the founding of South Korea. Concurrently, President Eisenhower did not 
congratulate Rhee on his fourth term of election and there was mounting Congressional 
criticism of Korea's police-state tendencies. 115 
In these circumstances, the United States decided to discard the passive American 
conduct towards the Korean government. As a first substantial move, the dedication of 
a new fertiliser plant provided by the American aid programme was deferred. However, 
the new Ambassador, Walter P. McConaughy, was worried about the situation, in 
which Rhee exploited one U. S. agency or department against another in Washington as 
over CINCUNC's release of operational control of the ROK forces apparently without coordinating with 
the Embassy regarding the political implications of such an action. 
114 KPRý 773.1 US 1960/1358, Letter no. 123, Han to Rhee, 17 March 1960. 
115 KPR, 773.1 US 1960/1360, Telegram no. WM-0357, Korean Embassy in Washington to Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1960. President Rhee received warm messages from leaders of Asian nations 
such as the Philippines' President Carlos Garcia, Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwanese China, and Viet Nam's 
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well as in Seoul if they were not fully harmonised with each other concerning Korean 
affairs, and in which there was an inadequate coordination by the Executive with 
Congress. Rhee and his government regarded the State Department position as not 
necessarily that of U. S. Government as a whole. ' 16 
Prior to the U. S. efforts to control the Korean chaotic situations as set forth, an 
unexpected and stirring incident broke out on 12 April. The body of a student rose to 
the surface at Masan harbour, with grenade fragments driven through the right eye. 
Approximately forty thousand demonstrators rallied and went on a general offensive 
against the police, the ruling party office, and goverment buildings. Rhee 
misunderstood the grave situation, and thought that this incident was ignited by 
Communist-oriented people or North Korean spies. 117 As the volatile Korean situation 
further deteriorated, Ambassador McConaughy strongly urged Washington to take 
drastic and tough measures openly unless Rhee's Government immediately followed 
the U. S. -recommended course of action. 
118 
Finally, on 19 April 1960, a very large demonstration.. led by Seoul National 
University students surged through Seoul and high school students joined in which 
instigated larger crowds to join in. This was called the 'Student Uprising' or the 
Ngo Dinh Diem. The U. S. Embassy in Seoul explained that "the U. S. never tendered congratulations on 
occasions of a political victory, but reserved them for the inauguration. " 
116 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/4-260, McConaughy to the State Department, 2 April 1960. 
117 Ibid., 795B. 00/3-2160,21 March 1960; DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff 
Secretary, International Series, Box 9, CIA Memorandum for the President, 26 April 1960. Allegations 
regarding communist participation in the South Korean political crisis would be repeated by Rhee's 
Government but Allen Dulles confmned that no credible evidence was received to substantiate any claims 
of corn_rnunist instigation or direct participation. 
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'Student Revolution'. About 100,000 students and ordinary people demonstrated in 
Seoul, and demanded admission to Kyung Mu Dae-the Presidential residence. As the 
Presidential residence guards fired at the demonstrators, a number of protesters were 
killed, which resulted in complete disorder in Seoul. A total of at least 115 people lost 
their lives and 730 were injured. Disorder was spreading throughout South Korea in 
general. Emergency martial law was instituted, and this allowed the UNC to release the 
15th Division of the South Korean Army in Seoul and several major important cities to 
cope with the situation. They stopped the rioting but explosive elements remained in 
the situation. ' 19 U. S. forces were placed on green alert requiring all personnel to remain 
on base. The American Embassy organised an emergency and evacuation committee as 
directed by the State Department. 120 
Washington reacted rapidly and issued an aide-memoire by Secretary Herter to 
Ambassador Yang on 19 April, forthrightly critical and implicitly threatening in tone, 
containing the most exceptionally severe criticism even made against the close ally. 
This indicated the fonnal U. S. view that these demonstrations reflected popular 
dissatisfaction over the election abuses and repressive measures unsuited to a free 
democracy. Washington demanded new elections from Rhee's Government to restore 
the confidence of the Korean people. 121 In conjunction with this aide-memoire, the U. S. 
118 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/4-1760, McConaughy to the State Department, 17 April 1960. 
119 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/4-1960,19 April 1960; 895B. 00/4-2260,22 April 1960. 
120 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Progress Report: 
Korea, Week of 18-22 April 1960. 
12 ' KPR, 701 1960/47 1, Information no. 192, Yang to Rhee, 21 April 1960; NA, RG 59,79513.00/4-1860, 
Herter to McConaughy, 19 April 1960; New York Times, 20 April 1960; Historical Office Bureau of 
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proclaimed that although the anti-government demonstrations were associated with 
Korean internal affairs, the U. S. government emphasised its role in Korean domestic 
affairs as patron's position. At a crucial moment of the Student Uprising, the U. S. 
government intervened publicly and loudly in the domestic situation in defence of the 
democratic rights of the Korean people. 
At the height of the disorders in Seoul, McConaughy issued a statement, 
requesting both demonstrators and the government authorities to restore and establish 
order, and acknowledging demonstrators' justifiable grievances. This American 
intervention in Korean affairs influenced the restoration of Korean esteem for the 
United States. President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter agreed that the United States 
had special justification for interfering in Korean affairs under the current situation, 
which, they believed, would seriously affect U. S. interests in Korea. 122 The Eisenhower 
administration chose the Korean people against the Rhee regime. The impact of this 
move by the U. S. government was immediate. The U. S. government went further than 
issuing its resolute concern. Even though allowing the Martial Law Command of the 
Korean Army to use tanks, General Carter B. Magruder, who had the operational 
control of the South Korean forces, did not allow live ammunition, thereby playing a 
positive role in furthering the cause of anti-govemment demonstration. During the 
tunnoil period until Rhee announced his resignation, the South Korean forces showed 
no intention of shooting at demonstrators. This was regarded as a decisive indication 
that the anti-government demonstration could destroy the Rhee regime. 
Public Affairs, A Historical SummM of United States-Korean Relations (Washington D. C.: U. S. 
Goverm-nent Printmg Office, 1962), p. 130. 
122 DDE Library, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations, 19 April 1960. 
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Ambassador McConaughy called to meet Rhee on the night of 19 April, who was 
obviously ill-informed on the serious situation by dishonest associates in the cabinet, 
and was not aware of the severity of these demonstrations. The American Ambassador 
made an effort to deliver the authentic nature of the situation to Rhee, but had a limited 
measure of success. This lack of recognition was also highlighted, when the 
Ambassador delivered the aide-memoire. Rhee insisted that the reason for the present 
turmoil was caused by Vice President Chang's treasonous attempt to destroy his 
government, and emphasised that the State Department's misunderstanding of the 
situation had made the demonstrations go further. 123 
The Eisenhower administration did not attempt to interfere in Korean domestic 
politics until the Student Uprising of 19 April broke out. Until then, Washington 
considered the presidential election of 15 March afait accompli even as escalating anti- 
government demonstrations expressed outrage at the rigged election. Unlike the passive 
attitude in the past, this U. S. criticism of Rhee's government was due to the fact that the 
current Korean situation was connected to the threats to U. S. security interests in the 
region. Fundamentally, Washington policyrnakers regarded the development of Korean 
democracy as being secondary, but in this situation, the U. S. was critical of the security 
of U. S. forces in Korea who would be involved in renewing hostilities ignited by the 
North Korean regime, which was keen to reunite Korea, manipulating South Korea's 
turmoil and instability. 
124 
123 KPR, 701 1960/471, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Yang, 19 April 1960; NA, RG 59, 
795B. 00/4-1960, McConaughy to the State Department, 19 April 1960. 
124 N,, e: w York Times, 22 April 1960; Christian Science Monitor, 26 April 1960; C. K. Moon, Hanmi 
AYi aebu [Anatomy of Korea-U. S. Conflicts] (Seoul: Nanam Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 30-32. _! 
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In the following days, Rhee did not fully realise the gravity of the situation until 
Vice-President Myon Chang resigned and two hundred university professors 
demonstrated calling for the resignation of Rhee and his government and the holding of 
new elections. 125 On 24 April, Rhee issued his withdrawal from partisan politics and his 
intention to serve the nation solely as its chief executive for the purpose of restoring 
confidence in his government, but Washington policy makers were sceptical that the ill- 
timed measure would be effective enough to restore people's reliance. 126 At the same 
time, the Eisenhower administration was somewhat cautious about Rhee's seeming 
attempt to divert public attention from the current situation by either attacking North 
Korea or initiating hostilities towards Japan. Furthermore, the Eisenhower 
administration considered a plan for isolating Rhee and his hard line faction in order to 
replace them with a new administration, as well as for action in the event of Rhee's fall 
or demise. Washington contemplated the contingencies, including a coup d'etat and a 
military takeover as a caretaker govemment. 127 
Although Rhee accepted the resignation of his cabinet as being responsible for the 
riots, he continued to brush aside the demands of the people and as a result 
demonstrations restarted in Seoul on 25 April and the climax came on 26 April 1960. 
Breathlessly dramatic events developed every day. While at least fifty thousand citizens 
demonstrated in Seoul, McConaughy urged Rhee's meeting with a delegation of 
demonstrators and issuing a statement on new elections. Shortly after meeting with the 
125 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/4-2360, McConaughy to the State Department, 23 April 1960. 
126 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, A synopsis of intelligence material for President 
Eisenhower, 25 April 1960. 
127 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/4-2160, Herter to McConaughy, 23 April 1960. 
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delegation, 128 Rhee offered to resign the Presidency; to hold a new elections; to have 
the Constitution amended to form a parliamentary responsible system; and to discharge 
Ki-poong Lee, who was the major party leader and the most powerful man after 
Rhee. 129 
During his meeting with Rhee, McConaughy, accompanied by the UN 
Commander Magruder, emphasised to Rhee the domestically dangerous and explosive 
situation and a further need for clarifying Rhee's statements. He went even further and 
called for Rhee's resignation of the presidency immediately to settle down all problems. 
The background of Rhee's determination to resign was considered to be his 
understanding of security uneasiness vis-a-vis the continued domestic agitation. 
However, the determination of his resignation was, in fact, dependent upon there being 
no alternative for him at that time. Following the Student Uprising of 19 April, whose 
success was evaluated as having followed on the Korean military's denial of using 
force, he tried to seek mutually agreeable compromising terms in continuing as a chief 
of state by the time of his resignation, but this attempt failed since the Korean people 
and opposition leaders did not accept it. 
Later the same day, the National Assembly, with hard line Liberals absent, 
unanimously accepted Rhee's resignation. The Assembly also resolved that the 
presidential election of 15 March was invalid; that a new election should be held; that 
the constitution should be amended to provide for a parliamentary system of 
government; and that elections for a new National Assembly should be held 
128 While meeting with group student representatives, Rhee told them that he would do whatever people 
wanted of him. Criticised by those representatives, he decided that the elections should be corrected. 
129 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/4-2660, McConaughy to the State Department, 26 April 1960. 
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immediately after passage of the constitutional amendment. 130 The next day Rhee 
submitted his resignation and Chung Huh, who had recently been appointed Foreign 
Minister, became Acting President in the interim government. Huh's great competence 
and genuine desire to reach an agreement in negotiations with Japan, contrary to the 
attitude displayed by Rhee, made Washington policy makers give credit to his 
presidency. 13 1 The United States anticipated that Rhee's resignation would improve but 
not solve the political difficulties in South Korea, but believed that Rhee's fall would 
bring about a turning point for Korean-Japanese relations. 132 
As Washington policy makers had anticipated, the Korean political development 
in the wake of Rhee's fall was gloomy. A number of top military officers were 
becoming interested in politics and were becoming quite politically conscious. In this 
respect, the U. S. government paid attention to the activity of Korean military officers. 
Furthermore, Acting President Huh apparently did not exercise vigorous leadership. 
Instead he was inclined to leave the initiative to the Assembly, which was then 
discussing constitutional reforms. However, the Liberal Party-controlled Assembly, 
where a number of Liberals were manoeuvreing to keep the possibility open for the 
return of Rhee to the Presidency, would result in a political instability. In this 
connection, the United States was irritated by Huh's lack of political initiative and 
leadership. The U. S. made an effort to bring Huh to call immediate presidential and 
vice-presidential elections and urged the resignation of the Assembly for the purpose of 
130 FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 18, pp. 644-45, Editorial Note. 
13 1 DDE Library, ANN Whitman File, NSC Series, 442 nd NSC Meeting, Significant World Developments 
Affecting U-S- Security, 28 April 1960. 
132 
_FRUS' 
Vol. 18, pp. 645-646, the State Department to the Embassy in Korea, 27 April 1960; Lbid., p. 
650, note 3. 
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his regaining political initiative' More than anything else, Washington's apprehension 
stemmed from the fact that Huh's incompetence led to the Korean people's frustration, 
setting the stage for new and more serious demonstrations than before, and which North 
Korea might be prepared to manipulate and renew hostilities. To make matters worse, 
Huh was believed to be endeavouring to maintain the Liberal Party in power and 
salvage the Rhee regime to every extent possible. Washington was much more 
concerned by an intelligence report on Rhee's involvement in government affairs and 
his influence on the interim government. 133 The United States was very apprehensive 
n, k about the implications that leftist and progressive elements could gain control of the 
South Korean government in the parliamentary system under the free and fair elections. 
Washington regarded this as very harmful for U. S. security interests in the region. 134 
Since Rhee's presence in Korea stimulated unsettling and destabilising situations, 
the Korean government decided that Rhee should leave Korea as quickly as possible. 
The Eisenhower administration granted Rhee political asylum in Hawaii even though 
this action might invite Koreans' misunderstanding that the United States had assisted 
Rhee to evade Korean law or judicial processes. On 29 May, Rhee left his country. 135 
Huh's interim government made the Eisenhower administration feel uneasy 
during the development of the Korean scene, particularly the dismissal of all Korean 
officers from the army. The U. S. military considered this step to be very serious 
because the caretaker government apparently did not care about the Korean military's 
133 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, OCB 
Series, Subject Subseries, Magruder to the JCS, 29 April 1960; NA, RG 59,795B. 00/5-360, Dillon to 
McConaughy, 4 May 1960; 795B. 00/5-560, Dillon to McConaughy, 7 May 1960. 
134 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/5-760, Herter to McConaughy, 10 May 1960. 
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discomfort or possible action against the Korean government. 136 On 15 June the 
National Assembly adopted a constitutional amendment bill, in which it established a 
bicameral legislature and a cabinet system of government. By the 29 July 1960 
elections, the Democratic Party won a major victory in the House of Representatives 
with 177 seats out of 233 electoral districts, while dominating the balloting for the new 
House of Councillors, with 31 out of 58 seats. However, the factional breakdown in the 
Democratic party itself was evident and this, in Washington's belief, could result in 
political instability and domestic turmoil in the absence of charismatic leadership such 
as Rhee's. Temporary unity was achieved when Bo-sun Yun of the old Democratic 
faction was elected to the ceremonial position of President. However, the split widened 
when Yun nominated another member of his faction to be Prime Minister, in which the 
nominee was defeated, and the new faction leader Myon Chang was nominated and 
confirmed by the House of Representatives on 19 August. 137 
The Second Republic was established by the Democratic Party in July 1960. In 
the early stages of Chang's Govemment, the United States gave full support, and 
Chang was ready to follow American advice in his economic and foreign policies. 
During the Second Republic of Korea, the United States exercised its full-fledged 
control over the Chang regime, which acquiesced in American demands for its 
135 FRUS, vol. 18, p. 663, Editorial Note. 
136 DDE Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, 447thNSC Meeting, 8 June 1960. 
137 NA, RG 59,795B. 00/6-1560, from the Embassy in Seoul, 15 June 1960; 795B. 00/7-2960,29 July 
1960; 795B. 00/8-1160,11 August 1960; 795B. 13/8-1960,19 August 1960; 795B. 13/9-1260,12 
September 1960. The factional tension within the Democratic Party was clarified by the cabinet 
appointments in which only two were designated 
for members of the old faction. The ensuing political 
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economic and foreign policies, which Rhee had previously resisted. After the fall of the 
Rhee regime, the United States had an opportunity to implement its strategic conception 
in East Asia. However, Chang's regime could not make visible progress with regard to 
normalised relations with Japan because of its shortcomings in domestic political 
power. 138 He encountered strong domestic opposition to hasty retreats on the fishery 
issue with Japan. At the same time, the worsening economic situation, mounting 
political instability, and unlimited idealistic freedom, overshadowed South Korea's 
problem with North Korea. 139 Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration was deeply 
worried by the seeming development of the ROK military leaders' concern over Korean 
politics in conjunction with national security. Washington's deep concern would be 
actualised by the military coup on 16 May 196 1. 
uproar led to the withdrawal of four new faction cabinet nominations and the appointment of four 
additional old faction members to the cabinet. 
138 The Second Republic's instability was based on the fact that the Democratic party was not one of the 
main groups involved in the revolutionary change in April 1960. The party did not have substantial 
coalition groups from the society. By adopting a new parliamentary system, the National Assembly 
became a forum for the struggle for bureaucratic power and incessant factional struggles between the old 
faction of former Korean Democratic Party members and the new faction of members joining the party in 
1955 within the ruling Democratic party. Faced with the disintegration of its party, the administrative 
capacity of Chang's cabinet was remarkably weakened by the perpetual factional disputes. On the other 
hand, various societal interest groups were highly mobilised during the ten months of Democratic party 
rule. There were more than two thousand street demonstrations in Seoul. 
139 DDE Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Records, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 29, NSC 6018, 'U. S. Policy toward Korea', 28 
November 1960. 
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In conclusion, the normalisation of diplomatic relations between South Korea and 
Japan was one of the main U. S. security objectives in the Far East during the 
Eisenhower administration. However, Rhee's tough resistance to normalised relations 
with Japan under American terms obstructed Washington's expectation of the early 
conclusion of an agreement between the two neighbouring countries. Rhee opposed any 
plans for American-Japanese cooperation in the military and economic sphere which 
would give Japan a stronger position in East Asian affairs. When the U. S. emphasised 
the strategic importance of anti-Communist arrangements in East Asia, requiring a close 
cooperation between Korea and Japan, Rhee asked for Washington's suspension of the 
Japanese build-up instead. Such a non-ideal client's stand seemed to provoke the 
United States to consider Rhee's removal when the Korean domestic situation started to 
deteriorate. 
After the Korean War, military and economic aid intensified South Korea's 
dependence upon the United States. Consequently, there was some strain between the 
U. S. and South Korea over a variety of issues. The tension was exaggerated by 
disagreement over what economic policies could be emphasised in the decision-making 
process. The U. S. objective was to focus on increasing domestic savings to substitute 
for aid and the imPortation of consumer goods to reduce the high inflation rate. Rhee's 
Government emphasised obtaining more aid and expanding productive capacity. In the 
Rhee Government view, the U. S. objective was rather astigmatic; from the U. S. point of 
view, the Korean objective was unrealistic. Although the Korean government asked 
for 
investment goods for economic growth, the U. S. provided consumer goods in order to 
maintain its anti-inflationary policy. The exchange rate 
became a point of conflict 
between the two countries. 
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Aid was the most significant leverage when the United States had to deal with 
Rhee's Goverment. The United States used aid as a weapon to force specific policy 
changes. Notwithstanding this leverage, Rhee's unyielding attitude to American 
economic policy towards South Korea heightened tension between the two governments 
even though Rhee reluctantly complied with U. S. demands in the end. 
The American policy of supporting the Rhee regime was based upon four 
considerations: (a) he had effective control in Korea, based upon his prestige, his own 
political shrewdness, and the inertia of an established system; (b) there seemed to be no 
other Korean who exercised effective leadership, and maintained political stability; (c) 
U. S. intervention in Korean political affairs, despite their obvious shortcomings from 
American perspectives, was risky and uncertain in its probable effect; and (d) there was 
a good deal of American sympathy for Rhee's firm anti-Communist posture. 
When ideological objectives dominate the patron's priority, it will seek to present 
the client to the world as a show case for the patron's ideology and political system. The 
United States regarded South Korea as one of the attractive and exultant models which 
it hoped would attract the Third World. However, such a hope degenerated. The United 
States had a great deal of concern about Rhee's undemocratic political activities which 
finther deteriorated with his authoritarian rule, but responded passively and took a 
prudent attitude in dealing with Korean domestic affairs. Since Rhee's anti- 
Communism was consistent with Washington's security interests in the 1950s, Rhee 
could enjoy firm support from the U. S. immediately before his fall, while severely 
damaging U. S. policy concerning the Korean Armistice, Korean-Japanese 
normalisation, and the development of Korean democracy. 
The U. S. discontent with Rhee was not only a phenomenon of the last period of 
the Rhee regime, but continued throughout, from the establishment of Rhee's 
293 
government to the fall of his regime. The resolve of Rhee's supporters to win the 1960 
presidential election by any necessary means, despite Rhee's declining popularity and 
mounting popular support for the opposition Democratic party, was manifested. The 
violent passage of the National Security Law, the closing of the leading opposition 
daily, KylMnghyang Sinmun, the execution of the Progressive Party leader Bong Am 
Cho, and the steady tightening at every level of Rhee's governmental and political 
control were all indications of the direction in which Rhee's Government was moving. 
As Rhee's Government continued to lose support in the Korean political theatres, 
there was much criticism of Eisenhower's Korean policy from American public opinion 
and liberal politicians. As a result, the U. S. goverment endeavored to put pressure on 
Rhee and his government to moderate their policies, but such pressures were 
increasingly ignored by Rhee. 
1 
Many officials in Washington, deeply involved in Korean 
affairs, were dissatisfied with continuing American inaction, and the Embassy in Korea 
warned Washington about the possibility of disorder if the trends of 1959 continued. 
But any course of the Eisenhower administration's action seemed feasible to reverse 
these trends. 
Before Rhee's goverment projected a rigged presidential elections on 15 March 
1960, the United States had expressed their concern about the National Security Law 
yL-g- and the cessation of publication of the opposition newspaper, Km hyang 
Sinmun, 
forced by Rhee's Government. However, these actions only reflected the U. S. 
standpoint, and with the view of not provoking Rhee's goverranent, even though 
Washington complained about the Korean situation. Consequently, such American 
methods did not succeed in transforming Rhee's government 
into accommodating the 
direction the U. S. wished for. On the contrary, Rhee attained his objective in Korean 
domestic politics through these events despite U. S. interference. As for the National 
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Security Law, the U. S. was given the Korean government's promise to conduct the law 
cautiously, which was to save Washington's face. Kyunighyang Sinmun resumed 
publication after the April Student Uprisings. Rhee succeeded in preventing U. S. 
intervention on Korean affairs until April 1960. 
However, with the advent of the April Student Uprising, Rhee's government 
changed its attitude and listened to American protest. The Korean government's altered 
position resulted from the fact that confronted with a toll of hundreds of dead and 
injured, the Korean goverranent was in a weak position to break the deadlock. 
Confirming the Korean populace's negative stance against Rhee's regime, Washington 
turned to a firm and unyielding position towards Rhee. 
The client state desperately needs its patron's support and, in many cases, 
provides extensive concessions to the patron state in exchange. The client state wants to 
tap into the patron's security resources without surrendering any measure of its 
autonomy. On the contrary, the patron seeks to exercise some measure of control over 
the client's political, economic, or geographic resources. Crises occur at the client level 
as small states pursue their own national priorities and security objectives which may 
not be compatible with the objectives of their patron states. The patron state attempts to 
accrue clients through which it can gain some form of advantage over its competitor. As 
long as Rhee did not follow U. S. security policy in the Far East vis-a-vis Japan after the 
Korean armistice, the United States had no choice but to look for another alternative to 
preserve its national and security interests in the region. With the advent of the Korean 
people's action against Rhee, which was viewed as successful, the Eisenhower 
administration took a drastic measure to support the demonstrators, rather than backing 
Rhee's regime. Unlike the situation of the Korean annistice, in which the United States 
accepted most of Rhee's demands in order to prevent a direct conflict between the 
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superpowers, a less strained environment both regionally and internationally gave the 
U. S. more room for exerting control over its uncooperative client, Syngman Rhee, and 
decide to give up its support for him. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, this thesis has identified certain prominent features of 
big power and small state relations in the paradigm of patron-client state relationships. 
This paradigm was applied to the relationship between the United States and South 
Korea during the Eisenhower-Rhee presidential period. 
Patron-client relationships are fundamentally unstable. This arises from the basic 
incompatibilities of their differing objectives. The patron tries to exert some degree of 
control over the client. This is not always favourable to the client, who on the other 
hand seeks security without surrendering any measure of its autonomy to the patron. 
This incompatibility is further reinforced by the dramatically different world views and 
the relative scope of their political visions. The patron state looks at the international 
system from an all-encompassing global perspective. It tries to understand the 
interactions between the different regions and its different bilateral relationships. By 
contrast, given the scope of its foreign policy interests, the client state has limited 
interests in international politics. More importantly, the client is more often confronted 
with threats to its national survival stemming from a variety of sources. On this 
account, two partners operate from a different framework with no common appreciation 
of the global implications of the superpowers' confrontation. 
The other characteristic of patron-client relationships forms the basis for the 
special goals the patron seeks. These goals dictate the patron's valuation of the 
relationship and the price the patron is willing to pay to maintain it. The client is a 
prominent factor in the patron's competitiveness. The more advantage the patron gains 
over its rivals through its association with its client, the more the patron will value the 
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relationship, often in apparent contradiction to the material benefits which the patron 
derives from the relationship. Under such circumstances, the patron may surrender a 
substantial measure of its political and military flexibility to the client in order to meet 
the client's demands, to ensure that the relationship endures, and to protect the 
strategically advantageous goals the patron perceives. When goals of strategic 
advantage dominate the patron's calculations, the client may enjoy a position of great 
influence in the relationship. In this relationship, there is some room for bargaining in 
the relations of asymmetrical military and economic dependency. The client state may 
be able to manipulate the patron state if the latter's vital interests are not at stake. 
As the Cold War intensified in the 1950s, small states within each bloc could 
manoeuvre to achieve their own interests as long as they stuck to the ideology of the 
superpowers. Each of the superpower's primary interest was in extending its own 
alliance amongst small and uncommitted states at the expense of its competitor and 
keeping its rival from expanding its influence amongst its own small allies. However, 
small allies required the existence of the other bloc so as to maintain their value as 
allies for their own bloc. Under these circumstances, small allies could convert the 
alliance with big Powers into an instrument of their po icies . 
The relationship between Rhee and the United States was much more complicated 
than simple compliance with the client state. Even though continuing support 
from the 
United States was indispensable to him, Rhee insisted on maintaining 
his own position 
on many policies and this led to conflict with the 
Eisenhower administration. Having 
had troubles with the armistice negotiations at the end of the Korean 
War, the United 
States realised that Rhee was not the ideal client. As Rhee realised 
that South Korean 
forces could not march north in pursuit of unification without 
American support, he had 
to concentrate on achieving more 
immediate objectives: obtaining a mutual security 
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pact with the U. S.; building military strength in South Korea sufficient to defend 
against renewed aggression; and obtaining economic aid to make his country self- 
sufficient. Even though Rhee's Government was under American influence, Rhee 
attempted to exploit the relationship. 
Rhee did so through a combination of unreliability and making concessions to 
U. S. demands. The bargaining tactics he employed were bluffs, threats, intransigence, 
and unpredictability. Once President Eisenhower was detennined to end the Korean 
War without victory by means of an armistice, Rhee threatened to withdraw his forces 
from UN control and to fight alone against the Communists until he unified Korea. He 
knew that if South Korean forces were used for unauthorised offensive operations, it 
would provoke Communist reprisals. Consequently, the armistice would be suspended, 
and so he would engage U. S. forces in ftirther combat. Rhee's threat to take unilateral 
action was less credible, but, at the same time, his propensity for rash action increased. 
Rhee knew that his conditions were not realistic, but equally worthwhile, since they 
presented a way in which South Korea could extract major concessions from the United 
States. 
When the big power depends on supportive actions by the small ally in order to 
advance its interests, the small ally increases its bargaining power not only in one issue 
but it can also use this leverage to maximise its overall influence. 
' Immediately after 
Rhee's sudden release of POWs, thereby jeopardising America's effort to come to an 
annistice agreement with the Communists, the Eisenhower administration speeded up 
its response to Rhee's demands to prevent further incidents. The U. S. 
failed to persuade 
1 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 
p. 11. 
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Rhee to accept an armistice agreement without reprisals. Since the U. S. had to pay 
attention to its global priorities and objectives that limited the conflict with Korea, it 
was often forced to soften its position, and submit to Rhee's tactics. The Eisenhower 
administration agreed to conclude a bilateral defence treaty with South Korea and to 
provide a large amount of military and economic aid following the Korean War. 
As Robert Keohane describes in his analysis of the dilemma of the United States 
and its small allies, the superpower cannot easily translate its enormous military, 
economic, and political strength into effective influence over small states. U. S. -ROK 
relations before the end of the Geneva Conference provide a clear illustration of this 
phenomenon. Even though Rhee had agreed to the armistice, the continued question of 
Korean unification, along with his unpredictability, enabled him to manoeuvre and 
embarrass the United States before and during the Conference. When the U. S. and the 
other three big powers-the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain-decided to hold a 
conference in Geneva for a peaceful settlement of the Korean and Indochinese problems, 
Rhee opposed attending the Conference until the Eisenhower administration promised 
further military assistance to his country and firm American support for the ROK's 
position at the Geneva Conference. To show his detennination, Rhee went as far as to 
declare the possibility of taking unilateral military action against North Korea if his 
demands were not taken seriously by the United States. Moreover, to Rhee's advantage, 
the U. S. devoted itself to negotiating with Rhee, principally to avoid being blamed not 
only by the Communist bloc, but also by its allies for the likely 
failure of the conference 
due to the ROK's absence. Rhee's bargaining position was further reinforced by the fact 
that distracted by the diverse interests of its allies at the conference, the United States 
had to re-evaluate South Korea's important role as a faithful client, for it had been a 
mouthpiece for America's hard-line anti-Communist policy 
following the Korean War. 
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For South Korea, the alliance with the United States enhanced its own ability to 
resist external aggression and internal collapse by the America's providing assistance to 
the Korean military and economy. Rhee and his government would justify their 
leadership by emphasising their success in securing economic and military support from 
the United States. Through the Mutual Security Treaty, American forces were stationed 
in Korea, thereby guaranteeing a U. S. security commitment to South Korea in the long- 
term. The United States had a major interest in South Korea. It was a valuable frontline 
base against communist expansion in the Far East. 
The fundamental aim of a U. S. -South Korea military relationship was to contain 
the North Korean military threat as part of the larger struggle between the U. S. and the 
Soviet Union. South Korea was regarded by the U. S. as a front-line base for defending 
Japan and the Pacific region. The loss of South Korea would have negative 
repercussions for the free world. This strategic view justified massive military 
assistance to South Korea. The two countries' military relationship has been regarded as 
one-directional, in that the relationship was dominated by U. S. political and national 
interests. The objectives of Rhee's Goverm-nent were to keep a significant number of 
U. S. troops stationed in its territory, and to strengthen the ROK forces. 
In this period, the two countries' military relationship was not coordinated. Given 
the asymmetry of CaPability between the two sides, while the U. S. notified unilateral 
decisions to South Korea, Rhee ardently opposed these and took a bargaining position 
with Eisenhower. In the case of the redeployment of U. S. forces 
from Korea, the 
Eisenhower administration regarded it as being necessary because of the burden on the 
U. S. budget. The U. S. government was much worried about the likelihood of the South 
Korean forces' withdrawal from U. S. operational control if it was carried out in the 
original plan. Considering Rhee's decision on the release of 
POWs prior to the Korean 
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armistice, Washington wp. S,, forced to be worried about a recurrence of a similar 
incident. For this reason, the United States decided to leave two infantry divisions in 
South Korea. On the specific problem of the ROK force reduction, Rhee took the 
position that he could not accept the plan unless ROK forces were to be equipped with 
the same quality of modem weapons as those used by U. S. forces in Korea. This 
demand, he knew, was out of the question as far as U. S. military policy was concerned. 
Such a tactic was a bargaining ploy. Rhee had to ask for the maximum possible from 
his partner, and, then, withdraw to a position which the U. S. would tolerate. To achieve 
this, Rhee managed to exploit the interaction of the American power system, in which 
American policy is largely the outcome of clashes and compromises among separate 
interest groups and bureaucratic units. Rhee manipulated Congressmen and the leaders 
of American public opinion, who were either vigorously anti-Communist or 
sympathetic to Rhee. The Eisenhower administration modified its position and the 
original plan could not be implemented. 
The U. S. -ROK governments did not harmonize the issue of normalised relations 
between South Korea and Japan. To South Korea, Japan was its enemy. Accordingly, 
the American policy of rebuilding Japan and encouraging it to restore its dominance in 
Asia as a counterbalance to China was criticised vehemently by Rhee. The U. S. looked 
upon its role as soothing this animosity and eventually bringing together and 
coordinating the policies of its two allies. Rhee rejected such an unpalatable plan. 
Rhee's strong anti-Japanese attitude became a major obstacle to developing a 
regional triangular security system in East Asia, and 
linking South Korea to the 
Japanese economy, both of which were the United States' ideal objectives after the 
Korean armistice. However, Rhee opposed any plan for a stronger Japanese position 
in 
U. S. eyes in Far Eastern affairs. Rhee's uncooperative attitude meant that U. S. -South 
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Korean relations deteriorated further towards the end of the 1950s. Crisis occurs at the 
client level as a small state pursues its own national priorities and security objectives 
which might not be compatible with the objectives of its patron state. Such a non-ideal 
client's stance by Rhee provoked the U. S. to consider his exclusion from the Korean 
political scene. When the Korean people attempted to resist Rhee's undemocratic 
activities, Washington therefore supported the people's will. 
Under the Rhee regime, the alliance with the United States was almost the only 
reliable guarantee for South Korea's survival. The viability of South Korea was 
enhanced by support from the U. S., but this support was obtained at a price. The more 
an aid package constitutes an important part of the small state's fiscal and 
administrative operations, the more limited the small state's external autonomy is, 
where the big power retains major interests and chooses to exercise its leverage. South 
Korea was bound to concede the participation of American officials in its policy- 
making process. 
While the United States and South Korea had a common interest in preventing 
communist expansion, the Mutual Security Treaty and the economic agreements 
between the two govenunents placed restraints upon the South Korean govemment. 
Militarily, the ROK forces were under the operational control of the UNC in which 
South Korea would have to endure the scepticism as to whether it was a truly 
independent state not only from the Communist bloc but also from the free world. 
Economically, the size and composition of the South Korean budget was regulated and 
based upon certain military goals mutually agreed between the two governments and on 
advice and screening by the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group given to Korea on an 
annual basis. 
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The policies of the United States and South Korea conflicted in several important 
respects. Firstly, Rhee wanted to roll back Communism and unify Korea. The United 
States favoured both goals but not at the risk of precipitating a direct clash with 
mainland China and the Soviet Union. Secondly, Rhee desired to strengthen the ROK 
forces to defeat North Korea. The U. S. was not willing to support the build-up of the 
ROK forces for likely military hostilities. Thirdly, Rhee wanted massive economic aid 
to make South Korea self-sufficient. The U. S. favoured the granting of economic aid 
only to keep South Korea stable. To sum up, South Korea preferred to have a stable 
relationship, based upon its interest, with the U. S., but the latter preferred to base its 
relationship on a calculation of its own national interest. 
The major problems during the second half of the 1950s were increasingly 
political: Rhee's continued insistence on unification by force, his refusal to normalise 
relations with Japan in spite of American desires, and conflicts over the question of 
Rhee's undemocratic activities in domestic affairs. In order to pursue its objectives 
against the big power's influence, a small state should be able to control its domestic 
politics. Domestic solidarity is, therefore, a prerequisite for a small state to achieve its 
policies independently. 2 Rhee had already consolidated domestic power while taking a 
bargaining position with the United States during the Korean War and post-annistice 
period in the first half of the 1950s. During this period, he was fully able to exert his 
bargaining skill, and to prevent U. S. intervention in Korean domestic political affairs. 
Rhee was left as a strong anti-Communist leader, in a manner which, for a while, 
enabled him to enjoy his political legitimacy based on domestic as well as international 
2 Ho Jae Lee, Han Kook Woegyo Junachakui Yisangkwa Hyonsil [Ideals and Reality of Korean 
Diplomatic PolicYj (Seoul: Pub Moon Sa, 1980), pp. 25-33. 
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assessments. However, in the late 1950s, with the emergence of peaceful coexistence 
between the U. S. and Soviet Union, this became questionable. Consequently, his 
forceful unification policy was considered by the Korean people unlikely to be 
successful. At the same time, his declining popularity and the mounting popular support 
for democratic principles paved the way for enhancing U. S. control over Rhee and his 
govermuent, whereby Rhee changed his attitude and conformed to the American 
demands. 
The nature of a patron-client state relationship is determined by the objectives 
sought and the extent to which these objectives are realised. Fundamentally, such 
relationships are inherently unstable because of the conflict between the patron's desire 
to control the client, which, on the contrary, tries to maintain its autonomy. As long as 
Rhee had not followed U. S. security policy vis-a-vis Japan following the Korean 
armistice, combined with his uncooperative position towards economic policy and 
democratic rule, the U. S. realised it needed to seek other alternatives to preserve its 
national and strategic interests in the Far East. Unlike the situation of the Korean 
armistice and the Geneva Conference in the 1953-54 period, the low risk environment 
at the end of the 1950s enabled Washington to have a sufficient room for exerting 
control over the Rhee regime. 
From 1948 to 1960, South Korea was dominated by its President, Syngman Rhee, 
whose prestige became increasingly damaged from the political and social realities of 
South Korea. When ideological objectives dominated the patron s priority, it would 
seek to present the client to the world as a show case 
for the patron's ideology and 
political system. Such an expectation slowly 
disappeared along with Rhee's growing 
undemocratic political activities. The United 
States continued to express its discontent 
over this issue both implicitly and explicitly 
in the whole period of Rhee's era. His 
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popularity and political leadership, in the last quarter of the 1950s, was ftirther 
compromised not only by the unfortunate consequences of his preconceived opinions 
and administrative shortcomings but also by the growing power of his political 
associates. However, Washington's active involvement in Korean internal politics did 
not begin until it recognised the serious consequences in terms of the U. S. interests in 
Korea. Following the rigged presidential elections in 1960, there were a series of 
nationwide riots. Along with the April Student Uprising, the United States had a good 
chance to replace the intractable Rhee regime with a government that followed U. S. 
guidelines both domestically and internationally. 
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